




# THE

# MISSING

# PEACE

**INDEPENDENT PROGRESS STUDY  
ON YOUTH, PEACE AND SECURITY**





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# Foreword

*from António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General*

In December 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security, marking a significant shift towards recognizing the role of young people as agents of peace. A few months later, in April 2016, the twin resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture echoed resolution 2250 by stressing young people's contribution to the inclusiveness and sustainability of efforts to build and sustain peace.

Since I assumed office, I have made prevention, including of violent conflict, a priority. The active engagement of young women and men can make a critical difference in averting violence and war. This should be recognized, supported and promoted as a critical precondition for the success of efforts to build enduring peace.

This Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security, requested by resolution 2250, is an important contribution to understanding the diversity and complexity of young people's engagement for peace. It offers new insights on the counterproductive effects of policies that cast youth as a challenge or problem, rather than an indispensable asset and partner in building peaceful societies. The study proposes ways to support the agency, leadership and ownership of young people and their networks and organizations, and facilitate their equal and full participation at all decision-making levels. It gives us a blueprint for implementing resolution 2250 and the recently adopted follow-on resolution 2419 (2018) on youth, peace and security.

I commend this study and its recommendations, which point the way towards a new and inclusive approach to engage youth in peace and security efforts. It is a valuable contribution to our collective commitment to build and sustain peace and achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

# Message

*from Natalia Kanem, Executive Director, UNFPA, and Oscar Fernández-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support*

Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2250 in 2015, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) were tasked by then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to jointly support the development of the independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security and steer a unique process that has led to what we believe is a landmark report. We are pleased that this study is now being presented in full to the wider public, following submission of an abridged version to the Security Council in April 2018.

Our respective organizations are privileged to have played a role assisting this important work, and we are gratified by the support provided by Secretary-General António Guterres for our endeavours in this regard.

For several years, UNFPA and the PBSO have worked with UN partners, non-governmental organizations, youth-led networks, foundations and others to ensure that the role of young people in advancing peace and security is fully recognized and supported. Security Council resolution 2250, born from young people's determination to obtain the Security Council's recognition of their contribution and engagement, and benefitting from the leadership of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, became a groundbreaking framework. Across the world, young peacebuilders have used it to open the doors of power, engage partners and mobilize commitment and support for their work for peace. The recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2419 (2018), co-sponsored by 76 Member States, illustrates the widespread political support this agenda has garnered over the past three years.

Joining strategic advantages and institutional expertise on youth and peacebuilding, UNFPA and PBSO have established a unique partnership, enacting new ways of working for the United Nations, across pillars and mandates. We extend our deepest appreciation to the independent Lead Author, Mr. Graeme Simpson, his Advisory Group of Experts, the Steering Committee that provided overall guidance and direction, and to all Member States and partners that supported this effort. We are confident that the study represents a fundamental stepping stone for the youth, peace and security agenda, defining its substantive scope and vision, from which concrete commitments, resources, programmatic efforts and policy development will follow.

We commit to continue driving the youth, peace and security agenda, as a central component of the United Nations' work for and with youth, and as a core dimension of our work to support national efforts to build and sustain peace.



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Nations Alliance of Civilizations; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); the United Nations Human Settlements Programme; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the United Nations Children's Fund; the United Nations Volunteers programme (UNV); the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women); the World Food Programme; the Anna Lindh Foundation; the Baha'i International Community; the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict and Complexity (AC4) at Columbia University; Cordaid; the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation; Finn Church Aid; the Global Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding; the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders; Interpeace; the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers; PeaceNexus; Search for Common Ground; the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY); World Vision International; Young Peacebuilders; the Commonwealth Secretariat; the Organization of American States; and the United States Institute of Peace.

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# Acronyms

<b>AC4</b>	Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict and Complexity (Columbia University)	<b>SGM</b>	sexual and gender minority
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank	<b>SSE</b>	social and solidarity economy
<b>CFR</b>	country-focused research	<b>TP</b>	thematic paper
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	<b>UNAMID</b>	United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur
<b>DR</b>	disengagement and reintegration	<b>UNDESA</b>	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
<b>FGD</b>	focus-group discussion	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>FHI</b>	Family Health International	<b>UNDPA</b>	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>ICT</b>	information and communication technology	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>IDEA</b>	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund	<b>UNHRC</b>	United Nations Human Rights Council
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration	<b>UN IAWG</b>	United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>IPU</b>	Inter-Parliamentary Union	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee	<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>KII</b>	key informant interview	<b>UNOY</b>	United Network of Young Peacebuilders
<b>LGBTI</b>	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex	<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization	<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute	<b>UNV</b>	United Nations Volunteers
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	<b>UN Women</b>	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>PBSO</b>	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office	<b>WPS</b>	women, peace and security
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal	<b>YPS</b>	youth, peace and security
<b>SfCG</b>	Search for Common Ground		



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# Executive summary

## Introduction

Resolution 2250, adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 2015, is the first resolution fully dedicated to the important and positive role young women and men play in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. Security Council resolution 2250 requested the Secretary-General “to carry out a progress study on the youth’s positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution, in order to recommend effective responses at local, national, regional and international levels”.

**The process of how this study was undertaken is just as important as the outcomes it produced.**

The study used an inclusive and participatory research approach by undertaking regional, subregional and national consultations with young people across the globe; conducting and receiving country case studies; commissioning focus-group discussions with “hard to reach” youth; and drawing on a survey-based mapping of the work done by youth-led peacebuilding organizations. Particular effort was made to reach out beyond easily accessible and elite youth, to young people who would not ordinarily have a say in these sorts of global policy processes. Given the challenge of young people’s increasing distrust in their governments and the multilateral system, it was essential to work with credible civil society organizations with strong trust-based relationships with youth on the ground.



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## Tackling stereotypes and policy myths

**Youth, unlike many other “unchanging” forms of identity (such as ethnicity or race), is a transitional phase of life.** The idea of youth as a transitional period is sometimes taken to imply that the formal markers of chronological age might be the most consistent signposts for defining young people. Although young people share many of the same peace and security challenges as society at large, there are unique dimensions to being young that expose young people to distinct challenges and opportunities. Over the course of our research, many young men and women asserted that their interests, identities and experiences as young people were inseparable from their stake in development, exercise of human rights, gender-differentiated needs, and experiences of conflict and violence.

**In an increasingly globalized world shaped by pervasive concerns about terrorism, organized transnational crime and extremist violence, perspectives on youth are distorted by contagious stereotypes that associate young people with violence.** The overarching consequence of these negative stereotypes is that they contribute to the marginalization and stigmatization of youth by framing young people as a problem to be solved and a threat to be contained. Moreover, these myths and assumptions have fuelled “policy panic”, particularly as it relates to the “youth bulge”, youth migration and violent extremism. This detrimentally skews youth, peace and security programmatic responses and priorities towards hard security approaches and away from prevention, ignoring the fact that most young people are in fact not involved in violence.

## Youth for peace

**In the absence of meaningful opportunities to participate socially, politically and economically, marginalized young people are strikingly creative in forging alternative places of belonging and meaning through which to express themselves.** Our research revealed how young people are actively engaged within their communities, from simple acts of community service and civic engagement, to advocating for the needs of their communities or participating in formal institutions. Young women and men also play active roles in organizing and mobilizing their peers at national, regional and global levels to address different forms of violence. In the descriptions of their peacebuilding work, some young people narrated survivalist or adaptive responses to intractable and ongoing conflict; others described transformative ambitions and processes of change. Through these descriptions, it is clear that the resilience of young people manifests not only in their agency, but also in their ownership and leadership in building peace. The initiatives undertaken by young people reflect the core approaches to sustaining peace – by taking into consideration the changing nature of violent conflict and the manifestations of exclusion of young people that remain unresolved.





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## Addressing the violence of exclusion: from marginalization to meaningful inclusion

This study documents the experiences of exclusion, described by young people from across the globe, as a form of structural and psychological violence that is deeply rooted in the reciprocal mistrust between young people, their governments and the multilateral system. This exclusion, and young people's responses to it, manifested across six core areas:

- **Political inclusion** – Meaningful political inclusion was a central demand from young people, and political exclusion was viewed as underpinning all other forms of exclusion. At the same time, young people clearly stated that “participation” and “inclusion” are not unconditional. Inclusion in corrupt, undemocratic or oppressive systems is not valid, legitimate or acceptable to most youth. As a result, many young people create alternative spaces for political engagement, challenging the very notion of inclusion.
- **Economic inclusion** – Young people clearly indicated their loss of confidence in economic systems that exclude them as key stakeholders, and that reflect growing levels of inequality. For many young people who participated in the study, economic inclusion manifested primarily as fair access to meaningful and reliable employment. However, young people's economic inclusion must be understood as a component of a larger and complex reality, moving the conversation beyond just jobs to one that accounts for their stake in the wider economy and broader development processes.
- **Education** – From young men and women living in remote parts of the globe to those involved in transnational networks, education was seen as indispensable to building peace and preventing violent conflict. It is also a means to address the systemic exclusion of youth. Whether as an object of grievance and frustration, a place of social cohesion and belonging, or an experience of fracture and exclusion, education featured universally as a core peace and security concern.

- **Gender** – Gender issues were viewed by young people as central to peace. However, most youth peace work relating to gender continues to be undertaken primarily by – and revolves around the unique experiences of – young women, and sexual and gender minorities. The view of gender as synonymous with young women and of youth as synonymous with young men has contributed to the victimization of young women, and sexual and gender minorities. It has also made less visible issues related to masculinities. Global policy and programming on youth, peace and security must engage with the gendered identities of both young men and young women, to support and promote positive, gender-equitable identities and roles, paying particular attention to cultivating non-violent masculinities.
- **Injustice and human rights** – Addressing the structural and collective dimensions of young people’s victimization, vulnerabilities and grievances sits at the epicentre of our approach to tackling the violence of exclusion. This includes addressing young people’s needs for protection, their engagement with the state through criminal justice and security institutions, and their potential for unique roles in transitional justice. A safe and enabling environment for youth peace work must be guaranteed to address young people’s protection and experiences of injustice.
- **Disengagement and reintegration** – Young people play a critical role in supporting the disengagement of their peers from violent groups, and their reintegration. Through their presence on the ground and their better understanding of the needs and local realities of disengaging youth, they may serve as a bridge between disengaging youth and the community.

## From a demographic dividend to a peace dividend

If the right investments in youth are made, and their peacebuilding work is recognized and nurtured, societies may reap a peace dividend. Building and sustaining peace through the transformative potential of young people demands a seismic shift and bold reorientation from governments and the multilateral system, for which Security Council resolution 2250 planted the seeds. Three mutually reinforcing strategies are needed to support a shift from remedial responses to a preventive approach, and from investing in risk to investing in resilience:

- **Investing in young people’s capacities**, agency and leadership through substantial funding support, network-building and capacity-strengthening.
- **Transforming the systems** that reinforce exclusion to address the structural barriers limiting youth participation in peace and security.
- **Prioritizing partnerships and collaborative action**, where young people are viewed as equal and essential partners for peace.







# Introduction

There are extraordinary young people creatively seeking ways to prevent violence and consolidate peace across the globe, in devastated and conflict-affected societies as well as in those enjoying relative peace. The Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security, prepared in response to Security Council resolution 2250 (2015), offered a unique opportunity to listen to them and learn about the multiple ways they work for peace and security. Their work promises the potential of a tremendous peace and security dividend for their societies, governments and international actors.

However, many young people are frustrated by the tendency of their governments and international actors to treat youth as a problem to be solved, instead of as partners for peace. Young people throughout the world expressed their loss of faith and trust in their governments, the international community and systems of governance that they feel excluded from, contributing to a strong and ongoing sense of injustice. This must be addressed to benefit from, and support, young people's contributions to peace, and realize the potential of 1.8 billion young people globally.

The Progress Study calls upon governments and international actors to undergo a seismic shift and recognize young people as "the missing peace".

## **Background and mandate of the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security**

The Progress Study was mandated by Security Council resolution 2250, unanimously adopted in December 2015 by the Security Council, under the leadership of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. There are well-established agendas on women, peace and security (under resolution 1325 [2000] and subsequent resolutions), and children and armed conflict (from the incipient resolution 1612 [2005]). However, before 2015, there was no comprehensive framework to address the specific needs and opportunities of a key demographic group: young people. The request for what would become resolution 2250 was largely driven by civil society organizations, which identified the need for a global framework that could engage Member States and United Nations entities to support young people's peacebuilding efforts.

Resolution 2250 is the first Security Council resolution to recognize the important role that young women and men play in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. It urges Member States to consider setting up mechanisms that will enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution. The resolution stresses the

## United Nations Security Council resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security



### Participation

Take youth's participation and views into account in decision-making processes, from negotiation and prevention of violence to peace agreements.



### Protection

Ensure the protection of young civilians' lives and human rights, and investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes perpetrated against them.



### Prevention

Support young people in preventing violence and in promoting a culture of tolerance and intercultural dialogue.



### Partnership

Engage young people during and after conflict when developing peacebuilding strategies, along with community actors and United Nations bodies.



### Disengagement and reintegration

Invest in youth affected by armed conflict through employment opportunities, inclusive labour policies and education promoting a culture of peace.



**4,230**  
young people



**2,159** young men



**2,070** young women



**1** non-identified

importance of addressing the conditions and factors underlying the rise of violent extremism among youth, and notes the role they can and do play in preventing and countering extremism. Resolution 2250 has five main pillars for action to guide the work of Member States and United Nations entities in this area: participation, protection, prevention, partnership, and disengagement and reintegration.

Resolution 2250 requested the Secretary-General “to carry out a progress study on the youth’s positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution, in order to recommend effective responses at local, national, regional and international levels”. The resolution further requested that the Secretary-General make the results of this study available to the Security Council and all Member States of the United Nations.

In August 2016, the Secretary-General appointed a Lead Author and an Advisory Group – almost half of them young people – to develop an independent study. A Steering Committee comprising 35 partners from the United Nations system, civil society, intergovernmental organizations and foundations provided guidance and direction. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office acted as the secretariat to support the development of the study.

A summary version of this study was presented to the Security Council in April 2018.<sup>1</sup>

## Methodology

### Participatory approach

It was vital to ensure that the Progress Study did not reproduce the problem it sought to address: the exclusion of youth. The study therefore used an inclusive and participatory research approach. At least 4,230 young people were directly consulted during the study.

Particular effort was made to reach out beyond easily accessible and elite youth, to young people who would not ordinarily have a say in these sorts of global policy processes, such as refugee youth, former gang members, youth living in hard-to-reach locations, second-generation migrant youth and Indigenous youth. To achieve this, we worked with credible civil society organizations that had strong trust-based relationships with youth on the ground. The study also sought to learn from young people engaged in peace work in different countries, and across different types and phases of conflict and violence, including both conflict-affected and relatively peaceful societies.

<sup>1</sup> Available at [www.youth4peace.info/ProgressStudy](http://www.youth4peace.info/ProgressStudy).



**263**

Focus group discussions

**18**

Focus group discussions in refugee settings

**6**

National consultations

**7**

Regional consultations

**25**

Country-focused research

These engagements showed that peace was not the exclusive preserve of post-conflict contexts or of developing countries, demonstrating the universality of young people's concerns and priorities about peace and security. The study benefited from the input of thousands of young men and women from across the globe, who shared a rich array of data, powerful stories and examples.

The study used the input and collaboration of scholars, experienced practitioner experts and policy think tanks to broaden the knowledge base and enrich the development of an effective strategy.

Almost all country-focused research, focus-group reports, consultation summaries and thematic papers are available online at [www.youth4peace.info](http://www.youth4peace.info). (Because of political sensitivities in certain settings, and to protect the young people and organizations, not all commissioned and submitted research is publicly available.)

## Research questions

The study sought to address the following overarching research questions:

- What are the main peace and security challenges that young women and men face, and how do these affect their lives (locally, nationally, regionally and globally)?
- What factors could promote and support young people's active involvement in building peace, preventing violence, and contributing to positive social cohesion in their communities, societies and institutions? And what factors prevent or inhibit the involvement of young people in building peace and contributing to security?
- What peacebuilding and violence prevention activities, initiatives and projects are being undertaken by young people, and what is their impact?
- What do young people recommend to enhance the contribution and leadership of young men and women to building

sustainable peace and preventing violence? Do they have particular views on how their governments, state institutions, civil society organizations, media or international actors could help to support these contributions?

## Process

The research was based on a qualitative methodology, and focused on identifying and analysing sources of positive change and resilience in people and organizations (Interpeace, 2015), rather than prioritizing risk and fault line analyses (Meeting Report #2, Advisory Group of Experts).

The research process included:

- seven regional and six national consultations with young women and men selected through an open call process, and one global validation consultation with young people selected from the regional consultations. A total of 331 young people (180 women, 150 men and 1 non-identified youth), from 148 countries, participated in the regional consultations; 654 young people participated in the national consultations
- 281 focus-group discussions with 3,123 young people (1,464 women and 1,659 men) in 44 countries and territories
- five online consultations carried out on the platform [www.youth4peace.info](http://www.youth4peace.info)
- 25 country-focused studies, commissioned through organizations or individual experts, documenting young people's involvement in peace and security issues in specific country contexts, through desk research, review of available country-level data, and key informant interviews
- 20 thematic papers and expert contributions providing background research, evidence, analytical thinking and recommendations on specific themes and topics related to the youth, peace and security agenda. Two of

these thematic papers reviewed and analysed quantitative YPS data

- a global survey of youth-led peacebuilding organizations, undertaken by the United Network of Young Peacebuilders and Search for Common Ground. The survey aimed to provide a snapshot of the scope, scale and impact of the peacebuilding work being done by youth-led organizations, and serve as a platform for their members to express their needs and concerns, and offer recommendations for the YPS agenda
- mapping exercises of work by Member States and United Nations entities that gathered information on key issues and recommendations for local and national governments, and the international community
- key informant interviews undertaken with young people in many of the countries where research was commissioned, and in Burundi, India and Syria. These included interviews with several young women and men who participated in formal peace processes, to understand and analyse the challenges and obstacles they experienced.

Annex 1 lists all the research commissioned for the study and submitted by partners, and annex 2 provides a breakdown of the young people engaged in the research, disaggregated by age, sex and location.<sup>2</sup>

## Limitations

There were several limitations to this research:

- The qualitative approach to focus-group research was not intended to be representative of the youth in any specific country. Findings

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<sup>2</sup> The research undertaken for the study is referenced throughout the text as CFR for country-focused research, FGD for focus-group discussions, KII for key informant interviews and TP for thematic papers.

are therefore indicative, and cannot be generalized beyond the populations who participated.

- Although some focus-group discussions were held with young women only to ensure a safe environment for sharing experiences, in most cases young women and men participated in mixed groups. This limited the study's ability to capture information on certain forms of violence, particularly sexual and gender-based violence.
- Significant quantitative data gaps exist. In particular, age- and sex-disaggregated quantitative data are not collected or available in many contexts, and youth-based perception surveys are limited. This problem is compounded by the diverse age definitions of "youth" and "young people" used in different contexts. These data gaps present methodological challenges for this report and for future assessment of the implementation of resolution 2250.

## An implementation strategy for resolution 2250

The Progress Study supports policy development and defines a strategy for the practical implementation of resolution 2250. Indeed, the participatory approach of the study is a model of a partnership strategy for multi-stakeholder collaboration for this sort of work within the United Nations system, particularly through organizational relationships with youth and civil society organizations.

In supporting the implementation of resolution 2250, the study seeks to contribute to the implementation and advancement of the "sustaining peace"<sup>3</sup> resolutions and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – in particular Goal 16 – by generating a global platform for young people, and fostering their contributions to violence prevention and sustainable peace, based on respect for human rights.

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3 As recently defined by United Nations Member States at the conclusion of the 2015 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 [2016]).

The study is divided into four parts:

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**CHAPTER**

**1**

Reflects on stereotypical conceptions of youth, and debunks policy myths that have misguided policy and programmatic approaches related to youth, violence and conflict.

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**CHAPTER**

**2**

Captures young people's perspectives on peace and security, and documents the breadth and diversity of their contributions to sustaining peace and preventing violence.

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**CHAPTER**

**3**

Explores the social contract between young people and their governments and communities, reflecting on the experiences and dangers of excluding youth, and the alternatives for meaningful social, political and economic inclusion.

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**CHAPTER**

**4**

Provides recommendations and a framework for partnering with, and investing in, young people to promote their inclusion and prevent violence – the core strategy for implementing the YPS agenda.



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“

**We've been categorized, we've been  
made into an outsider group.**

”

young person, Côte d'Ivoire  
(*Côte d'Ivoire CFR, p. 30*)



## Chapter 1

# Tackling stereotypes and policy myths

### 1.1 Defining youth

Young people as a social group are often defined more by “who they are not” than by who they are (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997). This “non-definition” reflects the sense of exclusion that is a widespread experience of young men and women across the globe. Despite the other sources of identity that segment the youth population, a common youth identity that transcends some of these other differences may be rooted in the common experience of exclusion itself.

Although the pathways from childhood to youth or from youth to adulthood are neither uniform nor predetermined, the formal markers of chronological age are often treated as signposts that signal points of transition from childhood or to adulthood. However, there is no consensus

on an age-based definition of youth,<sup>4</sup> and a wide variety of definitions are used in different organizations and regions. For example:

- Resolution 2250 defines youth as 18–29 years, but it notes the variations that exist on the national and international levels.
- The United Nations defines “youth” as between the ages of 15 and 24, “for statistical purposes” and “without prejudice to other definitions by Member States” (UNGA, 1981). However, diverse United Nations entities use different age definitions.

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<sup>4</sup> Given the complexities of defining youth, including terminological debates in the literature, this study uses the terms “youth” and “young people” interchangeably.



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- A wide variety of age definitions are used at regional and national levels – for example, the African Youth Charter defines youth as 18–35 years (African Union Commission, 2006).

The definitions of youth have also changed over time. These differences make gathering standardized or accurate quantitative data on youth very difficult.

### **A time of passage**

Along with other definitional challenges, it is important to recognize that youth, unlike many other “unchanging” forms of identity (such as ethnicity or race), is a transitional phase of life – one that evolves and changes with the passage of time.

### ***From youth to adulthood***

A number of researchers note that “youthhood” is lived as a transitional experience in the present, and is not defined by a preselected cut-off age at some future point (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2005; Furlong et al., 2011). As Olonisakin and Ismail (forthcoming, p. 7) put it, “Youth is a social artefact, as opposed to a simple biological, demographic or chronological category”.

Across the globe, young people and analysts describe how graduation from youth to adulthood is associated with diverse cultural, psychosocial, developmental, political and economic milestones or rites of passage that signal the acquisition of relative autonomy and recognition of adult status, based on evolving

capacities and social standing. Such milestones may include acquiring a specific educational status, going through certain religious rituals, getting married, having children, achieving economic independence, acquiring land or a home, or the death of a parent (Singerman, 2007; Navtej and Yousef, 2009).

Although these milestones are experienced by individuals, youthhood is experienced collectively rather than just as an individual phenomenon, and is rooted in the historical, sociocultural and political fabric of specific communities, groups and countries. For example, in the context of the Arab Spring, Laiq reports that:

*Activists tend not to base their youth identity on specific age brackets. Rather, they perceive themselves as a generation that has been through a rite of passage marked by a shared historical moment. They have a shared consciousness and a common narrative of change through which they self-identify as being part of a youth social movement.*  
(Laiq, 2013, pp. 4–5)

### **Disruptive effects**

However, normative assumptions about the pathways from youth to adulthood are disrupted by various factors. Violent conflict and humanitarian crises, political and criminal violence, natural disasters and health crises, migration and urbanization, and entrenched gender inequality all affect and potentially dislocate young people's transition to adulthood by distorting their life cycle progress, and rupturing the conventional places of community-based belonging, status and social cohesion. Although violence and social dislocation often force young people to take on some adult roles prematurely – for example, by taking on a breadwinning role (UNDP, 2016a, p. 142) – they can also shut down educational and employment opportunities, and close off pathways to marriage and family formation needed to attain adult status and recognition.

The representation of a linear life cycle model involving stages of dependence, education and training, labour market participation, independence, rest and retirement, does not reflect these complex dynamics. As noted by Honwana:

“ Young people’s transitions to adulthood have become increasingly uncertain ... [A] growing number of young women and men ... are unable to attain the social markers of adulthood, such as a secure job, marriage and a family. Trapped between childhood and adulthood, they are living in a twilight zone, a liminal space that has now become known as “waithood”. ”  
(Honwana, 2015)

### **Gender differences**

Young women and men both struggle to transition into adulthood, but in different ways. The shifting roles and societal responsibilities that signal the transition from youth to adulthood can be markedly different for young men and young women, and for young people from sexual and gender minorities<sup>5</sup> (SGMs). For example, when young women in Nairobi's informal settlements bear children, their status as mothers generally trumps their age as the key characteristic defining their social status (Horn of Africa CFR, p. 14). Although some young women may acquire the status of adulthood more quickly as a result

5 The term “sexual and gender minorities” is borrowed from the work of International Alert (Myrttinen and Daigle, 2017), who describe SGMs as “people whose sexual orientation, gender identity or sexual practices fall outside traditional norms”.

of childbearing or marriage, many experience the same struggles to transition as young men. Factors inhibiting young men's ability to marry, including financial constraints, may add to their problems in attaining adult status. For both young men and women, difficulty in acquiring land, jobs, education and a home mean that many find themselves trapped in youthhood, affecting their status in society and potentially contributing to a sense of frustration.

These experiences are not exclusive to conflict-affected societies. Researchers have described similar phenomena for developed countries (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015). Diverse expressions have been used to describe this, such as "boomerang generation", "twixters", "kidults", "adulthoodscents" and "thresholders" in the United Kingdom and the United States; "freeter (fruita)" or "parasaito shinguru" (parasite singles) in Japan; and "bamboccioni (big dummy boys)" in Italy (Honwana, 2012, p. 6).

For young women and men who participated in this study, the frustrations of perpetual youthhood were compounded by the widespread tendency of elders and policymakers to refer to youth as "the future", rather than as having a key role and stake in the present. As one young woman said: "There's this notion that we are the future ... we are the leaders now, we should be doing things now. We are the present" (East and Southern Africa consultation, p. 4).

## Heterogeneity and diversity

If defined exclusively by their age, young people are often seen as a homogenous and a-historical category that is unchanging over time. But despite some common needs, priorities and identities, youth is not a uniform social category. As a microcosm of wider society, young people are diverse, sometimes divided, and anything but homogenous. Beyond just differences in age, youth are characterized by diversity based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, caste, class, culture, context and political affiliations, to mention just a few. For example, field research in

Burundi (FGD), Palestine (FGD), South Africa (CFR) and Yemen (FGD – a) drew attention to political divisions among youth. Other research highlighted sectarian and caste-based tensions (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report), urban–rural divides, and significant divisions based on class-based privilege, access to education and jobs, and proximity to systems of political patronage (Côte d'Ivoire CFR). These divisions are by no means unique to youth. It is nonetheless important that such differences are not underestimated in wishful assumptions about youth "unity".

## 1.2 The youth, peace and security policy context

In 2014, it was estimated that 1.8 billion of the world's population was between 10 and 24 years old, and, in 48 of the world's least developed countries, children and adolescents make up most of the population (UNFPA, 2014). Some of the poorest countries with the least resources – for example, in the Sahel – have the highest proportion of youth relative to the total population (UNFPA, 2014).

### Youth, conflict and violence

Globally, youth are significantly affected by violence. The Institute for Economics and Peace calculated that, in 2016, an estimated 408 million youth (aged 15–29) resided in settings affected by armed conflict or organized violence (Institute for Economics and Peace TP). This means that approximately 23 per cent of the global youth population – about one in four young people – are affected by violence or armed conflict in some way. Estimates of direct conflict deaths in 2015 show that more than 90 per cent of all casualties occur among young adult males (UNFPA, 2015). In 2015, it was reported that each year there were some 200,000 homicides worldwide among youth aged 10–29 years, which was 43 per cent of the total number of homicides globally (WHO, 2015). In Brazil, people aged 15–29 make up a quarter of the population, but from 2005 to 2015 accounted for almost half of the total homicides (Brazil CFR, p. 3).

Conflict, crime and other forms of violence affect young people's lives in more ways than mortality. Although these effects are often unrecorded, young people suffer from a wide range of short-, medium- and long-term effects, ranging from repeat victimization, psychological trauma, identity-based discrimination, and social and economic exclusion. Currently, poor data make it challenging to accurately estimate how many young people are living in situations where they are exposed to these diverse forms of violence. However, the estimates that one in four youth are living in situations where they are exposed to violence are likely understated, as a result of poor data, underreporting, and patterns of violence that fall short of deaths related to crime, conflict or terrorism.

The vast majority of young people are not involved in, or in danger of participating in, violence. But it is important to note that, as well as being victims, young people are the primary perpetrators of armed violence and conflict in some areas. For example, in 2015, almost 60 per cent of suspected perpetrators of homicide in the Americas were males under the age of 30 (UNGA, 2015, p. 15).

### Policy context

Young people involved in the Progress Study stressed the importance of not narrowing the definition of "youth issues" when discussing peace and security. For example, some national youth policies were, in the eyes of young people, shaped around what were narrowly assumed to be youth issues, including "unemployment, HIV-AIDS, crime and 'deviant behaviour'" (Horn of Africa CFR, p. 16). Consultations by the Life and Peace Institute with youth in the Horn of Africa over the past decade have highlighted that:

*Youth should be included in initiatives aiming to address broad societal issues, and not only on "youth issues" based on stereotypes and assumptions about what youth are interested in and can speak on. Youth, in their plurality, should also have the space to define their*

*issues and act upon them – not just sit at the table, but also shape the agenda. This would avoid reinforcing the perception that youth's participation be limited to a narrow agenda, predetermined by non-youth stakeholders. (Horn of Africa CFR, p. 4)*

Young men and women also pointed out that the pigeonholing of youth issues is often associated with misleading or trivialized assumptions about sports, arts, leisure or technology as the primary, and possibly only, vehicles of young people's participation and expression.



**1 in 4**  
**YOUNG PEOPLE**  
are affected by  
**VIOLENCE**  
or armed  
**CONFLICT**

At the same time, it is important to recognize that, although youth share many of the peace and security challenges of society at large, there are unique dimensions to being young that expose youth to distinct challenges and opportunities. Many young men and women asserted that their interests, identities and aspirations as *young people* were inseparable from their stakes in development, the exercise (or the denial) of human rights, their gender-differentiated needs and expectations, and their experiences of conflict and violence.

The intersectional relationship between peace and security, development and human rights affirmed by young people offers a powerful transversal vehicle for integrated policy approaches across these pillars of the multilateral system. The focus on YPS straddles these operational pillars, and also brings a particular value – arguably through the unique contribution to prevention – to each of them.

### ***Youth, peace and security as a cross-cutting priority at the heart of the 2030 Agenda***

The 2030 Agenda offers a powerful tool for holistic and integrated programming approaches in YPS. This is mainly captured in Goal 16, which – at its core – promotes inclusive and accountable governance and access to justice, as well as in Goal 10 on inequality.

However, a major thrust of young people's input into the Progress Study was the assertion that YPS issues apply across the full spectrum of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, participants in the Asia and Pacific consultation stressed that, when discussing peace and security, they meant eradicating social and economic inequalities, providing public services for all social groups, maintaining national health-care and social services, and achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women.

There is no stand-alone SDG on youth, but, for young women and men, peace and security

demand an engagement with *all* the SDGs. Along with Goal 16, participants drew attention to the need for greater attention to YPS in relation to Goal 1 on poverty, Goal 3 on health, Goal 4 on education, Goal 5 on gender equality, Goal 8 on employment, Goal 10 on inequality, Goal 11 on sustainable cities, Goal 13 on climate change and Goal 17 on the development of partnerships. This reflects the symbiotic relationship between peace and security on the one hand, and development on the other, actively affirmed by young people through our research.

This relationship offers a powerful conduit for integrated programmatic approaches, and a strong incentive not to reinvent the wheel from a policy and practice perspective. Instead, it encourages profiling and attending to the experiences, needs, attributes and capacities of marginalized youth in a more integrated way, within existing policy frameworks. The focus on YPS in development also brings a particular value through the unique contributions that youth can make to preventing conflict.

### ***A human rights approach***

Young people over 18 years of age are not shielded by the umbrella of the rights regime that lends special status and protections to children under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). However, the marginalization they experience means that there is often a gap between the formal civil, political and economic rights they should enjoy as adults and the substantive entitlements that, in practice, they often do not have access to. This does not imply that there is a missing rights framework or a normative gap for youth, but rather that the realization of young people's rights should be prioritized. Resolving this "rights realization gap" demands establishing the status of young people as rights-holders in practice.

The human rights violations described by young men and women were not just about individual victimization or physical violence. They also spoke about the broad impacts of terrorism

and organized violence; gender-based violence, including the victimization of young women and the targeting of LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) communities; and systemic violence at the hands of state security forces. A prevailing concern expressed by young people throughout the consultations undertaken for the Progress Study was the disproportionate victimization and traumatization of youth at the hands of armed groups, terrorists or violent extremist groups, gangs and organized crime networks, repressive governments and, in numerous countries, law enforcement personnel and criminal justice systems. In countries as diverse as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Northern Triangle CFR); South Africa (CFR); Tunisia (FGD); and the United States of America (CFR), young people described their vulnerability to widespread arbitrary arrest and incarceration.

Particular attention was paid to the structural vulnerabilities that young forced migrants, internally displaced persons and refugees are exposed to. First, they are victimized in their home communities or countries. They are then forced to take greater risks of death or injury during their flight. Once in their new “homes”, they are often subject to discrimination, xenophobia or anti-immigrant populist violence.

In addition, young men and women clearly articulated how repressive conditions affected their collective freedom of movement, assembly and expression, and closed down their initiatives on peacebuilding, social cohesion, violence prevention, or dialogue and reconciliation. In very diverse country settings across the globe, young people described how peaceful political organization and legitimate organized political protest were frequently targeted and shut down in the name of counter-terrorism or the pretext of preventing violent extremism. Finally, young women and men were also vocal about broader deprivations of socioeconomic and cultural rights, and the importance of addressing their resulting structural exclusion.

By defining “protection” as one of its central platforms, resolution 2250 recognized youth vulnerability, and placed human rights and humanitarian protection issues at the heart of the YPS agenda. However, grievances and frustrations associated with the experience of injustice are central issues to young people. This means that justice, human rights and the rule of law are not just about protection, but are also strategic vehicles of prevention, essential to sustaining peace. This human-rights-based approach is essential to the YPS agenda.

### ***Intersections with women, peace and security***

Resolution 2250 has been, in many ways, modelled on the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda established by resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions.<sup>6</sup> The two resolutions share core commitments to prevention, participation and protection. Resolution 2250 further extends the WPS imperative of inclusivity in matters of peace and security, demonstrating the crucial contributions of civil society actors, and opening avenues of participation for traditionally excluded actors – such as women and young people. The two agendas are therefore inextricably linked. The YPS agenda offers a new avenue to focus on the pivotal role of young women, in particular, in preventing violent conflict and sustaining peace.

Important lessons can be learned for resolution 2250 from the experiences of implementing resolution 1325. Perspectives on the role and achievements of the global women’s movement can aid youth organizations and youth leaders seeking to contribute to peace and security. The challenges of securing and maintaining governments’ commitments to the goals and implementation of resolution 1325 also provide important lessons about what to do – and

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<sup>6</sup> Including resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2010), 1960 (2011), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015).



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potentially what not to do – to secure the shift from policy to delivery on resolution 2250.

However, although there are important policy intersections between the YPS and WPS agendas, and sometimes strategic value in partnerships between youth and women's organizations, young people were vocal in their opposition to the tendency to simply lump "women and youth" together. They compared it with the problematic pairing of "women and children" in other policy contexts, noting how this could be seen as both infantilizing women and diluting the core attention required for children. Expanding on the relationship between gender and youth is essential, rather than blurring women and youth as demographic categories. The value in this relationship resides in ensuring that the YPS agenda is engendered, and that the WPS agenda is more attuned to age and generational differences. On both sides, this requires giving special attention to the distinct experiences of young women in relation to their exposure to violence, political participation and inclusion, transitional justice, economic stake, security sector reform, education, disengagement

and reintegration from violent groups, and so on. It also requires considering the role of masculinity – and particularly the formation of masculine identity among young men – in shaping violence across societal contexts.

### **Youth, peace and security as a core contributor to building and sustaining peace**

The adoption of the sustaining peace resolutions A/RES/70/262 (2016) and S/RES/2282 (2016) sought to expand the international community's approach to peacebuilding. These resolutions move beyond an exclusive focus on post-conflict peacebuilding, and into the realm of preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of violent conflict by addressing the root causes and potential drivers:

*Both sustaining peace and peacebuilding are ultimately intended to reduce the risk of lapse or relapse into violent conflict. It can be seen as an aspirational goal, aiming at fostering the ability and capacity to look beyond crisis management and the immediate resolution of conflicts. The resolutions offer an opportunity to increase the focus on the UN system to preventing conflicts, so that not only the symptoms, but also the root causes are addressed.*

*(PBSO, 2017, p. 1)*

Much of the literature on youth participation in peacebuilding to date has tended to focus on young people's agency in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding settings (Schwartz, 2010; Del Felice and Ruud, 2016). Consequently, the wider preventive role of youth in building and sustaining peace has often been undervalued or even invisible.

The prevention of violent conflict is perhaps the central pillar of resolution 2250. From this perspective, investing in YPS has at its core the goal of building and sustaining peace. As chapter 2 will show, the initiatives undertaken by young people cumulatively reflect the core approaches to sustaining peace in practice.



### 1.3 Debunking assumptions

“Youth” is associated with a number of harmful labels and stereotypes, which can drive problematic programming responses and limit young people’s agency.

#### Harmful stereotypes

In 2006, a book on the role of youth in post-accord peacemaking posed a rhetorical question about young people in its title:

*Troublemakers or Peacemakers?*

(McEvoy-Levy, 2006).

More than a decade after this research, in an increasingly globalized world shaped by pervasive concerns about terrorism, organized transnational crime and extremist violence, perspectives on youth are still distorted by stereotypes that associate young people with violence, as both perpetrators and victims. The consequence of these stereotypes has been a failure to adequately appreciate and harness the agency, creative practice and resilience of young people, most of whom are *not* involved in violence and are just eager to get on with their lives, and some of whom are actively invested in crafting more peaceful societies for themselves and their communities.

These negative stereotypes are associated with gender. They evoke the subliminal image of a threatening young man with a gun, reinforcing ideas of violent masculinity (Haenfler, 2015). In the realm of violent conflict, the word “youth” has almost become synonymous with threatening young men, dangerous not only to national security but also to young women in their communities and societies. Young women, on the other hand, are characterized as passive victims at best, or invisible at worst.

However, there is also a danger of oversimplifying, generalizing or romanticizing young people, and their investment in sustaining peace and preventing violent conflict. As McEvoy-Levy (2011, p. 169) notes, an assumption about youth as agents of change or peace “underestimates



Even if you make the effort to change, society gives you an eternal tattoo, a label of an offender, a failure or a source of problems.



male, Tunisia

(Tunisia FGD, p. 19)

the structural challenges and asymmetries of power between youth and class/political elites that make peace action very difficult”. It is important to challenge assumptions that youth are a homogenous category, or somehow immune from issues of distrust or division across groups (Vinck et al., 2017). Just as most youth are not actively involved in violence, young people are also not all inherently committed to working for peace and justice.

#### Sources of stereotypes

In many instances, negative perspectives have been internalized by young people themselves. During our research, young people frequently reflected these views, either as self-images or through the stereotypical ways that they described other young people in their societies and communities. As a young person from Guatemala described it, “Young people only wreck things” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees TP, p. 12). Or as a former Georgian offender in the city of Gori asserted, “Most young people are not able to create anything worthwhile” (Georgian-Abkhaz context FGD, p. 21). Even young people who would not typically see themselves in these ways or who might see themselves as peacebuilders – often urbanized, educated, employed and organized – occasionally reflected these prevailing stereotypical views of “other” youth.

Although young people may sometimes reinforce these stereotypes, they are much



**We, the youths, are dreamers, entrepreneurs. We are victims, of course, too, and we cannot change that, but we are also everything else.**



young person, Colombia

(Colombia CFR – b, p. 21)

more systematically framed from above. It is mainly States and political leaders who seek to manipulate youth for political purposes, either by mobilizing them as foot soldiers for warfare or by cultivating a pervasive fear of militarized, rebellious, dissenting or marauding youth. In many cases, young people’s relationship to violence is normalized or exploited through their role as the “infantry of adult statecraft” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2005, p. 24).

These stereotypes are also widely sustained and reinforced by the media. From African-American youth in Chicago and New York (United States CFR), to second-generation immigrant youth in Järva (Sweden FGD), to young gang members in Central America (Northern Triangle CFR), to young peacebuilders in Burundi (FGD), young people complained of excessive media focus on youth violence, at the expense of any attention to less newsworthy ordinary young people or those involved in building peace: “Mainstream newspapers mostly publish news on youth in relation to violent incidents” (Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation, p. 4). A young man from Tunisia explained, “In all speeches, whether political, media, or even in society, when they speak the word young, the term ‘problem’ is always associated: the problem of unemployment, the problem of poverty, the problem of delinquency” (Tunisia FGD, p. 17).

For some, the misrepresentation of youth by the media was seen as contributing to the perpetuation or exacerbation of conflicts (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report), or the media were seen as co-conspirators in violent or repressive governmental action (Laiq, 2013).

Youth described themselves as nearly invisible and inevitably voiceless in the popular media. They complained about seeing youth in the press, but never hearing young people’s voices or perspectives directly. Young people described how media representations reinforced views of youth as short-sighted and impatient, with low horizons for the future, but failed to report on their sophisticated understanding, political maturity, peaceful organizing for real change, or astute contributions to resolving disputes and addressing grievances. A young South African student described how media coverage of the South African student protests about unaffordable university fees inevitably gravitated to the violence on university campuses. In doing so, the media failed to give the same coverage to an organized student collective’s submission of sophisticated policy proposals that offered viable alternative financing models and mechanisms for South Africa’s tertiary education system (Barry KII).

Negative youth stereotypes have at various times also been reinforced by scholarship within diverse academic disciplines – including developmental psychology, anthropology, sociology and some areas of criminology. These fields have often pathologized the problems associated with youth, based on the characterization of most young people as “dysfunctional” or “delinquent”.

### **Tarred with the same brush**

The overarching consequence of these negative stereotypes is that they contribute to the marginalization and stigmatization of youth by framing young people as a problem to be solved, or an actual threat, rather than recognizing the assets and resources they offer, or the hopes and aspirations they articulate. These perspectives ignore the reality that most young people are in fact *not* involved in violence. Instead, the stereotypes threaten to associate the entire youth population with the small, and disproportionately influential, sliver of the youth population who are drawn into violent underworlds.

This has an effect on both the young people themselves and their potential contributions to the prevention of conflict. A young person from South Sudan lamented:

*Our society has made us to believe that we lack knowledge, are ignorant of political processes, and cannot engage in constructive peacemaking without the involvement of older people or politicians. We are always struggling to find an avenue where we can prove our worth, experiment with new ideas or participate in the wider political process. Lack of space to contribute to peacebuilding makes us more likely to approve of and engage in violence. Violence is the only avenue, more or less, left for young people.*  
(South Sudan FGD, p. 10)

Policy and programmatic approaches based on negative stereotypes – whether demonizing young people as likely spoilers or romanticizing them as champions of peace – are based on working *for* or *on* youth rather than *with* them; on directing and speaking to young people, rather than listening to and consulting them, and including them in decision-making; and on treating them as having potential for the future, rather than having a role in shaping their present. Approaches that patronize young people in this way not only reinforce such stereotypes by depriving young people of their agency and potential capacity to drive change, but may dangerously distort policy and operational priorities, and misdirect investment and resource allocation.

### The “youth bulge”

During the past 50 years, research on the connection between a “youth bulge” – a high proportion of young people relative to the total population – and the risk of wars, increased violence and political instability has resulted in problematic policy approaches based on the assumptions of a simple correlation between these factors.



You are seen as something negative by the media, by society, and then it is easy to start seeing yourself that way ... Maybe they are talking about me?



male, Sweden  
(Sweden FGD, p. 8)

### Youth bulge and violent conflict

Early research posited that “irrespective of social and economic conditions, an increase in the number of youth in any society involves an increase in social turbulence [which is statistically confirmed by] the fact that everywhere in the Western world males aged between 15 and 29 years commit more crimes against property and more homicides than the older population” (Moller, 1968, pp. 256–7). Subsequent research emphasized that age is not, in fact, the destabilizing factor, and instead destabilization is associated with the limited absorptive capacity of the labour market to provide jobs, particularly for educated youth (Choucri, 1974, pp. 71–3). This research speculated that “the greater the unemployment among the educated youth, the greater are the propensities for dissatisfactions, instabilities and violence” (Choucri, 1974, p. 73).

By the end of the cold war, the theory of the threat to peace presented by the youth bulge – particularly when associated with young men’s supposed violent inclinations – was gaining attention in foreign policy circles. The argument devolved to claim that youth bulges in Muslim countries represented an international peace and security threat, since these demographic developments “provide[s] recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration” (Huntington, 1997, p. 129). According to Huntington, the “critical level” or tipping point that could lead countries to experience violence was a youth population of at least 20 per cent (Huntington, 1997, pp. 140–3):

These theories, which treated correlation as if it were causation, were transmitted to wider audiences via mainstream media. Kaplan (1996, p. 46) contributed to this narrative by sharing his observations from six West African countries: “I saw ... young men everywhere – hordes of them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting”. Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Zakaria’s (2001) analysis stated that “Arab societies are going through a massive youth bulge, with more than half of most countries’ populations under the age of 25 ... A huge influx of restless young men in any country is bad news. When accompanied by even small economic and social change, it usually produces a new politics of protest”.

Later, Hendrixson described this troubling convergence of this narrative with race:

“**The youth bulge is personified in negative, racialized and gendered terms as an angry, young brown man from Africa, the Middle East, or parts of Asia or Latin America, often marked as a terrorist. This stereotype is an example of what anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls “dangerous discourses” that overpredict individual acts of youth violence, even as they downplay the role of other forms of violence and structural inequalities that contribute to youth poverty and powerlessness.**”

*(Hendrixson, 2014, p. 128)*

Other studies (Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Urdal, 2004) went further to identify the role of formal educational attainment and employment as key variables that tempered the impact of youth bulges on the prospects of societal violence. Collier (1999, p. 5) argued that “the presence of a high proportion of young men in a society also increases the risk of conflict, whereas the greater the educational endowment the lower is the risk”. This idea contributed to the development of “opportunity cost theory”, which hypothesized that, for young people who are employed or have a higher educational background, the risks of participating in violence outweigh the benefits (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, p. 34).

These studies that framed an unusually high proportion of youth as a threat to social stability erred in “measure[ing] the size of youth cohorts ... relative to the total population rather than to the adult population” (Urdal, 2004, p. 7). Urdal, as a second-generation youth bulge theorist, identified the potential for large youth cohorts to be viewed either as a burden or, in societies with decreasing fertility rates and dependency ratios, as an asset – a demographic dividend – for economic development.

However, Urdal (2006, p. 617) went on to find that “an increase of one percentage point in youth bulges is associated with an increased likelihood of conflict of more than 4%”, while still debunking the notion of a simple linear relationship between the two. While he found that “relatively large youth cohorts are associated with a significantly increased risk of domestic armed conflict, terrorism and riots/violent demonstrations”, Urdal (2006, p. 623) was quick to point out that “... factors like level of development and regime type are found to be more important explanations of violence”. As a result of this research, Urdal (2012, p. 9) suggested that governments should “[provide] employment or educational opportunities for youth in periods of economic decline” to avoid instability and violence.

### **Youth bulge and the demographic dividend**

There is, at best, a weak correlation between large youth cohorts and high levels of violence. Furthermore, research that has claimed a strong correlation is contradicted by evidence demonstrating that numerous countries with high proportional youth populations continue to experience relative peace (Institute for Economics and Peace TP), including Benin, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. Indicative findings from the Institute for Economics and Peace also note that not all of the world's "least peaceful countries" have large youth cohorts (Institute for Economics and Peace TP).

Macro-level global studies based on national-level population data suggesting that youth bulges lead to violence also appear to be contradicted by subnational data and analyses. Recently, research examining this relationship in Afghanistan and Colombia found that states or districts with a larger number of young people relative to the total population appeared less likely to experience violent conflict in the future (United Nations Development Programme TP). This reinforces broader critiques of these policy assumptions, which do not allow "information about the lives of and perspectives of everyday youth to enlighten, situate, perhaps even challenge the correlations" (Sommers, 2015, p. 23). Youth bulge studies focus only on numbers or the proportionate size of youth populations, rather than on the distribution of resources and power across generations within societies. They do not ask how young people negotiate and interpret social reality and intergenerational issues, or consider the meaning or functionality of violence from the perspective of young protagonists (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming, p. 20).

Youth bulge theories have historically treated states as passive actors, failing to examine their role in increased violence and political instability. But evidence shows that many governments in societies with large youth populations pre-emptively adopt repressive approaches in anticipation of youthful dissent (Nordås and

Davenport, 2013, p. 936). "When faced with a large group of youth between the ages of 15 and 24, governments are more likely to engage in repressive action (for example, diverse rights restrictions as well as arrests, disappearances, and violence)" (Nordås and Davenport, 2013, p. 937). This repressive action manifests both nationally and internationally, labelling increasing proportions of youth within the population as a threat to national or international security:

*[Youth bulge thinking] supports population-based criminal theories like the debunked "superpredator" theory of the 1990s, which claimed that large populations of young men contributed to the rise of more criminals who would commit ever more violent crimes. It resulted in the increased policing of young Black and Latino men in the US. (Hendrixson, 2012, p. 3)*

In response to youth bulge theories and efforts to mitigate the "youth risk", more positive policy and programmatic approaches were developed that sought to invest in the skills, attributes, creativity and commitment of youth to reap developmental rewards for countries going through demographic transitions:


*Countries with the greatest demographic advantages for development are those entering a period in which the working age population will have a low proportion of young dependents, and the benefits of good health, quality education and decent employment. The smaller number of children per household generally leads to larger investments per child, more freedom for women to enter the formal workforce, and more household savings for a secure old age. When this happens, the national economic payoff can be substantial, leading to a demographic dividend. (UNFPA, 2018)*

This demographic dividend has also been framed specifically in relation to peace and security, by

viewing its potential to “fast-track development that post-crisis countries need to recover and move forward” (UNFPA, 2015, p. 85). However, when talking about youth as a demographic dividend, it is important not to see young people exclusively from the perspective of their economic or developmental benefit to society (as valuable as this is), in a manner that deprives young women and men of their full agency.

The demographic dividend should be viewed as a source of resilience that should be invested in – particularly because of the potential benefits for governance, inclusivity, and the unique contributions of youth to peace and security. It is also important to appreciate that this demographic dividend is qualitative, not merely quantitative, and is also not exclusively an investment in the future. For most young people, the latter view ignores their lives and their stakes *in the present*. Young people are emphatic that the reward to be reaped from the demographic dividend cannot merely be assumed, and is heavily dependent on the investment made to translate it into a peace dividend.

At least



**2.5 MILLION**  
**ADOLESCENTS**  
were displaced  
in 2014

(Institute for Economics and Peace TP, pp. 12–17)

## Youth “on the move”

Population movements – such as rural–urban migration, internal displacement, and transborder forced or irregular migration – often primarily comprise young people. At least 2.5 million adolescents (aged 12–17) were displaced in 2014 – 15 per cent of the “persons of concern” of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Institute for Economics and Peace TP, pp. 12–17).

### **Fears about youth and migration**

Despite evidence to the contrary, migrating young people (particularly young refugees and young people forced to migrate internationally for economic reasons) are frequently viewed as a drain on the social security system and a source of cheap competition with locals for scarce jobs, rather than as entrepreneurial and economically innovative. They are frequently treated as incapable of, or resistant to, “assimilation”, rather than as traumatized and resilient. In fact, their migration or displacement often represents a deliberate choice of flight over fight.

When apprehension around migration is associated with racial, religious or cultural differences, discriminatory undertones help to cast young migrants, refugees and internally displaced youth as security threats, potential terrorists, criminals or rebels. These representations are often highly gendered, with young migrant men seen as “preying” on local women or as sexual deviants. Such stereotypes infuse the popular discourse and underpin growing anti-immigrant or xenophobic populist movements that fuel violence and social discord. This phenomenon is manifesting across many regions of the globe, from the Middle East (Pande, 2013) and Europe (Amnesty International, 2014; Hagen-Zanker and Mallet, 2015), to the United States and South Africa (Harris, 2001). The resulting anxiety distorts public perception and immigration policy, particularly when defensive responses are politically manipulated and exaggerated by the media and opportunist political leaders. This often occurs through the cultivation of alarmist images

of a shifting demographic profile of the society – a “moral panic” (Cohen, 2002) – that particularly impacts and feeds off the migration of youth.

The 2018 *World Migration Report* by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2017, p. 222) emphasizes that “there is a real risk that focusing on migration and displacement only as a cause or consequence of violent extremism will simply exacerbate the threat” and that this may “become an excuse to restrict the entry of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; to limit their rights; or to force people to return to unsafe situations in their home countries”.

Reliable age-disaggregated data on forced displacement and migration trends are scarce, making it difficult to estimate the direct impact on youth. However, policies triggered by fear of refugees and migrants, which associate them with violent extremism, have led to increasing numbers of refugee and migrant deaths, with disproportionate effects on children and youth (IOM, 2017, p. 347).

In the European context, Möller-Loswick (2017) has argued that the European Union needs to “understand migration as a manifestation of violence and insecurity, and prioritize addressing its causes ... promoting democracy, human rights and political and social inclusion rather than reinforcing repressive state security apparatuses”.

### **Reality about youth and migration**

A recent United Nations – World Bank study on the prevention of violent conflict states that “well managed migration can offer many benefits and is an alternative to enduring the constraints felt by demographic transitions. Migrants contribute to their host countries by filling critical labor shortages, paying taxes and social security contributions, and creating jobs as entrepreneurs” (United Nations and World Bank, 2018, p. 63). Beyond the economic benefits brought by youth migration, the Anna Lindh Foundation also points to the value of youth-based intercultural dialogue associated with migration and the right of free



**We young people have three opportunities: to die assassinated, to migrate, or to join a gang.**



young person, Northern Triangle  
(*Northern Triangle CFR*, p. 50)

movement itself. In an Intercultural Trends Survey in the Euro-Mediterranean region carried out by the foundation, youth from Europe and North Africa expressed a desire for engaging in and embracing cultural exchanges, and felt that these “would be effective measures to deal with conflicts and radicalization”, contrasting with prevailing policy approaches (Anna Lindh Foundation, 2017, p. 2).

Urdal (2004, pp. 17–18) has argued that migration might in fact be considered a potential “safety valve” triggered by inequality and uneven development, and that, if opportunities to migrate are restricted, “this is likely to cause an increased pressure from youth bulges accompanied by a higher risk of political disturbance and violence in a number of developing countries”. This perspective still relies on a negative association between migration opportunities and young people’s participation in conflict.

### **Youth and urbanization**

Another dimension of the policy concern associated with the mobility of young people is the phenomenon of urbanization and the proliferation of youth in urban settings. Rapid urbanization in the world’s most youthful areas is partly attributable to population growth, uneven development, and the existence of livelihood opportunities in urban as opposed to rural areas (UNFPA, 2014). As emphasized by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2017, p. 227), “migration has nearly become synonymous with urbanization, given the dominance of the city as the destination of most migrants”.

However, young people's migration from rural to urban areas is not motivated solely by economic reasons. Sommers (2015, p. 95) explains that "a common reason for migrating to cities is to get away from controls and expectations that tradition and the older generation lay on young people". For example, urbanization in Tunisia has been explained by the extreme sense of peripheralization experienced by youth in rural or border areas of the country, which is described as epitomizing the exclusion of young people (Boukhars, 2017).

Patterns of rapid youth urbanization have often been assumed to contribute to increased levels of urban violence, but these assumptions are not borne out by the evidence. Data from 55 major cities in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa show no evidence that high urban population growth in developing countries increases the risk or frequency of social disorder (Buhaug and Urdal, 2013). Results from 34 household surveys from large African and Asian cities also demonstrate that it is not rural–urban migration per se that creates social upheaval or risks of conflict, but the marginalization of migrants, pervasive

socioeconomic and educational inequalities in urban areas, and the strain on urban governments that are unable to provide basic social services to burgeoning youth populations (Østby, 2016).

According to Sommers (2015), scholars and policymakers may have exacerbated the situation by ignoring the perspectives of young people, and their motivations and aspirations, consequently focusing donor investments on rural areas and livelihoods. This approach can also lead to favouring of "farm first policies" (Bryceson and Potts, 2005, p. 9), seeking to reverse the population movement trends rather than addressing the realities associated with young people's urban presence.

In addition, security-based policy responses to rapid urbanization revolve primarily around youth, particularly in relation to gangs and gang-related violence. This is despite the fact that "most studies indicate that on average the figure [of youth living in gang-affected communities who join gangs] is somewhere around 3 to 5 per cent" (Muggah, 2012, pp. 47–8). Hard security-based policy responses that demonize urban youth are not only less cost-effective, but are counterproductive, and merely substitute for "political, social and economic failures in relation to governance, planning and inclusive citizenship" (Muggah, 2012, p. x).

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### **Online mobility and globalization**

Young people are mobile, not only physically through migration but also virtually. Two thirds of the world's Internet users are aged under 35 years, and half are under the age of 25 (World Bank, 2016). Young people's horizons are being reshaped by their growing access to information and varied worldviews via social media and the Internet. They are increasingly aware of their rights and deprivation relative to other people in their communities and around the world, as well as opportunities that may exist in other places:

*Today's youth have higher expectations than the generations before them for self-direction,*



*freedom and opportunity. The information age has taught them their human rights and given them a broader vision of what their lives could be.*  
(UNFPA, 2014, p. 79)

Globalization brings the power of expanding horizons and visibility, the space for connectivity, and platforms for expanding direct social, political and economic participation. The *World Youth Report* demonstrates that these cybertechnologies offer unique organizational tools for peace and positive forms of digital organization, as well as platforms for civic participation among youth (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016). However, the Internet can also serve as a platform for disinformation and hate speech, both “enable[ing] and inhibit[ing] the spread of violent conflict” (United Nations and World Bank, 2017, p. 10). This duality was highlighted by some of the youth who participated in our research process, who described how technology can “transcend conflict lines and ... build positive communities” but social media can be used as “a tool for hate, abuse, discrimination and incitement to violence” (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 24).

Globalization structurally changes spheres of influence, and reshapes and blurs the spatial and temporal boundaries of youth subcultures in fascinating ways. No longer constrained by “turf” as a simple geographic boundary, young people can reach across wider divides and access more diverse influences – both positive and negative – role models and reference points. In response to their marginalization, young people now have capacity to transcend the experience of the purely local. As young people lose faith in governments that betray them, corporations that mislead them, consumerism that is not accessible to them and multilateral organizations that pay lip service at best, social media and cyberspace are changing the predominant influences over their lives and the way they exist in the world.



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## Violent extremism

Another key area where stereotypical representations of youth have significantly distorted policy priorities is the recruitment and participation of young men and women in violent extremist groups. The concerns of policymakers are partly based on the assumed preponderance of young people joining these groups. It is true that “the majority of Boko Haram fighters are teenagers, the typical ISIS recruit is around 26 years old, and most Jemaah Islamiyah members are young and male” (SfCG, 2017, p. 3), and that the majority of gang members – whether in Central America, the Caribbean, South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire or Chicago – fall into the youth age category. But young people who join violent or extremist groups constitute only a minute fraction of the youth population. The vast majority of young people, even in the face of legitimate social, political and economic grievances, remain peaceful, and resist any urge to become involved in violent conflict. Approaching young women and men on the implicit assumption that they are all at risk of joining violent extremist groups stigmatizes young people (Aliaga and O’Farrel, 2017, p. 22).

### **Current approaches to violent extremism**

Government action, ostensibly based on these concerns, is often driven more by pre-emptive security-based approaches (Nordås and Davenport, 2013) than by evidence or any commitment to preventive interventions (SecDev Group TP). Although some approaches to the prevention of violent extremism do acknowledge the importance of youth empowerment, participation and inclusion, such as the United Nations Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674), prevailing policy orientations continue to taint the youth population as a whole, exacerbating rather than addressing their underlying experiences of marginalization (Attree, 2017).

In both democratic and autocratic countries, the anticipation or suspicion of terrorism and violent extremism has triggered some governments to narrow or shut down the availability of civic spaces for dissenting youth voices; disregard human rights; and arrest, jail, and even target and attack youth (CIVICUS, 2017). This echoes a statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism that "several governments already routinely label political opponents and journalists as terrorists. Identifying 'extremism' as the problem only provides more grounds to crush dissent" (UNHRC, 2016).

In countries that have been facing insurgencies led by violent extremist groups – such as Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Tunisia (Cilliers, 2015; Boukhars, 2017) – community members have reported feeling more fearful of their governments' continual violations of human rights than they are of extremist groups. This has been articulated as a highly significant motive in young people's decisions to participate in violent extremist groups in Africa (UNDP, 2017), and state repression has often contributed to youth sympathizing with the harsh upbringings of gang members (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees TP, p. 13). In Tunisia, "the government and its security services have adopted a system of harsh policies of criminalization and intensive security monitoring of suspect communities ... instilling in young people profound feelings of humiliation and bitterness toward state authority. These police tactics are also the best recruiting tools for terrorist groups" (Boukhars, 2017, p. 18). In fact, repressive reactions of governments have been used by violent groups as a tactic to persuade or recruit new members, and to gain legitimacy among non-violent resistance and social movements (Neumann, 2017, p. 25; Novelli, 2017).

Hard-fisted law enforcement and security approaches – or "mano dura" as they are referred to in Central America – are being widely applied across different country contexts and types of violence, as demonstrated in our research in Brazil (CFR); Jamaica (CFR – b); El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Northern Triangle CFR); and South Africa (CFR). Across these diverse contexts of organized criminal violence, violent conflict or violent extremism (and the often blurred dividing line between them), it is inevitable that young people are found in confrontation with criminal justice or security institutions. Throughout all our research, young people spoke about their fear of the police and the violence they face at the hands of law enforcement personnel. In Central America, the risk of a negative encounter with police is

“**My government's main concern is keeping youth as quiet as possible. Youth has power, flexibility and voice ... but not all governments are happy that this is the case.**”

female, Asia-Pacific

*(Asia and the Pacific consultation, p. 7)*

four times higher for those under the age of 25 than for those older than 66 (Muggah et al. TP). In the United Kingdom, 33–50 per cent of young adolescents between the ages of 11 and 15 have had “experiences of adversarial contact with the police” (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 9). In Australia, 40 per cent of detained young people claimed to have been physically attacked (Muggah et al. TP, p. 10). In Somalia, a young man in Mogadishu explained how young people “do not regularly see justice. Many of our fellow youth have issues with the police and other elders because we are the youth or the ‘shabaab’. Young men in particular are constantly harassed or sent to jail” (World Bank et al., 2018, p. 34). Under the excuse of countering violent extremism, “young men in Mogadishu are routinely picked up by police and jailed simply for being young and possibly an Al-Shabaab sympathizer, with or without justification for suspicion of the latter, other than age” (World Bank et al., 2018, p. 27). The consequences and extent of these abuses of power may vary from context to context, but the common experience for young people is nonetheless striking.

### **Effects of current approaches to violent extremism**

Policies on the prevention and countering of violent extremism that violate basic human rights instead fuel violent extremism (OSCE, 2014). A young Salvadorian, following a beating from the police, felt “even more vulnerable, angry and disempowered than before” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees TP, p. 13). Former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, when launching his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, underlined that highly reactive, short-sighted responses with “a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights, have often made things worse” (UN Secretary-General, 2016).

Suspicion and speculation about violent extremism, and the policy responses they spawn, often leave young people feeling “caught between a rock and a hard place”, navigating a narrow corridor between the violence of extremist groups

and randomized or indiscriminate repressive governmental responses. Research in Kenya illustrates this dilemma:

*The counter-insurgency campaign of retaliation on Al-Shabaab attacks – to arrest or kill perpetrators – practised by Kenya security agencies came to further alienate Kenyan Muslims, especially young Muslims. Many felt wrongly targeted for arrest and detention and thus suppressed in the campaign against Al-Shabaab. In such contexts, radicalization and violent extremism became an attractive proposition for young people as platforms for affirming individual and collective rights and interests of coastal communities.*  
(Kenya CFR, p. 9)

In Central America, young people said “the police are worse than the gangs because they are supposed to help us and, instead, they persecute and kill us for being young, in order to fill their quota” (Northern Triangle CFR, p. 60). Similar experiences in Yemen mean that young people “don’t have faith in the rule of law and they don’t think ... about going to a police station, court or any institution” (Yemen CFR, forthcoming, p. 13). For young men in Niger, “the state of emergency, the fear of the police and their injustice towards us, their use of force and aggression even against witnesses, their lack of trust in us” results in “a very strong ‘us’ [those who have done nothing wrong] and ‘them’ [the government/authorities neglecting us] narrative” (Niger FGD, p. 33).

Overt security responses limit the scope for exploring more innovative approaches to addressing youth vulnerability and exclusion (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming, p. 5). Youth activists around the world have raised concerns that security approaches denigrate, potentially undermine, and often repress, the legitimate processes of youth-based political organizations, social movements, peaceful protests and expressions of dissent, narrowing the space for youth political involvement.

Traditional, hard law enforcement approaches, punitive mechanisms and militarized responses have also proven ineffective in preventing youth participation in criminal and violent underworlds, and are often counterproductive (Colombia CFR – a; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees TP). A growing body of criminological literature indicates that there is also little evidence that zero tolerance, militarized and randomized policing, and aggressive prosecution and incarceration are effective in deterring future gang activities or discouraging new members (Scott, 2017, p. 7). Randomized policing and penal practices, as well as targeted and discriminatory law enforcement practices – often paired with lack of appropriate infrastructure, poor training for its enforcers, inadequate checks and balances in the judicial and penal systems, and underdeveloped juvenile justice systems – all cumulatively contribute to growing trust deficits in the relationship between state and society in the law enforcement arena (UNDP, 2017).

““ It feels like the prisons have been reserved for youth. ””

young person, Burundi  
(Burundi FGD)

The ineffectiveness of hard security approaches is often reflected in high incarceration rates, which consolidate rather than rehabilitate criminality and support the growth of criminal networks, in turn producing high recidivism rates. For example, in Brazil, 22,000 youth were held in juvenile detention centres accused of minor crimes in 2014, even though these centres had capacity for only 18,000. According to Muggah et al. (TP, p. 12), “such environments [of overcrowded prisons] can induce hostile and aggressive behavior, which increases the probability of recidivism”. Young people are not only placed in overcrowded juvenile facilities, but are frequently also incarcerated along with adults under much harsher conditions. As a

result, 70–80 per cent of incarcerated youth in Florida are arrested again – but for more serious offences – within three years of being released (Muggah et al. TP, p. 8). In the United States, the prison system was described by young people as “not helping anyone become better people. It is just there to punish, break families ... a second wave of slavery” (United States of America CFR, p. 59).

To make things worse, there is growing evidence that these hard security approaches are simply not cost-effective, and divert funds away from social services (UNDP, 2016a, p. 131; Colombia CFR – a, p. 9) and other more effective prevention or harm reduction measures that are essential to tackle the drivers of violent crime, political violence and extremism. Moreover, hard security approaches are excessively costly compared with alternative prevention-based harm and risk reduction models (Muggah et al. TP).

In spite of evidence, the urgency associated with countering violent extremism still sees the majority of resources expended on the traditional law enforcement and security-oriented approaches of central governments. It continues to exclude civil society and youth organizations from receiving significant financial support to build community resilience to violence (Rosand, 2016, pp. 6–9). Between 2002 and 2017, the United States alone spent US\$ 2.8 trillion on counter-terrorism, including US\$ 175 billion in 2017 (Stimson Center, 2018). As Scott Atran remarked to the United Nations Security Council (Atran, 2015), “The focus is on military solutions and police interdiction; matters have already gone way too far. If that focus remains, we lose the coming generation”.

### **Violent extremism in the digital sphere**

A key concern of many governments and international actors has been the role of online platforms as potential vehicles for mobilization or recruitment for the promotion of violent extremism and organized crime; these mechanisms have sometimes been described as the “dark side of globalization” (Atran, 2017).



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Indeed, some violent extremist and armed groups appear better equipped than governments to use digital technologies to engage excluded and marginalized young people:

*According to some sources, in 2015 ISIS operated 70,000 Twitter accounts and tweeted 200,000 times per day. Mexico's Sinaloa cartel's Twitter account has more than 34,000 followers. A Latin American gang called the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, has over 40,000 likes on Facebook and communicates with its members across the Americas online. Social media is also emerging as a platform where white supremacy groups spread their racist ideologies and where hate speech propagates. (SecDev Group TP, pp. 1–2)*

Recent research shows that violent groups can be highly sophisticated. They can specifically tailor their marketing and branding strategies towards young people, and target different country or regional contexts (Rogers, 2017). They seek to offer “a ready-made community, identity, and the opportunity to be part of a cause [that] can be particularly attractive to young people” (Littman, 2017, p. 2).

The use of social media by violent groups, terrorist organizations and organized crime has

triggered what has also been called a moral panic (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2017). This has motivated many governments to monitor online activities, limit freedom of expression, target legitimate political activities and silence dissenting youth voices:

*National firewalls, wholesale blocking of social media, and even internet shutdowns are used by repressive governments in efforts to control online activity. But even in non-authoritarian settings, there is ambivalence about the internet's power of social mobilization. People may admire how democracy activists can organize online, yet worry when the Islamic State (ISIS) recruits remotely. (HRW, 2017, p. 42)*

In the name of countering violent extremism, the danger is that the Internet and globalization itself are cast as the threat, thus potentially destroying the virtual access and connectivity they give young women and men to access other young people's perspectives and experiences. Intrusive surveillance activities and strategies are not the exclusive preserve of repressive regimes or conflict-affected societies. Nor are they immune to worrisome potential collaborations between governments and the private technology companies that control these sites (UNDESA, 2016, p. 103). This is a global problem.

## Policy panic

The political urgency for governments to respond to the threat of global terrorism has contributed to a discourse in which sweeping characterizations of youth as fundamentally at risk of violent extremism have produced un-nuanced, counterproductive policy responses. The myths and assumptions associated with youth bulges, the impact of migration and globalization, and violent extremism have fuelled “policy panic” (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming, p. 11), which detrimentally skews YPS programmatic responses and priorities. This policy panic is not based on sound evidence, as illustrated by a pervasive failure of governments to scrutinize hard security and law enforcement actions for their efficacy and cost-effectiveness, especially in relation to youth.

For example, assumptions are made about how “idle hands” associated with unemployment and a lack of education drive youth participation in violence. Despite the availability of evidence for more than a decade contesting the relationship between youth unemployment, education and violence, some have been quick to erroneously assume a natural progression for unemployed or uneducated youth to join or participate in violent extremist groups. This has resulted in ineffective, short-term economic integration approaches (Novelli, 2017).

Effective prevention is not served by single-cause explanations and simplistic palliative solutions. This is especially the case when programmatic or operational solutions are based on policy myths rather than good data, ignore the perspectives and perceptions of young people themselves, and address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of conflict and violence. The causes, sources and experiences of youth exclusion are multidimensional. Evidence strongly suggests that a “cocktail” of economic, social and political factors – often associated with perceptions of corrupt governance – underpins the sense of injustice experienced by youth. When this is compounded by group differences and patterns of marginalization based on ethnicity, religion,

gender, class, caste or cultural identity (“horizontal inequalities”), the cumulative effect may drive young people to come together and engage in joint action, sometimes including violence (Richards, 1996; Abbink and Kessel, 2005; Oyawole, 2006). This reflects the complex character of youth identity and aspiration, and thus demands a diversified and holistic operational approach.

Very importantly, policy panic has the consequence of alienating and driving young people away, rather than drawing them in through inclusive politics, economics and social services. It further alienates young people and diminishes their trust in their governments and the multilateral system. Instead of offering proactive preventive approaches to violent conflict, it risks cementing young people in these roles, giving them a sense that no alternative pathways are available to them. As powerfully noted by Olonisakin and Ismail in the African context (although it has wider global relevance):

*Indeed, the policy panic on youth is hardly new; it has been building since the 1980s when youth emerged as a central theme, displacing notions of ethnicity and nationalism, in the study and policy responses to politics and security in Africa. This is often referenced by the ubiquitous role of male and female youth in social change processes, including violent uprisings ... The panic in policy arenas continue to be reinforced wittingly or unwittingly by successive events, including the onset of youth bulges, protracted armed conflicts and inter-group violence, increasing spread of violent extremism and organized crime, widespread militia and vigilante violence, and youth-led mass uprising (Arab Spring) in Africa. (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming, p. 11)*

The negative stereotyping of youth that this policy panic generates obscures not only the lived experiences of ordinary young people, but the contributions they make to building peace and to preventing violence.

## 1.4 The upside

In the absence of inclusive and meaningful opportunities to participate socially, politically and economically, marginalized young people are strikingly creative in creating alternative ways of belonging and meaning through which to express themselves. This resourcefulness and resilience manifest in different ways across diverse stakeholder groups, sectors and social constituencies, in fragile and conflict-affected, as well as in relatively peaceful, contexts.

### Sources of youth resilience

The resilience of youth and children has been explored in the psychological literature, and has been tackled in the fields of education (Schwartz and Gorman, 2003), developmental psychopathology (Rutter, 2012) and trauma (Walsh et al., 2010). The fields of anthropology and sociology have analysed the dynamics of youth violence, identity, anomie, and processes of positive and negative social cohesion. These areas have also been extensively studied across a variety of violent contexts, including both war and non-war situations. An extensive literature on the subculture of youth gangs, both inside and outside prisons, also looks at youth resilience in a variety of settings, examining juvenile delinquency in affluent communities, contemplating non-violent youth movements in poverty-stricken and violent communities, and analysing resilience factors in explaining recidivism rates in the criminal and juvenile justice systems. In its 2011 *World Development Report*, the World Bank identified employment for young people as a significant factor – among others – in building resilience in

peacebuilding and state-building in conflict-affected societies (World Bank, 2011, pp. 145–57).

Much of the work on youth resilience has focused somewhat narrowly on individual attributes and experiences, rather than collective experiences and manifestations. This work has looked at individualized explanations, based on risk and protective factors among young people at different developmental stages.

Individually based perspectives on youth resilience ignore the relationship between young people and their wider communities, peer groups and distinctive collective cultures. They may mask the diverse and creative factors that shape collective resilience to violent conflict, emphasizing the impact of the destruction of the social fabric that is the inevitable product of war and violence. A sense of community – which may otherwise provide a “home”, or a sense of social cohesion for young people – is often destroyed or vulnerable in situations of violence and conflict. The family; the schoolroom; the workplace; and sports, cultural and religious organizations potentially offer important spaces for social cohesion, trust and the safety of young people. But these social and community settings tend to be prime casualties of the dislocation and mistrust associated with conflict, violence and terrorism. Recent research has acknowledged the environmental and community-based factors that might influence resilient responses (such as prior exposure to violence and trauma, family and parental relationships, educational and recreational access) (Barber, 2009; Walsh et al., 2010; Jones and Lafreniere, 2014). The loss of confidence in

“ **Despite living in very difficult situations, the young people consulted have not turned to violence, even if so many in their community have. This resistance to violence is strength in which to invest.** ”

(Niger FGD, p. 33)

“ This [violence] has a very negative effect on us, but it has equipped us with knowledge to prevent it from reoccurring. ”

male, Nigeria

(Nigeria FGD, p. 16)

societal institutions, particularly associated with loss of trust in state institutions, can therefore have implications for youth resilience.

Research demonstrates that young people's resilience in the face of violent turmoil and experiences of marginalization depends heavily on the socializing function of these institutions, the relationships forged within them, and the capacity of young people to maintain these relationships in the face of conflict and violence – or to creatively forge alternative spaces. Studies suggest that “strong communities”, or young people's involvement in community associations, build their social capital and sense of belonging, and that such opportunities for empowerment are important deterrents to engagement in violence (Dowdney, 2005; Cuesta et al., 2007).

Studies in contexts such as Kenya (Van Metre and Calder, 2016) and Iraq (Carpenter, 2012) show that youth resilience lies in the assets, attributes, qualities, capacities and leadership that are embedded within communities and societies. These forms of resilience are societal attributes that external actors need to recognize, harness and support, and that cannot be invented or built by them:

*Youth participation and contributions to peacebuilding in Kenya are anchored on indigenous resources and practices, especially youth adaptations of cultural resources. Indigenous practices, especially language, underpin the contributions*

*of young people to peace and security in Kenya. For instance, youth in Kenya have adapted local language, especially Swahili and Sheng, to frame and brand peacebuilding ideas, messages and activities in ways that attract broad understanding and participation. Through the local resources, peacebuilding is stripped of technical jargon, yet it is robust and delivers the associated ends of preventing and mitigating violence and promoting reconciliation. This raises the possibility of major peacebuilding interventions being designed or adapted to reflect youth's vision of peace and roadmap to attaining it in relevant contexts. (Kenya CFR, p. 25)*

### **Virtuous or vicious cycles: positive and negative manifestations of resilience**

Resilience can clearly take both negative and positive forms. If youth feel alienated from political processes and believe they cannot influence the key decisions that affect their lives, some may turn to violent underworlds that offer alternative sources of status, recognition and social cohesion (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009). Such negative manifestations of resilience can contribute to vicious cycles, and may escalate rather than prevent or address violence and conflict (Simpson et al., 2016). The potential for negative resilience is powerfully illustrated in the case of young former combatants. In a variety of countries, it has been broadly observed that marginalized youth, returning to their community, may join community defence organizations, vigilante groups or gangs.

Young people engaged during the study provided other examples of negative resilience. One such participant said, “Today youth live under such insecurity and pressure, they have no faith in society and very limited patience to wait for long-term solutions. So many of them resort to the use of drugs, a lot of them suffer from chronic and serious psychiatric disorders” (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 12). A young woman from Tunisia said about her peers, “To tell



society that [they] are here, [they] exist ... they hit, they break, they attack just to be noticed by others” (Tunisia FGD, pp. 12–13).

Youth participants in South Sudan described how the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among civilians as a result of the conflict had increased the level of insecurity, making it essential to arm themselves. Having only known conflict, some young people described resilient war-based sub-economies that reflected the political and economic structures of their environment. As one young man explained, “My gun is my salary, and I have to raid to get something” (South Sudan FGD, p. 10). However, despite young people’s experiences of social exclusion, powerlessness and stigmatization, and the dislocation around them, the majority of young people manifest positive (rather than negative) forms of resilience.<sup>7</sup> Positive youth resilience manifests in different ways. In some instances, it may take the form of “adaptive” or “survivalist” ways of dealing with violence, seeking protection, avoiding recruitment, evading dangerous territories, providing support to others, stopping the immediate fighting, contributing to humanitarian responses, or undertaking internal or cross-border migration.

In other instances, the resilience of young people may be more transformative in character, through driving political change, rebuilding damaged relationships, and even addressing the underlying causes of conflict and preventing its violent manifestations. Standing at the “crossroads” between risk and resilience, young people have a unique perspective on the factors that may enable them to address their experiences of marginalization and exclusion through either positive or negative manifestations of resilience. As stated by a young man from India:

*Young people have the ability to look at things with a new light ... the hope of a better future*

<sup>7</sup> Absorptive, adaptive and transformative forms of resilience are the classic categories in resilience literature. These may manifest either negatively or positively.

*compels them to look at things positively to try and find solutions to the issues that had created the whole problem in the first place. (E-Consultation #2)*

Both positive and negative manifestations of resilience are related to the particular developmental phase in young people’s lives. Both resonate with their psychological and social needs, and help to address their experiences of exclusion. Both might appeal to the sense of adventure, the quest for recognition and the assertion of independence that are typical dimensions of youth psychology and identity. However, the positive forms of resilience of young people in relation to peace and conflict are vital to building and sustaining peace: they help societies address the manifestations, causes and legacies of violent conflict, and can be critical to how communities and societies prevent the re-emergence of conflict (Simpson et al., 2016). Negative manifestations may need to be co-opted or neutralized when they have the opposite effect of contributing to violent conflict. The virtuous cycle of positive resilience demonstrates the diverse ways in which young people can provide a foundation for rebuilding lives and communities in the wake of violent conflict. This illustrates more than just the resilient potential or attributes of young people themselves: when given a meaningful arena for participation in social, political and economic life, they are vital contributors to the rebuilding of communities, and more just and peaceful societies.

“ **War with benefit is better than peace without benefit.** ”  
male, South Sudan  
(*Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 8*)



© UNFPA/Daniel Bravo

“

We are left with a question in need of an answer: why are most youth peaceful? ... Youth can explain this wonderful mystery. But first they have to be asked.

”

*(Sommers, 2015, p. 24)*

## Chapter 2

# Youth for peace

We often fail to ask why the majority of young people remain peaceful, even in the face of hazardous circumstances, what peace and security mean to them, and what they actually do to sustain peace. This limits the visibility and understanding of youth perceptions of peace and security and, in turn, significantly curbs financial, technical and political support for their work.

In the research undertaken for the Progress Study, the thousands of young people who participated shared an extraordinary range of examples and self-reflections about their work. These represent the kaleidoscope of their perseverance, courage and innovation to contribute to building and sustaining peace and preventing violent conflict – often under very difficult and challenging circumstances.

### 2.1 Defining peace and security

Peace and security are vital issues of universal concern for young people in all countries, not only those divided by, or emerging from, violent conflict. But the ideas of peace and security, and what they mean have various dimensions for young people.

#### Beyond the absence of violence

When asked what peace and security meant to them, young people, across very different contexts, expressed that peace and security are more than just the absence of violence, or the end of violent conflict. In the East and Southern Africa consultation, participants described peace as collective harmony, “a lack of tension” and “not inflicting harm on others” (East and Southern Africa consultation, p. 5). Young people spoke eloquently about peace and security being about their values and aspirations, and about belonging, dignity, and living with hope and without fear.

These aspirational concepts of peace and security also included positive visions of free and democratic societies with environments conducive to development and dignity, which address social, political and structural inequalities. For the young people consulted during this study, sustaining peace required addressing the underlying causes of corruption, inequality and injustice that underpin violent conflict, as well as the immediate triggers of violence (positive peace), rather than just ending violence and addressing its symptoms and consequences (negative peace). Young people emphasized that the imperative of building positive peace



**We have not had peace for over 26 years. I just want to experience it once in my lifetime.**



male, Somalia

*(World Bank et al., 2018, p. 34)*

also relied on achieving negative peace, so these were not regarded as mutually exclusive or alternative approaches, and could be undertaken simultaneously, rather than sequentially. This is important because young people reported experiencing diverse and changing forms of violence in their daily lives, even when there was no ongoing armed conflict.

### **Protection and prevention**

Young people from societies affected by violence – whether in the form of terrorism, organized crime or political violence – as well as those from more peaceful societies, shared an overarching concern for protection. They elaborated in considerable detail the numerous risks and forms of violence that young people are exposed to in their daily lives. Young participants were quick to point out that, although they were seen as being at risk of joining armed or extremist groups, in fact they were the primary targets and victims of these groups. They were sensitive to the phenomena of suicide, substance abuse and other forms of self-harm associated with youth alienation. However, they described collective rather than just individual experiences of psychological and structural violence, drawn from their lived experiences of injustice and exclusion. A young Colombian participant stated, “I believe in peace ... because I want to live in a country that is inclusive, where freedom is not a privilege that only a few have” (Colombia consultation, p. 5). These sentiments were echoed by young men and women from many countries in the Arab States consultation.

For some, protection and security issues were seen as a necessary precondition for peace. For

others, peace was a prerequisite for security. For example, whereas many Kosovo\* Albanian youth saw peace as “the freedom to express oneself in a traditional society” (Kosovo\* consultation, p. 12), most of the Kosovo\* Serbian youth respondents associated peace with freedom from being threatened, and therefore saw security as a precondition for peace (Kosovo\* consultation, p. 12). “Security is when you feel safe, and when that happens you are in peace” (female; Kosovo\* consultation, p. 12). The need for protection was expressed not only in relation to direct violence and its traumatic effects, but more broadly to include the protection of young people’s rights, the enabling environment for their peace work, and prevention approaches to address structural and systemic forms of violence. Young women and men made it clear that protection and prevention are inseparable.

### **Peace, development and injustice**

Young people also argued that peace and security are inextricably linked to the broader agenda of young people’s stake in sustainable development, and in the assertion or denial of their socioeconomic and cultural rights. As stated by a participant in the East and Southern Africa consultation, “There is no development and progress with no peace” (East and Southern Africa consultation, p. 5). In the Latin American consultation, participants related the concept of peace to having democratic institutions and a democratic culture that promotes participation, particularly relating to inclusive and sustainable development. In the European consultation, participants were concerned about the exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers from the labour market and social services.

### **Peace and security as personal**

Young people also articulated concepts of peace and security that were deeply personal: “If you don’t have peace in your heart, where do you get

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

it from?" (male, Timor-Leste) or, as expressed by a young woman from Iran, "Security is achieved when people do not have mental tension and are not preoccupied with worries" (Asia and the Pacific consultation, p. 5). Well-being, happiness and hope, as well as living in harmony and in the absence of fear, often associated with personal feelings of positive self-esteem and dignity, were among the key personal issues mentioned by young women and men. Two young people from Bhutan attending the Asia and Pacific regional consultation drew attention to their country's "happiness index" as an important indicator of the state of peace and security in their country.

For youth in conflict-affected Niger, a priority was their physical health and well-being. Food security and poverty alleviation were viewed as indispensable both to living longer and to sustainable peace and security (Niger FGD, pp. 24–5). Young women and men also spoke about sustainable peace being rooted in reciprocal relationships of trust: with their peers; with elders and leaders in their communities; and

with their governments, societal institutions and even multilateral organizations. In Côte d'Ivoire, a young person articulated this as "living together peacefully with people who share my daily life" (Côte d'Ivoire CFR, p. 6). For a young Fijian man, it was about the ability to "express your feelings and trust easily" (Asia and the Pacific consultation, p. 5).

Many young people made strong connections between personal or individual circumstances and the collective experiences of their wider communities. As one young person from India framed it, "Collective action is important but so is individual change because in the long term it also impacts people around me. How can I start to have those conversations at home? How can I look at change and active citizenship at home too, rather than when I just set out of my house?" (India FGD). The importance of "a safe planet" and an awareness of the risks of climate change as a progenitor of conflict (Arab States and Europe consultations; Sustainable Development Solutions Network TP) also reflected

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“ Young people, like everyone else, just want to live long and live well. ”

Funmi Olonisakin

(Meeting Report #2, Advisory Group of Experts)

young people's close connection between the personal and the political, and the relationship between the individual and the global. By virtue of their age, this issue was articulated as being uniquely relevant to their future both as individuals and as organized youth. Young people from Fiji talked about how climate change increased the tension within and among families, highlighting the urgency of tackling climate change as a matter of survival for the young generation of Fijians (Fiji FGD).

The lines between the personal and the political, or between the public and private spheres, were therefore rather porous for young men and women when it came to peace and security. As described by a young woman in Borno, Nigeria,

“I restricted myself from going to places, and [was] sitting down doing nothing, this is all as a result of fear of attacks” (Nigeria FGD, p. 13). For young people – and young women in particular – notions of peace and security were inextricably tied to issues of gender equality and problems of gender-equitable norms.

### Conflict as normal

Young people recognized that no society is free from, or immune from, conflict and division. They made the clear distinction between violence and conflict, and recognized not only that conflict is a normal and natural part of any society, but that non-violent conflict can be an important driver of social change and can contribute to building consensus in society.<sup>8</sup>

In light of this, they stressed the importance of building a culture of peaceful dialogue, protest and dissent within their communities (East and

<sup>8</sup> This reflects the idea that not all conflicts have a destructive nature. Research on conflict transformation articulates the perspective that “conflict is normal in human relationships. Conflict is a motor of change” (Lederach, 2015, p. 11).



Southern Africa consultation). The challenge in their view was in normalizing, managing and institutionalizing conflict, to ensure that it did not manifest violently. As explained by a young woman from Nigeria, peace and security are primarily dependent on “the ability to manage conflict constructively and as an important opportunity for change, and to increase understanding. It means the ability to embrace non-violence as a way of life” (E-Consultation #2). This, they noted, demanded inclusive social, political and economic channels, as well as institutional platforms, to navigate the diverse sources of conflict.

Young participants were alert to the potential for conflict management processes to be tightly controlled by others in their access and format, and in the content of dialogues or consultations; and for youth to be manipulated or co-opted. This could be used to restrict rather than facilitate meaningful change and transformation.

### Peace out of reach?

For some youth, discussions of peace and security remained somewhat abstract and remote, because of the situations of immediate and extreme violence to which they were exposed. A great number of youth, from Somalia to South Sudan, and from Colombia to the Kurdistan region of Iraq, “have only known war and conflict” (World Bank et al., 2018, p. 25; Final Validation Consultation). Even in societies free from civil war or ongoing armed conflict, some young people describe living “in limbo, situations of unstable peace or ... ongoing localized violence” (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009, p. 10). Exposure to sustained high levels of violence and coercion led some youth in Central America’s Northern Triangle to describe their daily lives as akin to those of alcoholics, surviving “from one day to the next” (Northern Triangle CFR, p. 19).

In many of these instances, the young men and women expressed a deep sense of abandonment and disillusionment. One young woman in Afgoye, Somalia, explained, “The term peacebuilding is



**I am a social activist and I do not find peace ... I cannot have peace until and unless oversight from the state authorities of my work is minimised and while they do not trust me or feel my work is important to society.**



male, India- and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir

*(CR FGD Summary Report, p. 8)*

not practical to me ... there is nothing that can actually stop violence in our communities. It is everywhere in our homes and in our streets, in our political structures” (World Bank et al., 2018, p. 41). Another young female peacebuilder from Myanmar broke down as she described the violence and trauma that she had recently witnessed in her society, while the international community appeared paralysed (Asia and the Pacific consultation). A young man, talking about the devastation in Aleppo, asked, “How can we talk about a Security Council resolution on youth, peace and security, when our towns are under fire and being bombed to the ground?” (Anonymous #3 KII). A different form of scepticism was expressed by a young social justice advocate: “I don’t believe in peace as they are doing it now. To build real peace, we need to overcome social inequality by tackling the concentration of power in the elites. If we have to worry about food, we are never going to have peace. That’s a shitty lie. We are obliged to look for alternatives to survive and that is why we get involved in gangs” (Colombia CFR – b, p. 24).

Young people see “peace” as a deeply political issue, related to authorities and formal governance in which they have lost trust. Alternatively, it is viewed as a process that is exclusive to social and political elites. Family and community environments play an important role

in influencing these dynamics – for example, if parents prefer not to talk about peace and merely discard it as “dirty politics that only the elite concern themselves with” (Colombia CFR – b, p. 18). In Burundi, young people pointed out that the only space to engage in peace and security issues is through political parties that they regard with deep suspicion (Burundi FGD).

### Divisions of youth

Participants in the study were very clear that not all young people are inherently or automatically invested in working for peace and justice. Despite their widely expressed hopes, young women and men do not make romanticized assumptions that youth are magically “united” or “connected” by common bonds. Many young women and men were aware that those who worked in peacebuilding or youth organizations could easily be viewed as an “elite group”, especially when compared with the most marginalized and excluded. Young people highlighted that trust – as the core underpinning of peace and security – had to be built both horizontally among youth themselves and across generational divides within their communities, and vertically in the relationships between young people and social institutions, their governments and international stakeholders.

In some cases, youth found themselves on both sides of a conflict because of existing social or political divisions. As a focus-group participant in India- and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir said, “We are divided into various communities based on religious sects and castes. This makes our life difficult” (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 12). In Yemen, the civil war divided youth along different lines; like all other actors in the conflict, young people were “pushed and pulled in various directions by different actors and navigating their own internal political divisions” (Yemen FGD – a, p. 2). In Burundi, young people noted how ethnic differences were mobilized by political actors as a source of division: “As the elections approach, political party leaders recruit youth to

make sometimes violent propaganda. We even compose violent songs and hate speech against our opponents to intimidate them” (Burundi FGD). One young Yemeni woman lamented how “as a result of the cultural, social, psychological pressure, we are divided into many factions” (Yemen FGD – a, p. 5). Similar divisions were noted by Palestinian youth, who acknowledged the inevitability – but regretted the sometimes negative impact – of internal political divisions between young people within their communities. One of the key recommendations to emerge from the focus-group discussions in Palestine was the demand for a unified youth movement in Palestinian society that is insulated from factionalism and internal political division or manipulation.

These issues of division and mistrust are not unique to youth. However, young people were aware that they are often uniquely subject to mobilization or manipulation by elders and political elites, not only in political organization but also through gangs, organized crime and armed groups. Experiences of peace and security also reflect the reality of these intersecting and sometimes overlapping spheres in the lives of many youth.

## 2.2 Agency, ownership and leadership

Despite widespread feelings of injustice, frustration, mistrust and even desperation, many young people throughout the world mobilize for peace and security in their communities and societies in resourceful and creative ways. In all countries affected by rampant armed violence – be it because of active armed conflict, such as in Syria, or in communities plagued by gang violence in Central America – some young people are actively trying to appease tensions, rebuild trust and foster social cohesion. In countries “at peace”, young people are often the drivers of social change and political transition, working



to address the marginalization and exclusion of their peers. This mobilization for peace can take many different forms, from volunteer grassroots organizations to transnational networks, and from social and political dissent – online and in the streets – to artistic questioning of the status quo.

### Survey of youth-led organizations

In keeping with the principles of local ownership, agency and leadership in peace and development, it is important to draw attention to the unique contributions of youth-led civil society organizations. A survey undertaken as part of the Progress Study documents the work of 399 of these peacebuilding organizations (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017).

### Aims and goals of youth-led organizations

The organizations surveyed varied greatly in size, depth and impact. Most were working at the local level. Their most commonly stated goals were “empowering youth to develop their skills in understanding conflict resolution”, followed by “reducing violence and promoting a culture of peace in communities” (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 19). They also aspired to play an important role in restoring or supporting social cohesion within divided communities and to change the generally negative ways in which communities often tend to view their youth – seeking to shift perceptions from a prevailing mistrust of young people to presenting youth as “positive and constructive social agents”

# 399 youth-led peacebuilding organizations:

## Reflected a strong gender balance




45% female



55% male


## Operated on less than US\$5,000 per year

and only 11% have annual budgets that exceed US\$100,000



## Volunteers comprised about 97% of the staff

(United Nations Volunteers TP, p. 3)



(UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017)

(UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 38). Other organizational aims mentioned by respondents included advocating for human rights, encouraging the education of young people, increasing young people's access to economic opportunities, and seeking to prevent young people from joining violent extremist groups.

### **Operational advantages**

Respondents believed that the strength of their organizations and approaches was rooted in their understanding of local conditions and trust-based relationships with diverse youth in divided communities, as well as with other stakeholders. These relationships enabled them to work with populations and in settings that other actors could not always easily access. As one representative from an organization in Kenya stated, "We are able to penetrate areas that have been perceived as terror hotspots and feared by many, for instance ... Al-Shabaab militia strongholds in East Africa" (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 40). Another youth-led organization from Afghanistan noted, "The leadership and staff in our organization is all below 30 years old. The passion and energy we have has helped us to work with more than 15,000 youths in a very short amount of time" (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 40).

By definition, the youth-led organizations surveyed were led by young men and women. They reflected a strong gender balance in their staffing and composition, with 55 per cent male and 45 per cent female (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 22). The average leadership age was 29 years for men and 28 years for women.

### **Constraints**

Constraints on their ability to operate freely were the most commonly mentioned challenge identified by survey respondents. Many respondents attributed this to a lack of trust in young people and their organizations: "Members of the community and donors do not believe in youth and youth organizations; this makes it difficult to get funding to implement identified

projects" (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 33). The lack of trust sometimes manifested in youth organizations being prohibited from registration or barred from the formal recognition that might enable them to access additional funding (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Arab States consultations).

Limited funding was mentioned as the second most significant factor. Funding constraints play a significant role in determining the types of activities that organizations can undertake. Organizations and their work were mostly modestly funded or underfunded. Half the organizations that answered the survey operate on less than US\$5,000 per year, and only 11 per cent have annual budgets that exceed US\$100,000. Various institutional and capacity-based obstacles to receiving, managing and accounting for external funds inevitably leave youth-led organizations heavily dependent on local donations and the contributions of their own members. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the third main source of funding, followed by national civil society organizations.

Survey respondents explained how the inability to access even small amounts of seed funding or grants impaired some programmes from reaching wider audiences and having a greater impact. As one survey respondent from Colombo, Sri Lanka, summarized, "Most organizations are ground level but cannot scale up due to insufficient funding and lack of capacity to fundraise" (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 33). However, some youth leaders also warned against the assumption that large-scale or at-scale initiatives were necessarily preferable, highlighting that broader initiatives or networks can, over time, become less embedded in local communities and trusted by their peers. Others even warned of the danger that the uniquely endogenous character and integrity of these programmes may be tainted or impaired by a large injection of resources (Final Validation Consultation).

Youth-led organizations recognized that monitoring and assessing the impact of their initiatives were often an additional constraint for them – not for lack

of will, but rather because of lack of time, capacity and human resources. As one young person from Amman, Jordan, pointed out, “A proportion of funds must support research and organizational capacity development, rather than only programme implementation” (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 13). Many young people also do not believe that they have the knowledge and training necessary to meaningfully participate in projects related to peace and security. The survey noted that “the lack of sufficient skills, confidence, and awareness of the importance of engaging in peace and security, leads many young women and men to become inactive or hesitant to join active youth groups” (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 32).

### **Volunteerism**

Most youth-led organizations working on peace and security reported being heavily dependent on volunteers, who comprised approximately 97 per cent of the staff. This reflects wider trends described elsewhere and is not unique to youth-led organizations. According to the Global Youth Development Index, 21 per cent of young people – that is, an estimated 230 million people aged 15–24 – actively volunteered through diverse organizations in 2016 (United Nations Volunteers TP, p. 3). This heavy reliance on volunteerism is an attribute of youth-based and youth-led organizations in the peacebuilding field and beyond. In many instances, young people report gaining “valuable experience, self-esteem, awareness, voice, social status, and larger and more diversified social networks” from volunteering (United Nations Volunteers TP, p. 3).

However, this dependency may constrain youth-led organizations and youth-focused programmes, limiting their sustainability, scale and leadership, and the ability of others to replicate these organizational forms. The dependence on volunteerism can also make organizations vulnerable to human resource constraints.

In addition, the expectation that volunteers provide their time for free might mean that volunteer opportunities are only accessible

to young people who can afford to spend time on non-income-generating activities. In the Kosovo\* consultation, youth noted that a youth unemployment rate of 57 per cent meant that only an elite few were able to volunteer. Furthermore, volunteerism can also become a constraint for young people seeking to develop independent sources of income or employment. Young people in Nepal described how their parents discouraged them from participating in volunteer activities that brought in little to no income (Nepal CFR, p. 26).

### **Leadership**

Youth-led organizations are an important source of youth leadership and agency for peace and security, but are not the only one. Many organizations doing important work with or for young people are not led by young people but are “youth focused” (or may have dedicated programmes that are youth-focused situated within broader agendas). These organizations do not always identify as peacebuilding organizations, but they make important contributions to peace and the prevention of violent conflict. Youth leadership is found in diverse institutions and arenas of civic life, as well as in civil society organizations and remote communities, and within state institutions, and business and religious communities, among others. It is very important to recognize this organic form of youth leadership. This reflects the diverse spectrum of youth interests relevant to peace and security. These interests are frequently found outside formal political institutions and youth organizations, in seemingly unorganized systems and informal movements, many of which function horizontally rather than through top-down leadership. It is important that the full diversity of youth leadership should be recognized and supported to maximize youth ownership and agency – the autonomous and resilient capacities of young people to act and drive change – over the peace and security issues that affect their lives.

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\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

## ENGAGES

in all phases of peace and conflict:  
*prevention, humanitarian, on-going and post-conflict*



### BRIDGES

development, human rights,  
humanitarian, and peace  
and security



### OPERATES

at every level:  
*peer to peer, family, community,  
national, regional, international*



## YOUTH PEACE WORK



### RESPONDS

to different types of violence:  
*violent extremism, political conflict, organized criminal  
violence, sexual and gender-based violence, etc.*



### COLLABORATES

with diverse partners:  
*local and national governments, community  
leaders, media, cultural organizations, justice,  
police, other peacebuilding organizations*

## 2.3 Typology of youth engagements

In this study, youth described an enormous array of endeavours that aim to build and sustain peace. Selective description of these projects and initiatives cannot do justice to their richness, depth, variety and creativity. Some of these were stories of success; others reflected on the obstacles and limitations that young people confronted. Some described small-scale, familial or community-level engagements; others described the aspirations of global networks and programmes. Some were adaptive or survivalist in nature; others were more transformative in intent. Through all these narratives, young people illustrated the potential of investing in youth resilience for peace as a spectrum of opportunities: to “invest in the upside”.

There are many types of youth peacebuilding engagements. Although this section analyses and categorizes these engagements in a loose typology of youth peace work, in reality they intersect and overlap, reflecting the real experiences and complexity of building peace.

### Working in different phases of the peace and conflict cycle

Young people are actively engaged in different phases of the peace and conflict cycle – which, of course, is not a linear or irreversible process with simple dividing lines between each phase.

This adaptability, and the challenge of working across different phases of the peace and conflict spectrum were vividly illustrated in breakout discussions during the East and Southern Africa consultation. Young participants from Botswana, Malawi, Somalia, South Africa and South Sudan observed that, although peace and security were common concerns for all of them, the priorities, constraints and strategies for addressing the prevailing problems varied dramatically across their different contexts:

- Somalia and South Sudan were described as societies embroiled in ongoing conflict. Security risks and restricted civic space impose clear limits on what young people can do and their freedom to organize publicly.
- South Africa was characterized as being in post-conflict reconstruction mode, where youth can generally organize, and even express forms of dissent more freely, although the degree of civic and political liberty varies. Programming was organized around demands for meaningful change, rather than more defensively shaped by an imminently dangerous and repressive political context.
- Countries such as Botswana and Malawi were seen as enjoying relative peace. However, the experiences of youth marginalization and exclusion still urgently need to be addressed.

The participants painted a picture of how strategies and priorities for youth-focused peacebuilding differed across these contexts. Unsurprisingly, approaches to youth peace work across the globe reflected this diversity.

### ***Outbreak of violence***

Youth engage in endeavours to prevent the outbreak of violence in situations of relative peace or “pre-conflict” settings, including through early interventions to prevent violence. These pre-emptive initiatives use diverse methods, including education, peace debates and dialogues, religious dialogues, civic and voter education, educational theatre and community radio, and sport and music festivals.

Examples of youth-led or youth-focused work to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict include early intervention (longer-term) models with young children, as well as more immediate prevention approaches (shorter-term interventions) with youth in divided societies. One example of an early intervention approach providing peace education to school-age children is World Vision



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International's Gestores de Paz in Colombia, where young people visit schools and transmit messages of peace to children throughout the country. Another approach is seen in the work of the Nansen Dialogue Network in multiple countries in the former Yugoslavia, which brings school students from ethnically and religiously divided communities together through dialogue, to break barriers and stereotypes in an endeavour to contribute to reconciliation (Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation). In Sweden, the network Tillsammans för Sverige (Together for Sweden) organizes summer camps to support social cohesion and dialogue within migrant communities in isolated neighbourhoods of Stockholm (Sweden FGD).

**Ongoing and escalating violent conflict**

Youth also intervene to mitigate the impact of violent conflict where it has emerged, and to build peace and social cohesion – for example, through peer-to-peer dialogue in conflict-affected communities in Kyrgyzstan (FGD), or through supporting the disengagement and reintegration of former Al-Shabaab fighters in the midst of

the conflict in Somalia.<sup>9</sup> The Ugandan Reformed Warriors Program involves disengaging young men who have been involved in cattle raiding, and facilitating trust-building between them and their communities. Many of the young men participating in this programme have become “Peace Ambassadors”, who advocate for peace beyond their own communities (Uganda CFR). In Kenya, young people involved in the Kaabong Peace Ambassadors developed entrepreneurial and life skills by training to improve former fighters’ livelihood opportunities during the conflict, through savings and loans schemes (Kenya CFR).

In other instances, youth groups described taking the primary responsibility to provide humanitarian support, food and aid, thereby helping to maintain social cohesion in contexts where there are real risks of internal conflict, and where even international organizations are in retreat because of the escalating risks of war. For example, through the “1000 Bakery” in Yemen, youth baked

9 <http://elmanpeace.org/>

and delivered bread to more than 12,000 families in Sana'a in the midst of the conflict. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, in partnership with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), advocates for continuation of education in times of conflict, to try to preserve schools as safe spaces and as places for dialogue for children (UNICEF, 2016a; Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP).

Youth have also played a key role in monitoring and documenting human rights violations during conflict. In Burundi, the Forum for Conscience and Development gathers information on issues from electoral violence to human trafficking, and a network of more than 20 local organizations (INAMA) documents human rights violations and trains young "Citizen Reporters" to report arrests and disappearances (Burundi FGD).

### **Post-conflict peacebuilding**

Young people engage in efforts to ensure that various forms of violent conflict do not recur or re-emerge. They also recognize continuity and change in the ways that patterns of violent conflict transmute and evolve over time, and the importance of addressing new fault lines of exclusion, which often reflect the underlying causes of past conflict that have not been adequately resolved. Young people have engaged directly and indirectly in formal and informal peace processes, with varying degrees of success – for example, in the Philippines, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. In Mali and Somalia, the United Nations Mine Action Service employs young men and women in community-based teams, thus providing employment for young people in post-conflict contexts, and enabling them to tangibly contribute to peacebuilding and community safety.

Youth have participated in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, both in the wake of conflict and in some situations of ongoing conflict. For example, in Sierra Leone, Somalia and various parts of Central America, youth-led reintegration and diversion programmes for former fighters, young offenders and gang

members have contributed to preventing relapse into violent conflict. In Cameroon, the Local Youth Corner aims to transform former violent offenders into champions for peace through capacity-building and training, to facilitate their successful rehabilitation and reintegration (Sanyi and Achaleke, 2017). In addition, this youth group distributes entrepreneurship awards to former violent offenders to actively engage them in the prevention of violent extremism and help reduce recidivism.

The power of youth involvement in "dealing with the past" illustrates young people's key role as transmitters of historical memory to ensure that future generations learn from past conflict. Young people and their organizations have been extensively involved in truth and reconciliation, and other transitional justice processes – for example, in Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Timor-Leste (International Center for Transitional Justice TP). The Réseau Action Justice et Paix (RAJP) in Côte d'Ivoire partnered with UNICEF to develop training and organize retreats on conflict prevention for young people, and drafted recommendations for the reparations policy of the National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation for Victims (International Center for Transitional Justice TP). Assessing the significance of RAJP's initiative has wider applications, including to many of the examples described here:

*In many ways, the catalytic effect of this project matters more than any final product: the dialogue process resulted in the creation of a powerful tool, produced by youth for youth. It also created momentum for what will be a long-term process of awareness-raising, advocacy, and ultimately reform.*  
(Ladisch and Rice, 2016)

An example of young people's engagement in memorializing past conflict in the years that follow is the Kenyan youth-led initiative Picha Mtaani, which hosted a 24-hour street exhibition that was visited by about 500,000 people nationwide to reflect on the violence that occurred after the 2007–08 elections (Kenya CFR).

The enduring engagement and commitment of young people to peace, sometimes over decades following violent conflict, is strikingly illustrated by Japanese youth's ongoing participation in the People's Decade for Nuclear Abolition. This vibrant youth-based and youth-focused nuclear disarmament campaign holds workshops, dialogue forums and exhibitions, and uses these to advocate for the elimination of nuclear weapons (Soka Gakkai International TP).

### **Working across different types of conflict and violence**

Work with and by young people on sustaining peace addresses different types of conflict and forms of violence. Young people have described a wide spectrum, including armed rebellion, violent extremism, ethnic and communal violence, criminal violence, violent uprisings, sexual and gender-based violence, conflict over natural resources, and violence in prison and at the hands of the criminal justice system.<sup>10</sup> A global evaluation of children and youth participation in peacebuilding, focused on Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nepal, noted that:

*Female and male children and youth have a broader understanding of peacebuilding that focuses on the need to address different types of violence, discrimination, and injustice that affects them in their families, schools, and communities, including domestic violence, gender-based violence, early marriage, ethnic discrimination, and disrespect.*  
(McGill and O'Kane, 2015, p. 111)

In most regions and numerous country contexts, young people emphasized that the YPS agenda should not focus too narrowly on specific forms of violence, such as violent extremism or terrorism, to the exclusion of the different realities or priorities facing them

in their countries or regions (Latin America and Caribbean, and East and Southern Africa consultations). Young women and men were also enthusiastic about the potential to learn from each other and develop innovative practices through exchanging their experiences across different types of violence and their creative responses to them.

### **Extremist violence**

Extremist violence was viewed as a serious concern across many regions. Organizations such as the Pakistan Youth Alliance (E-Consultation #1) aim to build youth resilience to prevent recruitment into extremist or terrorist groups. The Pakistan Youth Alliance organizes awareness campaigns and cultural events at schools and universities. It became renowned for a "Peace Rickshaw Project", which placed messages about peace and social cohesion on rickshaws, co-opting the campaigns and methods used by some extremist groups (Pakistan CFR).

In Somalia, the Somali Youth Development Foundation focuses on community development in line with the SDGs, combined with sports and intercultural dialogue, to offer young people alternatives to violent extremist groups (E-Consultation #1). Yemeni youth described how they seek to protect "vulnerable" colleagues from recruitment into extremist groups through a combination of building networks with young Yemenis outside the country; publicizing counternarratives through radio, social media and theatre groups; addressing the root causes of conflict by promoting human rights, security and development; and expanding the voice of Yemeni youth in conflict-affected communities. One young participant described the approach: "What is needed is not to simply go on social media and confront [these groups] but to offer young people viable alternatives" (Yemen CFR, p. 27). Another said, "We are competing with extremist and armed groups to win young people over to the side of civil society" (Yemen CFR, p. 22).

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<sup>10</sup> For a full categorization of these types of violence, see Olonisakin and Ismail (forthcoming, pp. 9–12).





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### ***Criminal violence***

Young people made important observations about the interrelationship and porous dividing lines between different types of violence. Many examples were cited of how organized criminal violence fed into, or subsidized, political and extremist violence, and vice versa. In places such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (Northern Triangle CFR); Colombia (Colombia CFR – a; Colombia CFR – b); and South Africa (South Africa CFR; Simpson, 2001), as well as in many other cases, there are striking examples of how mobilization or manipulation by elders and political elites reaches beyond politically involved youth to include young people in gangs and organized crime. Young participants in the study shared many creative and courageous engagements in the area of criminal violence, particularly in relation to the pervasive problem of organized violence and youth participation in criminal gangs (see section 3.5). Youth have also given attention to other related aspects of violence, including violence prevention activities in prisons in El Salvador, South Africa and Tunisia;

and activism related to gun control in response to gun violence in Colombia, South Africa and the United States.

### ***Sexual and gender-based violence***

Young people are engaged in various approaches to gender-based violence prevention and response. They support survivors of sexual violence and protect young women in vulnerable settings. In Pakistan, Aware Girls provides psychosocial assistance to survivors of gender-based violence, supports the financial and educational empowerment of young women, conducts awareness-raising on sexual and reproductive health rights, and promotes gender equality more generally (Pakistan CFR). In India, young people developed the SafetiPin app to map safe and unsafe areas of cities, using GPS tracking, to prevent sexual and gender-based violence, and protect young women (SecDev Group TP). The app rapidly expanded to 10 Indian cities and three other urban centres in other parts of the world, and has been used by government agencies and security departments.



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Young people help to change attitudes and reform criminal justice to address gender-based crimes. The Jamaica Forum for Lesbians, All-Sexuals and Gays raises awareness through the Youth Social Advocacy Project about the violence and abuse that LGBTI youth face, and the development of prevention approaches. The forum is the first such organization in Jamaica to have successfully collaborated with the government in defending LGBTI rights (Central American and the Caribbean CFR). It has successfully lobbied for constitutional protections, and provides counseling and support services for LGBTI youth.

It has also launched widespread multimedia public education campaigns, such as the We Are Jamaica campaign, which told the life stories of LGBTI Jamaicans. In countries such as Brazil and Turkey, youth organizations have organized to combat police abuse of power, targeting transgender people.

Important work is also being done with and by young men to address harmful gender

stereotypes and cultivate masculine identities that are not based on control over women. The One Man Can campaign initiated by the Sonke Gender Justice network in South Africa hosts dialogues with young men about what they can do to prevent gender-based violence.<sup>11</sup> In the United States, Men Can Stop Rape was established to promote the idea of “positive masculinity” among youth in high schools and colleges. This initiative encourages young men to think about, and challenge, the ways in which they have been taught to prove themselves that might promote prejudice or violence against women.<sup>12</sup> In the Pumwani informal settlements of Nairobi, Kenya, the DREAMS program organizes male “agents of change” to teach men and boys how to prevent violence against women and girls in their communities.<sup>13</sup> Young people noted that there

11 <http://genderjustice.org.za/project/community-education-mobilisation/one-man-can/>

12 [www.mencanstoprape.org/](http://www.mencanstoprape.org/)

13 [www.dreamspartnership.org/](http://www.dreamspartnership.org/)

are some well-established correlations between gender-based violence and other patterns of violence, and that this might present both challenges and opportunities for intervening in cycles of violence.

### ***Intercommunal, religious and political violence***

Addressing intercommunal, religious and political violence is another important focus of youth-led and youth-focused initiatives, including some of the examples already cited in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Kenya, the Philippines and Yemen. Many youth-led initiatives have attempted to bring a fresh perspective to centuries-old ethnic or intercommunal conflicts. Under extremely constrained political and security circumstances, the organization JAMAA has brought Tutsi and Hutu youth together for sports and leisure activities in Burundi (Kemper, 2005), and the Palestinian-Israeli Emerging Leaders Program focuses on joint campaigns against both intercommunal and community-level violence (SecDev Group TP). The National Ethnic Youth Conference in Myanmar has sought to foster trust between different ethnic groups through youth participation in constitution-making dialogues, as well as debates on peace and reconciliation, the rule of law and human rights (Myanmar CFR). In Cameroon, the Cercle International pour la Promotion de la Création promotes interreligious dialogue among youth, combined with leadership development programmes, and theatre-based and intercultural programmes aimed at developing civic engagement as an alternative to violence (E-Consultation #1). In places such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Guatemala, youth have organized around conflicts and escalating violence associated with natural resource extraction, often involving the expropriation of communal or ancestral land.

### ***Working at different levels of society***

Youth peace work engages diverse stakeholders and operates at different levels of society. This multilevel peacebuilding work reflects the diversity of young people's multiple points of access –

as a demographic group, they are present as stakeholders across *all* these tiers of society.

### ***Work in and with the community***

As noted previously, much youth-led peacebuilding work is highly local, often small-scale, and peer-to-peer in orientation. Yet the impact of much of this work is community-wide. An example from Kyrgyzstan involved peer-to-peer engagement of girls through their madrasa (religious school) to prevent their potential support for, or recruitment into, extremist groups. By recording songs of positive narratives of Islam, which were then shared within their community, this approach sought to build positive social cohesion and trust within the community (Kyrgyzstan FGD). In Medellín, Colombia, young people have contributed to the transformation of Comuna 13, previously considered one of the most dangerous neighbourhoods in the city, into a vibrant community that welcomes tourists for graffiti tours and to take part in the community's cultural activities (Colombia CFR – a).

### ***Intergenerational work***

Youth peace work can also transcend the boundaries of local or small-scale programmes. Among other methods, this happens through intergenerational work. One example is the Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum, which has sought to bring imams of all ages together to discuss how to offer guidance to young followers and encourage intercultural understanding (United States Institute of Peace TP). The Union of Karenni State Youth, a network of Karenni (Kayah) youth organizations in Myanmar, took the initiative of fostering encounters between elder leaders of ethnic armed groups and political parties, who rarely met and spoke together (Berghof Foundation TP). This was premised on first building trust between the youth wings of the different armed groups and political parties, on which they could leverage the inter-ethnic and intergenerational dialogue.

### ***Youth peacebuilding as the intermediary***

Youth work to prevent violence and sustain peace can engage youth at the community

level, but can also translate into policy and advocacy between communities, and with national, regional and multilateral authorities and institutions. Where youth initiatives achieve this intermediary function of both “listening in” and “speaking out”, youth peacebuilding can serve as a powerful connective tissue between these different levels of engagement. These roles as intermediaries are sometimes played by young people and youth organization within their communities – “bonding social capital”. In other instances, their intermediary function is between local communities – “bridging social capital”. Sometimes, they have this connective role at the interface with the national level or international community – “linking social capital”.

Where this connectivity can be supported, it offers a unique potential for contributing to a more systemic approach to building and sustaining peace. For example, young women in the conflict in South Sudan have been depicted as “bridges and a means for communication during intra[communal] conflicts”, in part because they can cross lines to visit relatives and bring messages to the opposing side of the conflict (South Sudan FGD, p. 11) In another example, the Center for Intercultural Dialogue in Macedonia has evolved from localized dialogue “in someone’s living room” into an initiative supported by the government to offer bilingual education to young people of different cultures, to encourage dialogue and understanding (Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation). The Asociación Nacional de Estudiantes de Secundaria in Colombia helped establish human rights committees in 18 schools to document and combat the use of schools as places for recruitment into the armed forces, and subsequently took part in the National Peace Council in Colombia (Lie, 2017). The Young Women’s Peace Academy in the Caucasus, in partnership with the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, translated local mentorship and leadership programming for young women into a network of 130 organizations in three countries doing peace training and capacity-building. In 2015, the academy drafted a Young Women’s Peace Charter targeted at national and international actors (UN Women TP).

### **National and international levels**

Youth peace work can take the form of broad programming and networking at national and international levels. Programmes such as Outward Bound Peacebuilding, organized by the Palestinian-Israeli Emerging Leaders Program, have translated local peer-to-peer leadership dialogues into sustainable national and international encounters, applying the lessons in more than 25 countries supported by a growing global network of young people working in their communities. Seeds of Peace trains young people from different conflict-affected regions in leadership and conflict management so that they can return to their countries and establish their own organizations (USAID, 2017). Using a powerful on-line presence, Transit Youth (Yemen) is working to connect young Yemeni forced migrants both inside and outside Yemen’s borders (Yemen CFR). One organizer said, “Yemenis outside could be a bridge between the grassroots activists in Yemen and the international organizations in the countries of their residence” (Yemen FGD – a, p. 21).

For many organizations working at national, regional and global levels, awareness campaigns, youth forums and leadership programmes are common interventions for building capacity, exchanging knowledge and enhancing impact, although these have uneven influence in the global policy sphere. They range from advocating against racial prejudice in their communities, such as the My Friend campaign in Myanmar (see box 1), to offering recommendations to the international community through the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum. The adoption of Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) is itself a testament to the power of young people’s work on a global scale: youth organizations, with the United Network of Young Peacebuilders at the forefront, were the first to advocate for such a resolution.

### **Working through partnerships and bridging operational silos**

Young people’s work on peace and security intersects with diverse fields, disciplines and sectors. This has sometimes led young people and their organizations to expand and enrich their

work by building effective collaborations and partnerships.

### **Partnerships with civil society and international entities**

Youth organizations working on peace and security have established partnerships with civic, trade union, political, human rights, women's, cultural and sporting organizations; religious communities; education service providers; and many more. Youth organizations have also been adept at forging partnerships with the media, and cultural and arts institutions – for example, Radio Okapi in Democratic Republic of Congo, where youth were involved in the design, development and programming of radio stations focusing on peace and security issues (Democratic Republic of Congo CFR).

Numerous organizations also referred to the critical partnerships they were able to forge with various United Nations entities and international organizations in support of youth peace work, such as the partnership in Côte

D'Ivoire between the International Center for Transitional Justice and UNICEF to create a radio programme in which youth could discuss current issues and the national reconciliation process (International Center for Transitional Justice TP). Other partnerships were well documented in submissions to the study, such as the partnership of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo with Urban Youth Councils, which seeks to improve relationships between civil society and the security forces.

### **Working with government**

For many youth organizations, partnerships with their governments, where possible, are an important dimension of their work. For example, youth in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation emphasized that bringing government actors to the meetings of young peacebuilders helped both groups find common ground for action, develop mutual respect and redress trust gaps (Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation). In Kenya, the Lang'ata Youths

## **BOX 1**

### **My Friend campaign – Myanmar**

In 2015, a group of young human rights advocates from Yangon launched a campaign encouraging young people to post on Facebook and Twitter pictures of themselves accompanied by young people of other ethnicities, with the hashtag #myfriend or #friendshiphasnoboundaries.<sup>14</sup> This was in response to increasing division and tension between ethnic groups, and violence and discrimination directed against ethnic minorities, specifically the Rohingya population.

Wai Wai Nu, one of the campaign's co-founders, is a Rohingya Muslim herself who, at the age of 18, was sentenced to 17 years in prison. After serving 7 years of her sentence, she went on to attain a law degree and began to advocate for the human rights of ethnic minorities. What started as an online campaign to promote peace and celebrate diversity has since brought together thousands of young people, both online and through in-person events with civil society leaders, musicians, artists, academics and even some government officials. Within two years, the initiative built a Facebook following of more than 30,000. It has evolved into a sustained network of young people associated with the online campaign.

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<sup>14</sup> <https://mashable.com/2015/11/06/myanmars-my-friend-campaign/#1ArEwPFAC8q6>



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Network partnered with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission to develop dialogue forums and programmes on “responsible citizenship” among youth (Kenya CFR).

Where working with government can be difficult at the national level, young people are often able to work with local authorities, traditional leaders or urban local governments. Young Libyan participants at the Arab States consultation noted that, even when it was impossible to work directly with the national government during the conflict, they could collaborate with local authorities and even grow wider networks through multiple local government partnerships of this sort (Arab States consultation). This also came up in the East and Southern Africa region, where youth underscored the value of the information that local governments could provide about the community to inform action (East and Southern Africa consultation, p. 11). In Central America, youth groups have actively sought partnerships with mayors and urban local authorities (Northern Triangle CFR; Muggah et al. TP).

Collaboration with the government often involves engagement at the institutional level – for example, building relationships with the police through community policing endeavours, in contexts as diverse as Canada (Ottawa Police, 2016) and South Africa (CFR).

### **Benefits of partnerships**

These various partnerships can challenge the conventional assumptions about the small-scale or local constraints of youth peacebuilding endeavours, because they enable youth organizations to expand the influence, impact and scale of their operations, as well as their reach and visibility (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017). But the advantages of these partnerships and collaborations are not just about increased scale. Young peacebuilders and youth-led organizations highlighted how these partnerships increased their ability to participate in national and international campaigns, strengthened their legitimacy on the ground, and sometimes offered a degree of protection in repressive or threatening environments.

Young people also described partnerships as an invaluable vehicle for sharing information, and filling in the gaps in their knowledge and data. Young leaders believed that they benefited greatly from the monitoring and evaluation tools and resources that they often received through their partners, particularly access to information to fill data gaps. Partnerships in which there is meaningful dialogue and exchange of good practices, based on an equal balance of power between the partners, and in which youth-led organizations are able to acquire and assert their leadership and advocate for themselves, were viewed as particularly important. Equitable partnerships, including with organizations from other sectors (such as women's, developmental or human rights organizations), facilitating an exchange of innovative practices, provide numerous potential benefits to youth organizations. These advantages included expanding their visibility and influence, and improving their programming capacities.

Partnerships not only benefit the young people in these organizations but also enhance the impact of the work of all actors in the peacebuilding field, including community leaders and authorities, religious institutions, NGOs, and other members of civil society. Peacebuilding organizations and other actors can benefit from the local knowledge, energy and determination of the young people involved. As a respondent from Somalia explained, "Through partnerships we can contribute our part and reap the benefits of others' efforts. We can accelerate learning and distribute skills and knowledge" (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 28).

These partnerships and collaborations also enable work on YPS to traverse many of the operational silos between development, human rights, humanitarian action, and peace and security. Governments and the multilateral system may derive significant benefits from this youth peace work.

## **Claiming space through innovative tools and creative approaches**

Young people's use of art, culture, media and sports is a distinctive feature of their engagement for peace, including their innovations related to social media, communication platforms and cybertechnologies.

### ***Information and communication technologies***

Social media – and information and communication technologies (ICTs) more broadly – are being used as tools to build global networks and connect young people in multiple locations. ICTs offer innovative mechanisms for communication and networking in conflict-affected and divided societies, and for extending the reach of youth organizations by supporting training and peace education.

These initiatives represent much more than just a "creative cyber toolbox" that young women and men are particularly adept at using. They represent innovative spaces claimed by young people for dialogue and participation. These spaces are creatively and predominantly occupied by young people, making online technologies an obvious priority for any strategy aimed at youth participation and inclusion. In lieu of often hierarchical and inaccessible conventional representative politics, young people use ICT tools to democratize and facilitate their direct participation, voice, agency and leadership. For example, youth report using WhatsApp for multiple purposes, including direct real-time communication between youth and their representatives in delicate peace negotiations, and the creation of WhatsApp peacebuilding courses where young people cannot easily gather.

ICTs have also been invaluable to young people in the monitoring, documentation and publication of human rights violations in situations of conflict, as well as in informing and protecting vulnerable communities. There are many examples of videos documenting atrocities, captured and uploaded by young videographers in embattled conflict zones.

In Syria, SalamaTech is an online platform for Syrians in war zones, helping to sustain dialogue and communication, providing updates on the situation, and assisting in the coordination of humanitarian responses for those in need. In Egypt, HarassMap is an online app that enables young women to report their experiences of sexual violence or harassment. Ushahidi (Kenya) is one of the more renowned and established initiatives in this area; it is used widely around the world for election monitoring and data collection on violent incidents, with more than 10 million posts and as many as 25 million users (SecDev Group TP).

There are also fascinating adaptations of online video-gaming technologies to peacebuilding, such as PeaceMaker (Israel–Palestine), which developed an award-winning game revolving around finding peaceful solutions to the conflict in the region; it has sold more than 100,000 copies in English, Hebrew and Arabic.<sup>15</sup> There are other rapidly evolving platforms, and a growing field of “peacetech” being developed and used by young peacebuilders. Examples include the PeaceTech Lab,<sup>16</sup> which works to reduce violent conflict using technology, media and data to accelerate and scale peacebuilding efforts; and the Stanford Peace Innovation Lab,<sup>17</sup> which uses behaviour modelling, innovation, persuasive and social technologies, and finance to increase positive peace. Even where these initiatives are not youth led or exclusively aimed at young people, it is clear that youth are the key users and audience.

### **Arts and media**

Art, music and poetry, as well as more traditional media approaches, feature in youth peace work. Many initiatives mentioned earlier in this chapter have arts, sports or culture as a component. In 2016, the Guatemalan annual International

Poetry Festival, organized by young people, focused on the issues that Indigenous people face in the country, and the human rights violations they were subjected to during the country’s internal conflict (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees TP). Also in Guatemala, the street theatre group Caja Lúdica<sup>18</sup> used dance and clown performances to reclaim dangerous parts of Guatemala City, and challenge both the power of street gangs and police abuse of power targeted at youth.

Numerous youth organizations reported making extensive use of radio and television, particularly to access rural and migrant youth. They included various organizations in Burundi (Burundi FGD), and the use of radio in Uganda (Radio Pacis, Uganda) to facilitate dialogue between refugee groups and host communities. In Iraq, Salam Shabab is a youth-run reality television show involving around 50 Iraqi youth undertaking a series of tasks to become “peace ambassadors” in their country (SecDev Group TP).

### **Sports**

Sports have provided another approach to youth peace work. The Somali Youth Development Foundation uses sports tournaments to foster intercultural dialogue and offer young people alternatives to joining violent groups (E-Consultation #1). In Kenya, the Kaabong Peace Ambassadors programme used sports, music, cultural and dance programmes in their work with peace processes relating to land disputes, as well as in dialogues between communities and security officials (Kenya CFR). On a global level, PeacePlayers International<sup>19</sup> aims to transmit the values of peace to young people through sports. It is reported to have partnered with more than 260 organizations, trained more than 2,000 coaches, and accessed more than 75,000 young people through its

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15 [www.peacemakergame.com/](http://www.peacemakergame.com/)

16 [www.peacetechlab.org/](http://www.peacetechlab.org/)

17 <https://peaceinnovation.stanford.edu/>

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18 [www.cajaludica.org/caja/](http://www.cajaludica.org/caja/)

19 [www.peaceplayers.org/](http://www.peaceplayers.org/)



programmes, in countries as diverse as Israel–Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa (USAID, 2017). Box 2 describes another example.

### **Contributing to peace through direct action**

Young people can be powerful challengers of the status quo through peaceful protest, social critique, cultural expression, and online mobilization and organization.

This is a long-standing, and perhaps universal, dimension of the change agency of youth, with numerous examples throughout history of young women and men at the forefront of political and social change. These examples include the role of youth in the civil rights movement in the United States; the initially peaceful and brutally repressed student-led protests against apartheid in South Africa; the Indignados Movement in Spain, protesting against the government's economic austerity measures; protest action by Lutte pour le Changement, demanding protection

and accountability in Democratic Republic of Congo (CFR); the recent anti-corruption protests in Guatemala; the non-violent peaceful protests in Serbia of the Otpor ("resistance") movement, unifying democratic opposition groups to protect freedom of expression; anti-corruption movements such as Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso, using music and art to build popular support; Y'en a Marre in Senegal; the youth uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia; popular protests of Indian youth against sexual and gender-based violence; and recent protest action by students and minority groups in the United States against gun violence and police abuse of power. Such movements have often faced state violence in reaction to their mobilization.

Recognizing young people's direct, peaceful, popular action is important to avoid conceiving young people's contribution to peace as purely institutionalized, organized or taking the form of "projects". This view may ignore the power of spontaneous youth movements, and render

#### **BOX 2**

### **Luta pela Paz – Brazil**

Luta pela Paz<sup>20</sup> ("Fight for Peace") pairs boxing, martial arts and education to help demobilize gang members and prevent others from joining. It was founded by a young man in 2000, who established a gym in the Maré favela in Rio de Janeiro that served as a base to offer support to young people, and address their experiences of exclusion as well as the pressure to join gangs. It uses boxing and martial arts training to teach young people discipline, self-control and sportsmanship. The training is paired with after-school assistance, vocational training and support services offered by social workers. Young people in the programme are also provided with leadership opportunities, including the possibility of joining an elected Youth Council.

Since its creation, Luta pela Paz has partnered with organizations across the world and has expanded to provide similar services in 25 countries. Luta pela Paz believes that changes in how young people perceive themselves can trigger behavioural changes that transform their interpersonal relationships and outlook on the future. More than 90 per cent of the young people involved in Luta pela Paz described feeling more confident and healthy because of their involvement; 89 per cent were more willing to cooperate with others, and 88 per cent felt more optimistic about their future.

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<sup>20</sup> <http://fightforpeace.net/>



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invisible the role of unorganized youth and social movements. However, it must also be acknowledged that youth involvement in popular protest and social movements is not inherently inclusive, necessarily benevolent or inevitably peaceful. This is powerfully illustrated by the involvement of youth in the resurgence of populist, nationalist movements that are often anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and premised on prejudice and exclusion. Such movements have sometimes generated or promoted violence rather than contributing to peaceful outcomes.

In addition, although youth movements may appear to be led by youth, they may sometimes be subject to manipulation by various political stakeholders, including governments themselves (Sommers, 2015). The leadership by youth may be usurped or overtaken by older and better-resourced political actors; such popular

mobilization might, in some instances, actually exacerbate exclusion of many youth stakeholders (Berents and McEvoy-Levy, 2015).

However, peaceful protests and dissent remain some of the most important tools for youth-based movements struggling for peace based on political change and justice. They offer attractive alternatives to violence and may also stimulate positive change processes within societies. This is not always fully appreciated as an important component of youth peace work, partly because it is often perceived as potentially threatening by many governmental and international actors. It is critical that the spaces for these social movements be protected – and recognized as an important component of young people’s contributions to building and sustaining peace – rather than treated as merely threatening to the status quo and invested interests.

## 2.4 Reaping the reward: consolidating youth peace work

The activities, approaches and strategies outlined in this examination of youth peace work reflect the multifaceted perspectives of peace and security for young people. They illustrate how the distinct characteristics of the violence, conflict and context that young people encounter shape the parameters and manifestations of their interventions. In some cases, their actions are proactive, pre-emptive and preventive; in others they are constrained, adaptive and defensive.

To the extent that young people seek to address the underlying causes rather than just the symptoms of violent conflict, their work has the potential to be transformative. These are the concrete manifestations of the “upside” of young people’s agency, leadership and positive resilience in the face of violence and conflict. They offer alternative avenues (to hard security responses) for investment in building and sustaining peace, and resolving violent conflict. It is important that we explore how best to support and sustain these avenues.

### Transmission and sustainability of youth leadership and capacities

The transient nature of youth as a social category and as an identity presents youth-led and youth-focused peace and security work with a key challenge: to ensure that this work and its benefits are transmissible from one youth cohort to the next. The composition of their leadership means that youth-led organizations face unique sustainability challenges, because they need to replace leaders who age out of the youth category. The capacity to reproduce committed youth leadership over time is significant for the long-term sustainability, evolution and cumulative impact of a youth movement for peace and security.

This is an important concern of both youth-led and youth-focused organizations, which must navigate how to develop leadership, reproduce

organizational practice, and transmit institutional memory and experiential lessons from one youth generation to the next. It is less about the durability of specific organizations than it is about the cultivation, reproduction and sustainability of youth leadership, agency and ownership. However, leadership turnover can also be an asset, because it creates a built-in defence (albeit there are no guarantees) against temptations of patronage, elite control and clientelism.

Youth organizations – particularly student organizations with a transient membership base – sometimes intuitively undertake these goals without this necessarily being documented, evaluated or even recognized. Some long-standing international organizations working with youth – particularly on leadership development – offer illustrative examples of the positive potential for institutional sustainability across youth cohorts. One of the largest and most long-standing international youth organizations undertaking considerable work on peace and youth-based civic engagement is the global Scout Movement, which has also successfully invested in, and supported, youth leadership development over multiple generations.<sup>21</sup> Another example is the European Union’s Erasmus Programme, which has invested in building capacities and supporting the leadership of youth – including in relation to peace and conflict – for more than 30 years.<sup>22</sup>

### Avoiding elitism or romanticization

Although fostering youth leadership is important, it is also important to guard against the cultivation of youth elites, who are organized, have the language skills and access that enable them to be easily heard, and may sometimes speak too readily for the most marginalized or less formally organized youth. In Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the challenges faced by the leadership of some youth-led organizations were described as the “me first” phenomenon, in which some young leaders put

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21 [www.scout.org/](http://www.scout.org/)

22 [http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/node\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/node_en)

individual ambitions before community interests, or where “road-blockers” who were hired to help identify participants for projects selected their friends or peers (Côte d’Ivoire CFR).

It is important to be mindful of the need to reach a broad range of young people, who are not necessarily organized or leading as peacebuilders. As noted previously, youth are not homogenous, and their divisions and diverse opinions should be represented in youth peace work. Recognizing the realities of individual ambitions, sociopolitical divisions, and competition for scarce resources or visibility is necessary to avoid romanticizing young people by incorrectly assuming that they all inherently share a selfless yearning to engage for the common good. These factors are not unique to youth.

### **“Do no harm”: preserving the core attributes of youth peace work**

To maximize the benefits of investing in young people building and sustaining peace, it is important that such investment is premised on a “do no harm” approach, which ensures that the core attributes of youth peace work are carefully preserved, supported and harnessed.

As noted, many youth-led organizations are often severely underfunded and heavily dependent on volunteerism. Many readily acknowledge their lack of institutional, technical and human capacity, including the ability to raise, administer and account for larger funds, and to evaluate and monitor the impact of their initiatives. It is therefore crucial to increase investment and resources in this work, facilitate expanding and mainstreaming peace work within a wider range of youth organizations, and cultivate and support the leadership of youth. It is also important to contribute to professionalizing the field and incentivizing youth participation alongside a powerful voluntary commitment.

However, this is not without potential pitfalls that must be avoided or carefully navigated. If not diligently implemented, the much-needed and

important injection of funding can compromise the integrity of youth-led peacebuilding, rather than enriching the endeavour. Investing additional resources must be part of a wider strategy to build the institutional capacity of youth-led organizations, guarantee an enabling environment, and ensure that the additional resources enhance creativity in youth peace work, rather than overly bureaucratizing it. Failure to do this may tax rather than strengthen the limited capacities of these organizations, or expose them to manipulation, or worse. Furthermore, in seeking to build the capacity and institutionalize youth-led programming, professionalization and voluntarism should be balanced, ensuring that young peace workers are not exploited, but that youth-led peacebuilding is also not unhealthily commodified.

It was also previously noted that many youth-led and youth-focused organizations are small, local and narrowly focused. Although this is not true of all organizations or programmatic approaches, it does raise the question of how young people can best translate their creativity and programmatic impact to scale. For many, creative partnerships and collaborations with other organizations and across sectors are key, not only because they traverse different operational silos, but also because they play a central role in expanding the scale and impact of youth-led and youth-focused peacebuilding. Support for these cross-cutting collaborations is therefore very important for the growth and evolution of this field.

However, fostering partnerships and collaborations should not disempower youth or skew the balance of power between young people and those with whom they partner. The importance of preserving youth leadership and equality in these institutional relationships cannot be overstated. Sensitivity is also required to the threats that youth leadership often presents to existing leadership and older generations. Awareness of the unintended consequences of exacerbating or creating generational tensions, or subverting more



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traditional power relationships between generations is essential (Dwyer, 2015). Young participants in the study were emphatic about the importance of cross-generational dialogues and interactions. It is also important that it is not assumed that wider reach and size of programmes automatically mean greater impact. Increased scale of programming can impair the integrity or authenticity of youth-led peacebuilding that may depend on being locally embedded and trusted. Indeed, many young peacebuilders articulated that maintaining the balance between acting locally and still having an impact globally was both a core asset and a challenge of their work.

The capacity constraints and skills base needed to support impact assessment and measurement of youth-led peacework must be addressed through support and investment. However, there is also potential that, in the demand for standardized methods

of programme planning, design, monitoring and evaluation, the innovation and risk-taking that are the lifeblood of much youth work on peace and security may be inadvertently inhibited.

All the measures discussed in this section – including funding needs, capacity and skills development, and facilitation of partnerships – are legitimate and important demands of young people themselves, seeking to address the limitations and obstacles they encounter, and to support an environment that will enable them to optimize their contributions. Yet all must be undertaken with extreme caution so that external solutions are not imposed that may negatively affect the authenticity and functional aspects of youth-led peacebuilding. The endogenous resilience and resourcefulness of young people, as well as their agency and leadership, must be preserved through smart, conflict-sensitive investment in the upside of youth peace work.



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“ Trust is a key challenge as we are perceived as children who are not able to make things evolve and change. But without young people working on peace and security, the decision makers will not understand our needs. Young people need to be taken seriously and held responsible on their [youth-led] projects. ”

young person, France

*(UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 32)*

## Chapter 3

# Addressing the “violence of exclusion”

Young people around the world described their experiences of exclusion as a form of structural and psychological violence that is indivisible from their political, social, cultural and economic disempowerment. This manifests in both mistrust by young people of state–society relations and in mistrust of young people by their communities and wider society. This chapter addresses and counters this “violence of exclusion” by demonstrating the imperative of meaningfully including young people all over the world.

### 3.1 Meaningful political inclusion

Meaningful political inclusion is a complex and core issue at the heart of the YPS agenda. It has been a central demand from young people across the globe during our research, and was seen to underpin all forms of social, economic and cultural exclusion. Over the course of our consultations, young people frequently applied the mantra of the disability rights movement: “nothing about us without us” (Charlton, 1998).

Young people demanded inclusion in all political and policy decision-making processes and forums, arguing that they should have a direct say in the formulation, design, implementation and evaluation of the policies and approaches that affect them. Young people have also clearly stated that “participation” and “inclusion” are not unconditional: they cannot be a form of co-option or tokenism where young people are used or manipulated by others. Inclusion in corrupt, undemocratic or oppressive systems is not legitimate or acceptable to most youth: “While young people suffer from exclusion, inclusion in an unjust and corrupt system is not the answer to their suffering” (Tunisia FGD, p. 22). Similar sentiments were widespread across our research. Young people were adamant and vocal that political inclusion must be legitimate and meaningful.

This raises an important question: what constitutes *meaningful* political inclusion and participation of young people, and how can this be undertaken to prevent violence and sustain peace? This was the subject of dynamic debate throughout our research, and there was no single

“ We young people are only called up when it’s time to wave flags or put up posters. When we want to share proposals, they don’t take us into account and when we voice criticism we are sidelined. ”

young person, Northern Triangle  
(Northern Triangle CFR, p. 19)

answer. Contributing to sustaining peace, and preventing the outbreak, continuation, escalation and recurrence of violent conflict requires expansion of young people’s roles and engagement in formal and informal political processes and institutions. It demands attention to improve young people’s roles in representative political processes, and also in wider policy and political processes that directly impact their lives, and their relationships with their communities and the state. Young people described a creative spectrum of context-specific possibilities, including what was optimal at various points in peace and conflict cycles, as well as at multiple levels – locally, nationally, regionally or internationally. These options included different and interrelated peacebuilding “tracks” – whether via grassroots community-level engagements, through civil society involvement, or via formal political processes and peace negotiations.

### **Addressing political exclusion: building civic trust**

In the course of this study, young people consistently raised two important and related frustrations that present enduring threats to peace and security: their exclusion from meaningful civic and political participation – often based on the distrust in them as youth, and a consequent lack of political will to address their exclusion – and their own mistrust of systems of patronage and corrupt governance. This directly informed their confidence in processes of change.

The survey of youth-led peacebuilding organizations noted respondents’ belief that “the most challenging aspect of their work is that youth face a lack of space for devising and implementing their activities, are marginalized and misunderstood because of negative perceptions by their community members and elders, resulting in a breakdown of trust” (UNOY and SfCG mapping, 2017, p. 32). It was commonly acknowledged that political inclusion and participation of youth needs to be based on both restoring young people’s trust in state institutions, multilateralism and the social contract between state and society; and restoring trust in young people expressed by politicians, elders, societal elites and many international actors. A Georgian youth described, “The level of trust [in young people] is generally quite low. This prevents us ... from realizing our abilities. In such cases, you lose both your motivation and your confidence ... our opinion often causes mirth among our elders. Our opinion is rarely taken into account. I’m very upset about this” (Georgian-Abkhaz context FGD, p. 15).

These sentiments of being voiceless and disempowered produce potential risks to peace and security born of the unresolved frustration of young women and men, particularly when they are combined with feelings of victimization by their governments. However, from a more proactive prevention point of view, political participation is also viewed by young people as indispensable to their recognition and dignity. It also offers institutionalized avenues for addressing grievances and conflict issues to prevent frustration and potential violence, and therefore to sustain peace.

### **Youth policies**

There has been a recent increase in the number of countries with national youth policies (Bacalso and Farrow, 2016). Such policies have sometimes been presented as a way for governments to respond to expressions of frustration by youth at their political exclusion.



More often they are adopted to streamline “youth-related issues”; sometimes they are adopted more out of duty than because of the assessed needs of young people themselves. Establishing a youth policy is not, in itself, necessarily a meaningful indication of taking youth participation seriously. Youth policies might hive off and entrench youth issues in one policy arena, at the expense of a more integrated approach to youth issues across the whole of government, and different government departments and institutions (Oosterom, 2017). This is true of peace and security issues, which are usually strikingly absent from youth policies.

### **Youth councils**

The establishment of youth parliaments, national youth councils or similar governmental structures has been seen by some as an important vehicle through which to increase the legitimate representative participation of young people in politics and policy dialogues. The role and credibility of these structures, however, vary significantly from one context to another. Young people who participated in our research had widely diverging opinions on whether these councils served to counter or to reinforce experiences of political exclusion and inequalities faced by young people.

In some countries, youth council members are elected, and the councils serve as representative structures that are seen by young participants as offering legitimate points of entry to policy processes, and increasing the linkages between youth and national parliaments – for example, the European Youth Forum.<sup>23</sup> Some young people felt that youth councils play an important role in empowering young people and ameliorating their political frustrations. In the Kosovo\* consultation, it was stated that “young people put a lot of hope on bringing

transparency to the process and creating conditions for the Local Youth Action Councils to empower each other, exchange best practices, and therefore increase their ability to withstand political pressure” (Kosovo\* consultation, p. 14). Young people in the European consultation described the multiple roles that youth councils can play to enhance youth participation in both decision-making and policymaking processes, although they also acknowledged that this is a difficult standard to achieve.

Others felt that such councils were severely constrained by their purely advisory roles. In Somalia and Sri Lanka, youth councils are not directly connected to national parliaments, which has raised questions regarding the “actual power of such structures to effectively channel youth voices into concrete change” (Inter-Parliamentary Union TP, p. 16). For some, youth councils give access to government personnel and policymaking processes, whereas others see them as unhelpfully segmenting policy into “youth” and “non-youth” issues, potentially doing more to narrow channels of meaningful participation, or tighten political parties’ control over youth politics.

Youth councils are also criticized in some instances for not having mechanisms to ensure the broad participation or representation that reflects fluctuating and diverse youth populations: “They seldom cater for marginalized subgroups and often provide too little input into political decision-making” (Hedström and Smith, 2013, p. 40). They can be closely associated with existing parties or political structures, and can be perceived by many youth as subject to political pressure and manipulation, including by governments. In fact, “it is often noted in the literature that despite the existence of National Youth Councils in many countries, they frequently lack legitimacy among the youth population and are instead viewed as instruments of government, rather than institutions with staff that really

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\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

23 [www.youthforum.org/](http://www.youthforum.org/)



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represent the interests of youth” (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009, p. 68). It has even been argued that many youth activists perceive youth councils as “repressive sites of social control rather than youth-led spaces for critique. Dissent and critical thinking are central to their understanding of democratic participation, and they therefore see youth councils as an attempt to constrain the more radical elements of youth politics” (Taft and Gordon, 2013, p. 95).

Although the problematic examples cited should not taint the valid practices of more innovative and inclusive youth councils, it is clear that these councils vary significantly from context to context in their practices and legitimacy, and the extent to which they are “fit for purpose”. It is not possible to generalize about their efficacy for wider youth political participation. However, establishing national youth councils by themselves cannot substitute for meaningful and mainstream political inclusion of youth in the context of peace and security.

## **Electoral politics**

Despite the size of the global youth population, young people are disproportionately underrepresented in formal political structures, and young women even more so. In 2015, only 1.9 per cent of national parliamentary seats were held by young people (aged under 30 years). In 2016, it was reported that “more than 80 per cent of the world’s upper houses of parliament [had] no MPs aged under 30” (Inter-Parliamentary Union TP, p. 7). The World Values Survey reported that youth participation (43.6 per cent) in elections is also significantly lower than the overall participation of the population (59.1 per cent) (IDEA, 2017, p. 103).<sup>24</sup> Between 2010 and 2014, electoral participation and party membership of youth aged 18–29 was significantly lower than the overall population (UNDESA, 2016, pp. 71–2). Young people’s political party membership is symptomatic of the loss of trust by young people in party politics: overall, 5 per cent of the global population are members of political parties (already a low figure), and youth political party membership is almost 20 per cent lower at just 4.1 per cent (IDEA, 2017, p. 103). Closing these generational participation and representation gaps at local, national and global levels should be a priority.

Our own research found that, despite extensive global data on overall voting behaviour and registration, there is a severe lack of disaggregated datasets for youth within the majority of government electoral databases. This signals that most governments – including in developed countries – do not effectively monitor the percentage of youth vote, or make it publicly available. Of 202 countries and territories examined in a baseline study, only 7 had available government-recorded and publicly shared data on actual youth voting patterns, 91 had survey-based data, 10 had incomplete government data,

<sup>24</sup> If the simple comparison was between youth and adults (or those aged over 30), instead of between youth and the whole population, the difference would have been much greater.

and 94 had no data available at all on youth voting trends (Simpson and Altiok TP). This is a significant data gap that needs to be resolved.

The low levels of electoral participation by youth and their severe underrepresentation in local or national decision-making structures are partially related to the structural barriers young people face. Although the minimum voting age in most countries is 18 years or higher, in 73 per cent of countries young people are restricted from running for office, even when they are eligible to vote (Not Too Young To Run, 2018). Minimum age requirements of 25, 35 and even 45 years significantly delay young people's eligibility to run for office. The notion that young people are not ready or experienced enough to play key political roles in these spheres was seen by youth in many contexts as a deliberate exclusionary strategy by elders and political elites. There is also evidence that political party preferences often privilege older male candidates, who are seen to have more experience or more established track records. This presents even greater challenges for young women willing to engage in electoral and party politics (IPU, 2016).

There are many creative ways to better integrate youth in formal political processes. Youth quotas within elected bodies (nationally and locally) are one of the measures that should be encouraged to ensure (potentially catalytic) political entry points for young women and men into formal political structures. Countries that employ youth quotas have higher average levels of youth representation (IPU, 2016, p. 23). However, quotas do not offer the sole solution to fundamental challenges and structural deficiencies. They may still foster elitism, or lend themselves to co-option of the political agency of youth, particularly by political parties.

Quotas therefore should be complemented by other efforts to enable youth participation in elections, government and policymaking more generally. This may include through credible youth councils, assemblies and parliaments, as

well as decision-making forums at local, national, regional and global levels. Within the United Nations, the Department of Political Affairs has promoted youth engagement in electoral processes in a variety of roles: as voters and candidates, agents of voter education, voter registration staff and polling officials (UNDP, 2017). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a practice guide for *Enhancing Youth Political Participation Throughout the Electoral Cycle* (UNDP, 2013) and for *Youth Participation in Electoral Processes: Handbook for Electoral Management Bodies*. (European Commission and UNDP, 2017). As part of these efforts, it is important that attention is paid to reaching a diversity of youth; formal structures and processes are often more inaccessible to rural youth, unorganized youth, young women, young people living in poverty, and those migrating to urban centres.

### **Beyond representation: youth at the interface of state–society relations**

For young people in virtually every region of the world, the experience of exclusion from meaningful civic and political participation has reinforced their growing mistrust of governance structures, and this is often associated with the loss of confidence in formal representative politics. In response, many young people who might have been interested in formal politics have withdrawn from these arenas, seeking instead to create alternative avenues for participation. Some young participants emphasized that what is frequently pointed to by adults as political apathy is more often an active withdrawal from political systems in which young people have lost faith and trust.

The search by young women and men for alternatives has important implications for peace and security. This was expressed by a young man in Yambio, South Sudan:

*Our society has made us to believe that we lack knowledge, are ignorant of political processes, and cannot engage*

*in constructive peacemaking without the involvement of older people or politicians. We are excluded from local decision-making. We are always struggling to find an avenue where we can prove our worth, experiment with new ideas or participate in the wider political process. Lack of space to contribute to peacebuilding makes us more likely to approve of and engage in violence. Violence is the only avenue more or less left for young people.*

*(South Sudan FGD, p. 10)*

This reflects the clear self-interest that governments have in establishing credible and trusted avenues for meaningful political participation of youth. Participation may be through a blend of representational roles within the formal political structures (which must include the full diversity of youth stakeholders), but should also include arenas where youth are consulted and included in substantive dialogue and policy processes on matters that directly affect their lives; it should include unorganized, rural or remote youth, and young women in particular.

This kind of meaningful engagement of young women and men does not just benefit youth; it can lay the groundwork for the enhanced legitimacy of governments, and stability in wider society. This is particularly important where such engagements reach beyond the formal participation of young people in representative political structures. Through various forms of civic engagement, youth can and should play critical and constructive roles in policy development, institutional governance and service delivery mechanisms. This is necessary in general, but is especially true of institutions, services and functions that have a particular impact on the lives of young people.

The participation of young women and men in the design and implementation of community development strategies has been shown to be important in preventing violence, inhibiting extremism and sustaining peace (see section 3.2). Similarly, participation of youth in both formal and informal education, including in the design of curriculums and especially in the governance structures of educational institutions, represents a key arena for inclusion and direct participation

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of young people at a vital interface between youth and the state (see section 3.3) (Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP).

From a peace and security perspective, in addition to education, few institutional interfaces between youth and their governments are more significant than those related to the policing, criminal justice and security apparatus. Hence, young women and men are key stakeholders in criminal justice and security system reform processes that are instrumental in the (re)building of state–society relations. It is noteworthy that, in some cases, young people play roles in informal policing or security institutions, from neighbourhood watch or private security establishments, to more informal community police or vigilante groups. In the Nigeria focus group, discussions by members of informal policing structures regarded this service as a social obligation on youth: “Some of us feel stronger and put our best to work because we are protecting our families, parents, friends and neighbourhood. We made ourselves and wanted to do this, so we feel it is a responsibility obliged upon us to protect our environment” (Nigeria FGD, p. 17).

There are several examples where youth peacebuilding initiatives have specifically sought to develop working relationships and partnerships with local or national criminal justice and security institutions (see chapter 2), as a trust-building endeavour. These are viewed as crucial peacebuilding or conflict-prevention mechanisms – they are an alternative to informal policing, and the associated risks of violence and lack of accountability. Governments stand to benefit with youth in the building of such collaborative endeavours, based on transformed power relationships between police and youth. Similar civilian interface mechanisms, complaints mechanisms and ombuds facilities have been developed, including in some prison systems. However, although these approaches importantly target improved relationships and accountability between the community and criminal justice or security systems, they are seldom specifically focused on youth–state relationships, despite

the prevalence of youth on both sides of these relationships. “The community” can also easily be elder driven and may actually exclude youth from these interfaces.

A host of programmatic innovations have been undertaken by governments, and supported or initiated by multilateral institutions, concerned with improving state–society relationships through community involvement in criminal justice reform, juvenile justice innovations, democratic policing, community–police relationship-building, penal reform and security sector reform more generally (Democratic Republic of Congo CFR). Although many of these programmes focus broad attention on the importance of the interface with the community and civil society, it is not clear that these approaches have given enough attention to the inclusion and participation of young people as a central component (Forman, 2004).

Young people seeking to reclaim and be involved in all these spaces should be fully enabled to do so, through direct civil and political participation, as well as formal political representation.

### **Meaningful participation in peacemaking processes**

Young people’s participation in formal peace processes remains very limited, despite their obvious stake in these processes. Perversely, as a cohort that often makes up the majority of foot soldiers in violent conflict, it is violent, predominantly male, youth who may have the best prospect of being included in formal peace processes. Rarely, this may be as leaders of warring factions, or in some instances through familial or other relationships with the leaders of armed groups. In the meantime, young people who have remained peaceful or who have been actively working towards peace – even in cases where they have been the main drivers of political change – tend to be excluded from formal talks and transition processes, especially at a national level. Of course, the line between young people’s roles as perpetrators and as victims of violence during conflict is frequently blurred.

## “ Youth shouldn't be on the table, but around the table. ”

young person, West and Central Africa

(*West and Central Africa consultation, p. 5*)

### **Youth contributions to peacemaking**

During active conflict and peace processes alike, young people are often used, manipulated and treated as expendable by conflict parties and political stakeholders. This partly explains their exclusion from political negotiations or settlements relating to formal peace processes. However, youth involvement in post-accord political and criminal violence is also intertwined with the interests of political elites, who often deliberately mobilize marginalized youth as a means of asserting their bargaining power at the negotiation table. As a result, young people's political agency is primarily associated with the risks they pose as potential dissidents, "spoilers" or destabilizers of embryonic peace processes (McEvoy-Levy, 2001). In the absence of legitimate youth participation in the process, this may contribute to a blurred dividing line between youth agency and manipulability in these processes (Schwartz, 2010; Bangura, 2016).

For these reasons, the meaningful inclusion of young people in peace processes is an important investment in the prevention of post-accord recurrence of violent conflict. Conflicts in Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Middle East offer dramatic illustrations of how youth protestation, fuelled by frustration, may spill over into violence at the perception of unjust peace agreements (McEvoy-Levy, 2001). Young people's exclusion from negotiated peace processes is therefore counterproductive to sustaining peace, since the frustration associated with this exclusion is "one of the principal reasons groups resort to violence and protests" (Paffenholz, 2015, p. 1) or why they may be mobilized to abandon support for nascent peace processes. Instrumentalization of youth violence, and the complex relationship between youth and political elites, therefore highlight the importance

of meaningful inclusion of young people in peace processes, including those who may congregate and express their dissent "on the fringes of the pro-peace parties" (McEvoy-Levy, 2001, p. 33).

However, there is a much more positive rationale for young people's participation in peace processes than just to prevent them from acting as spoilers. Youth involvement offers perhaps the best means for sustaining peace, because "a peace agreement's endurance depends on whether the next generations accept or reject it, how they are socialized during the peace process, and their perceptions of what that peace process has achieved" (McEvoy-Levy, 2001, p. 5). The potentially strategic roles of youth as advocates in navigating the transition from past conflict, and in rebuilding damaged relationships, make them vital allies to any peace process – and potential transgenerational guarantors of the durability and transformative potential of peace agreements. Meaningful participation of youth in these peace processes is crucial to their sense of ownership, and can also contribute significantly to the buy-in of civil society more generally. Young people should therefore be recognized as valued agents of peace – rather than just beneficiaries of it (Creary and Byrne, 2014):

*It is the previous generation that refused to negotiate. Instead, the youth should be involved in the negotiation process.*

*For certain reasons, the older generation does not take this step, so we must do it. (Georgian-Abkhaz context FGD, p. 26)*

### **Quotas and other forms of inclusion in peacemaking**

Youth quotas can ensure participation in formal peace negotiations, and can serve as a mechanism both to address the exclusion of youth from these processes and to enhance the quality of participation of young women and men (see, for example, box 3). It could be argued that quotas in dialogue processes or representative bodies such as constitution-making bodies are easier to accommodate

### BOX 3

## Youth quotas in peace processes – Yemen’s national dialogue conference

With strong encouragement from the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, the parties accepted a 20 per cent youth quota in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) to shape the new Yemeni Constitution in 2011. Forty “independent youth” (not party affiliated) out of 10,000 applicants were selected through the quota system (Women and Youth Forum, 2014), which meant that 7 per cent of the total NDC members were young people who were politically independent. However, within two months of their presence in the NDC, with some exceptions, independent youth representatives started to vote as a bloc (Alwazir, 2013). As a bloc, they also built alliances with women and other civil society constituencies, which enabled this “non-political party” group to acquire a significant role and power in much of the decision-making process (Paffenholz and Ross, 2016, p. 205). As Paffenholz and Ross (2016, p. 205) explain, this non-political party block had “an unusually high degree of influence to be given to such constituencies, as compared to other National Dialogues”.

The civil society coalition and alliance-building activities were not sufficient to insulate these youth entirely from claims of co-option by the main political stakeholders in the process. Some critics attributed this to their limited interaction with the young people outside the NDC (although this was disputed), while others claimed that “some youth delegates have purposefully isolated themselves from the youth outside as a reaction to the harsh criticism they had received” (Alwazir, 2013, p. 7). Despite critiques of co-option and even claims of corruption directed at youth participants in a fairly “elitist” political process, the quota system arguably set up new norms for youth political inclusion in Yemen. As one NDC youth representative commented, “The quota system applied in the National Dialogue Conference permanently changed the mindset about women and youth participation in such processes in Yemen”. She went on to claim that “although there was still some resistance to wider civil society participation, the temporary inclusion due to the quota system demonstrated the positive value of youth participation” (Anonymous #2 KII).

Youth representatives took on leadership roles in facilitating some of the technical working group sessions. They were outspoken about sensitive issues (such as the proposed immunity law) and challenged many entrenched hierarchical political traditions (Alwazir, 2013). Their overall impact in the NDC was arguably transformative in shifting the prevailing mindset about “youth political agency”. Although the participation of youth in this peace process could never have prevented the escalation of violent conflict that subsequently ensued in Yemen and that continues at the time of writing, it hopefully will serve as a precedent that limits the options for political parties to exclude youth voices in subsequent peace processes in Yemen.

than in closed-door and delicate, mediated processes. But a strong counterargument can be made that it is precisely in the closed-door, or highly exclusive or elite processes that youth participation is most required and most loudly demanded. Participation in these forums creates an important entry point for youth, allowing them to present their unique experiences and needs as key stakeholders in the building and sustaining of peace in their societies.

Practically, a quota requirement drives youth participation, rather than relying on this as purely voluntary action or selective choice. When given the opportunity, young women and men have used these roles to expand the space for their participation, and to catalyse other peacebuilding action and enrich the peace processes themselves.

Youth participation in the formal peace negotiations between the Philippines Government and

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front from 1997 to 2016 was more organic and not based on quotas or any other representative basis. Young people largely engaged in the process through informal connections, including family connections, usually to perform operational roles, and provide logistical and technical support on different sides of the political divide. In retrospect, these less politically sensitive functions on the different sides enabled young people to play a key role in building bridges (often informally) across party lines, contributing significantly to forging creative solutions in the negotiation process (Philippines CFR, p. 13.) However, these sorts of opportunities can be very limited and easily exclude youth who do not have the necessary skills, connections or organizational base.

In South Sudan, UNHCR facilitated the participation of six young refugees as observers to the South Sudanese High Level Revitalization Forum. Despite some resistance to their presence and participation, the youth who participated felt very positive about having claimed the space to share their concerns and visions for peace. They also felt that they were able to table the specific needs, experiences and priorities of refugee youth, and that this distracted many of the other participants from more “self-interested” political pursuits (Vuni KII). After some frustration, these refugee youth delegates also began to challenge their limited roles in the room, by demanding the right to make a joint statement. During their participation in the peace process, these young people were emphatic that they should be in the room as youth, as young members of civil society and as youth members of political parties (Anonymous #1 KII). This raises important questions about oversimplified notions of youth representation in these processes, as well as where youth identities and roles transcend these different categories.

In Syria, the Syrian Youth Assembly, rooted mostly in the Syrian diaspora outside the war-torn country, has focused on connecting with, and providing support to, youth still living in Syria during the pre-negotiation phase, and serving as

a conduit for their voice, particularly in targeting the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy in Syria and other policymakers. Based on the maintenance of these networks and contacts, their role has largely been limited to the submission of reports, and advocacy aimed at infusing a youth lens into wider civil society engagements. They have sought to profile and assert the need to address youth-specific issues within the peace process, where these issues appeared to be underappreciated. Although members of the Syrian Youth Assembly expressed their frustration about these challenges, they also continued to pursue the aspiration to constitute a Youth Advisory Board, similar to the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, in the hope that this could more systematically bring youth issues to the fore in the peace process (Badwi KII).

However, although youth quotas and guarantees of participation open important doors, they should not be viewed as an exclusive goal (relative to other arenas of engagement). They may produce high levels of frustration, particularly where there is limited capacity or political will to ensure full diversity and political independence of the young people participating. In fact, “overly obsessing with inclusion in formal peace processes – and then not getting it – raises frustration that may erode the true youth power in peacebuilding” (Berghof Foundation TP, p. 16).

Much has been learned on this topic from research on women’s participation in peace processes. There is little dispute about the value and importance of quotas as an entry point, and about the contribution of quotas to the quality and durability of the peace settlements achieved (O’Reilly et al., 2015). However, evidence also shows that the quality and not just the quantity of participation determines its value: “Quotas alone do not automatically lead to more women’s influence, as case study research indicates that political party loyalties often trumped genuine women’s interests” (Paffenholz et al., 2016, p. 6). Factors such as the diversity of participants at the table



(including, in this instance, young women), the independence of those participating, the extent to which participation is fully informed, and – perhaps most critically – the connections between female participants in the formal peace process and a wider women’s movement beyond the confines of the negotiations process itself all appear to be vital in shaping the quality and impact of women’s participation in formal peace processes.

There can be little doubt that similar concerns apply to youth quotas. They clearly have the benefit of fast-tracking progress in an arena in which exclusion of youth is a serious problem that must be addressed. But quotas cannot be optimally effective without ensuring the necessary diversity, representivity and relative political independence of the young people participating.

### **Constraints to inclusion**

Meaningful inclusion of youth in formal peace processes is limited by the constraints of numbers, representativity, and concerns for efficiency in often delicate exercises. Civil society inclusion in peace processes has long been debated: broadening participation in negotiated settlement processes could compromise the efficiency and practicality of peacemaking, particularly in terms of brokering agreements:

*On the one hand, it may be preferable to include actors from a broad range of society as a way of garnering support for the peace process; on the other hand, the inclusion of too many actors can complicate negotiations and may even prevent an agreement from being reached in the first place. Thus, there is a potential dilemma between enhancing the legitimacy of the peace process, and ensuring its efficacy.*  
(Nilsson, 2012, p. 247)

However, statistical analyses of the durability of peace processes show that “the inclusion of civil society actors and political parties in combination significantly influences the durability of peace” (Nilsson, 2012, p. 262). Even more striking is



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the analysis showing that women’s inclusion in peace processes is associated with an increased likelihood of an agreement being reached and enhances its durability (O’Reilly et al., 2015, p. 11). Of primary significance from a youth perspective is that, beyond just the efficiency questions of youth involvement, the meaningful participation of youth in these peace processes has the potential to add significant legitimacy to both the process and its outcomes.

It is important that participating youth inside these processes have credible and legitimate connections to wider youth populations and constituencies outside the formal peace processes. This is a partial guard against the manipulation of youth within these forums, as well as a way of ensuring that there is reciprocal information flow and connectivity between the formal mediated peace processes and the less formal endeavours beyond the negotiation table. In all the examples we looked at, the role of young people in formal peace processes was significantly connected to, and enhanced by, their interface and trust-based relationships with peacebuilding actors outside this process, who were also playing a key role in informal

peacebuilding endeavours with the potential to support or help sustain the peace process. These additional participatory processes have the potential to harness and channel young people's contributions to peace processes through connectivity between the informal and formal spheres: "Having a better understanding of young people's efforts in the informal space is key to realizing their potential contribution to formal peace processes" (Berghof Foundation TP, p. 16).

The transitional nature of youth presents important challenges to effective inclusion. As young people age and transition into adulthood, there is a need to reproduce or regenerate youth leadership and participation in peace processes, dialogues, reconciliation processes and constitution-making negotiations – especially when these processes endure for some years (see section 2.2). Paffenholz et al. (2016) and McWilliams (2015) point to the significant impact of a wider women's movement in helping the standing and impact of women in peace negotiations. There is arguably no similarly constituted unified global youth movement (or, at least, it is in its infancy by comparison), and hence modes of youth political participation are themselves continually evolving.

Recognizing the inclusion of young women and men in peacemaking processes is not an act of benevolence, a favour to youth or a purely expedient contribution to the efficacy of these processes. Young people have the *right* to participate fully – no less than any other social, political or demographic group. Acknowledgement of youth as rights-holders in this regard is crucial to redressing the tradition of excluding young people from these processes.

The inclusion of young people in peace processes can serve as the "connective social tissue" that "integrates diverse engagements across multiple levels within a wider understanding of reconciliation strategies as both multi-faceted and non-linear" (Simpson, 2016, p. 8).

## Young people setting the agenda for political participation

Youth peace work focused on civic and political engagement may take many forms, including civil society consultations and dialogue processes, community-level social cohesion or "bridge-building" work, and even direct action in the form of peaceful protest, advocacy or organizing (Grizelj, 2017). These engagements span multiple phases and modalities related to formal peace processes. It is vital to facilitate or enable the space for youth contributions, not only in the mediated peace processes themselves, but throughout the pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-agreement implementation phases (Paffenholz, 2014; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Paffenholz et al., 2016).

“ **For you, politics is power. For me, civil society is power.** ”  
(Laiq, 2013, p. 75)

The meaningful political contributions of young people to the prevention of violence, and to sustaining and building peace are not only about their representation in political forums, participation in established policy and practice, or participation in formal peace processes. A narrow focus on the notion of inclusion fails to recognize where young people take independent initiatives, and define the platforms through which they can better express themselves politically for peace and security – arenas of direct participation. These are not spaces where young people are being "included" or "invited in" – they are spaces that young people have invented or made their own.

In part, this is about the issues of mistrust, and resistance to co-option, manipulation and party-political control that we found throughout our research. In response to these issues, many young people have withdrawn from formal politics, electoral systems and other institutions, and are

creating alternative avenues for participation. These approaches are not mutually incompatible and coexist side by side. As the *World Youth Report on Youth Civic Engagement* explains, “Youth political participation is evolving rather than declining. Although young people vote less and are unlikely to be active members of political parties, they participate in a wide range of alternative political activities” (UNDESA, 2016, p. 78).

Sections 1.3 and 2.3 explored the range of political and peacebuilding activities that youth engage in, including community engagement, creative programmes and the use of social media. For example, in the peace and security context, digital technology brought “a new form of empowerment that is fundamentally altering the relations between citizens and states that has an impact at both global and local levels” (SecDev Group TP, p. 1). Social media and ICTs are increasingly being pioneered by young people as an alternative means to exercise their political agency, demand accountability, amplify their voices, foster connectivity and create new networks. Online platforms are particularly important for those (with digital access) who may not be able to participate in deliberative or formal political processes, or who are constrained by restrictive institutional politics. Young people’s widespread use of digital platforms suggests “that young people no longer need to join formal political organizations to participate in or be educated about collective political action” (Vromen et al., as cited in Pruitt, 2017, p. 510).

However, uneven digital access can sometimes exacerbate experiences of exclusion:

*Worldwide, some 4 billion people do not have any internet access, nearly 2 billion do not use a mobile phone, and almost half a billion live outside areas with a mobile signal ... In African countries, the bottom 40 per cent is only one-third as likely to have access to the internet as the upper 60 per cent; 18 per cent of men report using the internet versus 12 per cent of*

*women, and 20 per cent of youth versus 8 per cent of those more than 45 years old. (World Bank, 2016, pp. 8–9)*

Although ICTs can facilitate the political involvement of actors who are excluded from formal politics, they can also “further cement dividing lines in society, at grassroots level” (Tellidis and Kappler, 2016, p. 86). The digital divide can reinforce “global inequalities in terms of who accesses which technologies, and who is excluded from cross-societal and cross-cultural discourses” (Tellidis and Kappler, 2016, p. 77). This is a challenge for young women in particular, who tend to have less access to the Internet and consequently suffer from a greater level of digital illiteracy, which directly affects their chances of finding employment or getting an education (SecDev Group TP). Considering both the positive and negative roles that the Internet can play, online political participation should not be treated as the ultimate solution to address youth political exclusion.

Young people’s political activities also include the roles they play in defending human rights, documenting and monitoring violations of ceasefire agreements, and facilitating reconciliation or building community-level social cohesion in divided societies. Young people also participate in political research and analysis, and provide early warning assessments and risk assessment models (UNDP, 2017).

All these approaches, roles and platforms are vehicles of independent political engagement, expression and activism, and should be fully protected and preserved. Governments and political processes can derive real benefits from young people’s innovation and leadership by embracing these spaces. State instincts are often to control, strictly regulate or even shut down independent political participation – for example, in online spaces or independent radio stations (BurundiFGD). This can lead to counterproductive results: “The more sites are ‘managed’ and controlled, the less inclined young people often



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are to engage with them. Instead, young people want to be taken seriously as producers and partners in processes of online engagement and deliberation” (Collin, 2015, p. 40).

The civil society sphere is critical as an area where young people cultivate independent leadership, and mobilize for peace:

*Today, youth stand in a unique position ... They have expanded the political and civic space and have given depth to the meaning of citizen-led movements. They have a broad legitimacy, grounded in a politics that exists beyond the structures of the state. They have mastered social media, which can be utilized to provide more innovative ways of ... organizing and creating new citizen-based structures. They believe that using one’s voice itself is an act of citizenship. Youth are the ideal vanguard for building the foundations of a more inclusive and participatory polity. (Laiq, 2013, p. 75)*

Meaningful political inclusion for young people is often viewed as an important preventive antidote to the frustrations that may otherwise drive violent responses. However, inclusive participation is

meaningful and an entitlement in its own right. It is about recognizing and preserving the spaces of young people’s creative – even if sometimes disruptive – agency for change.

### 3.2 Beyond just jobs

Across all of the study’s engagements with young people, concerns about young people’s livelihoods and stake in the economy arose as a key issue, irrespective of the country context and level of violence. For most young people who participated in this process, economic inclusion was mainly about fair access to meaningful and reliable employment. This comes as no surprise, given the global youth unemployment rate of 13 per cent – approximately three times the adult unemployment rate (ILO, 2017a).<sup>25</sup> However, jobs are only one piece of the puzzle in solving young people’s exclusion from broader economic policy and decision-making processes. It was clear that, for young people, questions of access to political

<sup>25</sup> However, assumptions about what unemployment rates mean for young people and the stigmatization they imply must be carefully scrutinized (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015).

power and economic stake were inextricably linked. Whereas much attention has been given to the importance of livelihoods and employment for young people, much less has been paid to their increasing scepticism and diminishing trust in their governments' abilities to equitably deliver the benefits of economic growth.

Employment must offer all young people, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, migratory status, ability, geographical location and socioeconomic background, an opportunity to build on their capacities, as well as feed into their broader economic, social and political inclusion. Young people consulted rarely linked job creation programmes with building peace. Instead, they talked about unemployment, underemployment and precarious employment in relation to poverty and inequality, and the impact of this on their overall well-being and communities. A young Abkhaz explained how jobs contribute to a sense of self-worth and help clarify the role of youth in society:

*Financial independence is necessary. When you are taking pocket money from your mother, it is hard to talk about how you can benefit the country.*  
(Georgian-Abkhaz context FGD, p. 12)

As described by a young person from Georgia, unemployment poses barriers to young people's participation in peacebuilding activities, hindering their ability to plan for the future:

*When a young man is experiencing financial problems in the family and should have elementary food, there is no point in talking to him about peace.*  
(Georgian-Abkhaz context FGD, p. 7)

Unemployment and working poverty<sup>26</sup> also have detrimental impacts on the ability of young people

to transition into adulthood. International Alert (Amarasuriya et al., 2009) found that, for young unemployed or unmarried Sri Lankans, this lack of financial independence resulted in their exclusion from being treated as "real" adults, even beyond the age of 29. In societies that practise early and forced marriage, a lack of financial independence for young women contributes to their transition directly from childhood to adulthood, with little opportunity for experiencing the positive aspects of youthhood.<sup>27</sup>

## Challenging the narrative of "idle hands" and violence

As discussed in section 1.3, peace and security programming and policies continue to be driven by a widely presumed causal relationship between youth unemployment and violence. Within this paradigm, youth unemployment is framed as a "looming social crisis", and "idle youth" are viewed as potential spoilers of peace (Coulter et al., 2008; DeJaeghere and Baxter, 2014).

But a growing body of research has found no clear empirical evidence supporting a simple causal relationship between youth unemployment and violence (Cramer, 2010; Holmes et al., 2013; Cramer et al., 2016). In its research in Afghanistan, Mercy Corps (2015) found that, although 84 per cent of participants found jobs and improved their economic standing, there was no measurable drop in their support for armed groups. In Somalia, a change in employment status for graduates of the Somalia Youth Leaders Initiative showed no relationship with a willingness to engage in political violence (Mercy Corps, 2013).

Economic factors that motivate young people to participate in violence appear to be fairly limited. In Colombia, research on recruitment into the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) describes young people being motivated primarily by status and the allure of rebel life, compared with a

<sup>26</sup> It is important not to conflate unemployment and poverty; an estimated 16.7 per cent of employed youth in developing and emerging countries live on an income below the extreme poverty threshold (Sharma et al., 2017).

<sup>27</sup> For example, in Democratic Republic of Congo, 37 per cent of young women aged 20–24 were married before the age of 18, compared with 6 per cent of young men in the same age group (Democratic Republic of Congo CFR).

life of agricultural labour (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008). In Kenya, levels of youth unemployment have stayed relatively constant over the past two decades (approximately 17 per cent), while levels of violence have fluctuated over time (Sharma et al., 2017). Meanwhile, Spain has one of the highest youth unemployment rates<sup>28</sup> in the world (approximately 40 per cent) (ILO, 2017b), but has not experienced large-scale violence led by young people.

Although there is little evidence to support a simple causal connection between youth unemployment and violence, some evidence suggests that, where economic frustration overlaps with young people's social and political exclusion, violence may be more likely to occur (Sommers, 2009; Walton, 2010; Idris, 2016). In its report on Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, Interpeace et al. (2016) found that unemployment was not the decisive motivation for young people's violent trajectories, but social dynamics determined the trajectories of *some* young people towards violence in their search for recognition, identity and a feeling of being valued. Young people's economic inclusion must therefore be understood as a component of a larger and complex reality, moving the conversation beyond just jobs.

### **Deficiencies of existing employment programmes**

Assessing the peacebuilding impact of employment interventions is a hard task, given current programme design and evaluation. A 2016 review of 432 employment interventions across 32 countries by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, the World Bank and UNDP (2016) showed that, for the most part, peacebuilding outcomes were not well designed and integrated into the project result frameworks of employment programmes. Where programmes were designed with peacebuilding outcomes in mind, they were not thoroughly evaluated.

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28 Calculated by the International Labour Organization based on those aged 15–24.

Other significant deficits in the design and evaluation of employment programmes include a lack of gender- and age-disaggregated data; limited comprehensive conflict analyses that consider economic inequality and disparity, and adopt a “do no harm” approach; failure to map existing traditional and war-based power relations that may contribute to young people's economic exclusion if unaddressed; and a lack of clarity on theories of change,<sup>29</sup> based on an assumed relationship between employment and peacebuilding (Amarasuriya et al., 2009; IRC, 2012).

### **Mismatch between aspirations, training and jobs**

Employment interventions to date have been developed mainly as active labour market programmes (ALMPs),<sup>30</sup> with little focus on young people's needs, aspirations and yearning for dignity. Jobs created through ALMPs are often non-skilled or casual labour, and, as a result, fail to consider young people's own desires and hopes for their future (Amarasuriya et al., 2009). In Colombia, youth described how:

*Employment opportunities that meet labour market demands are important, but it is also crucial that the youth find such opportunities attractive, rather than boring or even shameful ... [B]ecoming a farmer, a coffee grower or a builder were not attractive options, neither in economic nor in social terms.  
(Colombia CFR – b, p. 29)*

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29 The three primary theories of change, or “transfer mechanisms”, used to inform the analytical framework for employment interventions are (1) employment programmes can facilitate contact between social groups in conflict; (2) employment programmes can address grievances that are root causes of conflict; and (3) employment programmes can offer opportunities and alternatives to violence (ILO et al., 2016).

30 ALMPs were originally developed to respond to high levels of unemployment and assist people in getting back to work by providing them with the necessary skills for, and access to, the labour market; see Izzi (2013).

Over the course of the study's regional consultations, young people continually identified the mismatch between vocational training opportunities and the needs of local labour markets as a barrier to their economic inclusion. This mismatch contributes to the "expectation frustration gap", which risks raising expectations that cannot be satisfied, thereby contributing to grievances (Mercy Corps, 2015). Training provided to young people is also frequently targeted towards their inclusion in formal economies, where there is a limited absorptive capacity, particularly in countries experiencing instability or violent conflict (Sommers, 2009; UNDP, 2016a).

“ **I'm very much afraid that when I finish my studies, they will not hire me.** ”

female, Kyrgyzstan  
(Kyrgyzstan FGD, p. 9)

### **The informal economy**

Globally, 3 out of 4 young people (75 per cent) aged 15–29 are employed in the informal economy. In developing countries, the ratio for young people employed in the informal economy is as high as 19 out of 20 (ILO, 2017b). Increasing youth growth rates, coupled with contracting economic opportunities in the formal sector, highlight the importance of interventions focused on the informal economy (Chigunta et al., 2005; Sommers, 2012). More recent research has pointed to the serious challenge of youth underemployment, with educated and skilled youth being forced into precarious, non-regular work (Fox and Thomas, 2016; UNDP, 2016b). This is often exacerbated in conflict-affected settings—for example, in Syria, young people have become “over-represented in informal employment and in non-contractual and unregistered work” (UNDP, 2016a, p. 139).



Source: (ILO, 2017b)

Informal economies often serve to demonstrate young people's positive resilience and adaptive responses to difficult circumstances, enabling them to circumnavigate some of the structural barriers that limit their participation in the formal economy. However, the danger of employment in informal or “shadow” economies is that they offer young people little or no access to labour rights and broader social protections, not to mention the psychological toll of job precarity on young people's overall well-being (Amarasuriya et al., 2009). In developing countries, young women and SGMs are mainly employed in informal economies. As a result, they are subjected to greater harassment and violence with little recourse to justice, partly because of the criminalization of these economies (Idris, 2016; Boukhars, 2017) and gender-inequitable social norms.<sup>31</sup> During and after violent conflict, young women are often forced into low-reward and high-risk informal work, including survival sex, which has significant consequences for their physical and mental well-being, and produces knock-on familial and communal effects (UN Women, 2015). To reduce the need for young women to engage in high-risk work, further investments

<sup>31</sup> For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, 86–88 per cent of women are self-employed (Goldin, 2015).

are needed to ensure their equal access to education and livelihood interventions (UN Women TP).

Young people working in informal economies face greater exposure to abusive and arbitrary treatment from law enforcement officials, who often lump together legitimate informal work and illicit activities as threats to state security (Davenport, 2007). Illicit and war-based sub-economies hold vast swathes of young people and have an enduring influence over youth that can persist long after the violence ends. This is especially true where armed or criminal groups are able to provide better social services and opportunities, supplanting formal governance structures and fuelling resentment about unmet promises (Kemper, 2005; Devarajan and Ianchovichina, 2017). Young people's participation in criminal organizations can also have the effect of inverting generational relationships – that is, parents become financially reliant on their children's involvement in illicit activities and may in fact reinforce young people's involvement in this line of work. This highlights the necessity to engage not just with the youth themselves but also with the families of young people who participate in the illicit economy.

It is evident that many young people yearn for stable employment that offers them social protection, good wages and opportunities for professional development (Sharma et al., 2017). Multilateral actors have been paying increasing attention to expanding policy frameworks that can address these broader issues (ILO 2012, 2016, 2017b). Country-focused research in Libya revealed the disparity between private and public sector workers, with only 37 per cent of youth aged 15–34 in the private sector having access to social security, compared with 90 per cent of public sector workers (Libya CFR). In 2015, the ILO adopted recommendation 204, which provides guidance to Member States on the transition from the informal to the formal

economy (ILO, 2015).<sup>32</sup> More recently, the African Development Bank called for policies for youth within the informal economy to focus on enhanced social protections, supporting transitions from informal to formal employment and tackling poor oversight in certain industries (AfDB, n.d.).

### ***Individual versus collective gain***

The vast majority of employment interventions are limited by the underlying assumption that changes in individual behaviour will produce positive outcomes for development and peace at the community level. In this way, these interventions ignore broader social, political and economic factors that inform their success. For example, young people repeatedly shared their feelings of mistrust in their governments and the private sector, mainly as a result of a lack of transparency and accountability, and uncertainty over donor motivations for engagement (Amarasuriya et al., 2009; West and Central Africa consultation). Claims of nepotism persist over the inequitable distribution of resources and allocation of opportunities, with young people describing processes of beneficiary selection plagued by systems of patronage and corruption.

Many young people expressed their frustration with the different forms of discrimination they face when seeking employment, because youth from marginalized communities “[are] stigmatized when they mention their address” (Colombia CFR – a, p. 9). All these factors feed into young people's deep suspicions when engaging with their governments, the private sector and the international community. There is a need to examine how their systematic economic inclusion across society could help address this trust deficit. Furthermore, employment programmes that emphasize

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<sup>32</sup> For young people working in the formal economy, the ILO's Rights@Work for Youth campaign and training aim to raise young people's awareness of their rights according to international labour standards (ILO, 2016).



individual economic advancement, rather than viewing young people as embedded in a wider community, miss an opportunity to address restrictive cultural and social norms, particularly as they relate to young women.

Supply-side-orientated employment interventions that have provided young women with training in “non-traditional” occupations have had little success because of discriminatory practices among employers and the absence of social support structures (childcare arrangements, transport, protection, flexible schedules) (Filmer and Fox, 2014; Goldin, 2015). It is critical that employment interventions function alongside programmes aimed at promoting gender-equitable masculine identities, which play a significant role in shaping the economic inclusion of young women and SGMs (Myrntinen et al., 2014).<sup>33</sup> This is particularly true for young women who have made gains and been able to transcend restrictive gender norms during periods of violent conflict, only to subsequently lose those gains in the post-conflict period (UN Women, 2015). Economic empowerment projects for young women must adopt a whole-of-society approach, to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on young women themselves and prevent a backlash among young men (Myrntinen et al., 2014). Meanwhile, programming that aims to explicitly address the economic inclusion of young men must ensure that it does not reinforce gender inequalities by engaging with, and upholding, social structures that exclude young women and SGMs (Wright, 2014).

Maintaining a narrow focus on employment programmes as a means to solving young people’s economic exclusion and contribute to peace obscures the broader picture. These programmes are ultimately limited by the number of youth they can actually engage, and often neglect those most in need (for example,

<sup>33</sup> For further discussion on masculine identities, see section 3.4.

“ **The other challenge is racism against girls ... if you are a girl, you can’t get a job ... no you can’t study engineering, this is not for girls.** ”

female, Libya

(*Libya consultation*, p. 19)

young, single mothers; refugee youth; and rural youth). They therefore often run the risk of entrenching inequalities, or even generating or exacerbating conflict.

To improve the efficacy of youth employment programmes and build trust, young people must be meaningfully engaged in needs-based assessments, and the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of conflict-sensitive interventions. Programmes should work alongside communities to identify where youth can become engaged in local businesses, and where young people and community members can co-develop economic opportunities. Such processes have additional benefits from the sense of ownership that they create; in the United States, participants in focus-group discussions believed “that it was important to create a sense of duty amongst the youth (including giving youth the opportunity to lead or educate other youth)” (United States CFR, p. 49).

### **Moving towards broader economic inclusion**

Economic, social and political inequalities are deeply intertwined, heavily influencing the ability of young people to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. Growing inequality within countries threatens social stability, development and the governance structures that underpin these processes (IMF, 2017). Systemic change is needed to address corruption and systems of patronage that manifest in corporate monopolies and cronyism (Debarre, 2018;



**In my country, most youth become violent because of their frustration. Poverty is not the only issue; unemployment can lead to that, but to me the most important thing that can make young people frustrated is when they are not recognized and they can't express their views and opinions.**



male, Nigeria

*(West and Central Africa consultation, p. 7)*

Lawson, 2018) – all of these have a detrimental impact on the lives of young people by restricting their ability to develop capital, holding them in working poverty.

Increasing wealth and income inequality disproportionately affect young people, and young women in particular (OECD, 2014). Even where young women have made small gains, their wages and access to resources, land, shares and financial networks remain limited (El Feki et al., 2017; Lawson, 2018).

As inequality increases, the level of opportunity for, and social mobility of, young people born into low socioeconomic households decrease, contributing to their exclusion. For these young people, “differences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings, lifetime wealth, and lifetime utility than do differences in shocks received over the working lifetime” (Huggett et al., 2011). In other words, in highly unequal societies, the likelihood of young people rising from the bottom of the income distribution to the top is very slim, and depends in large part on the circumstances they are born into (Krueger, 2012). Inequality obstructs young people’s ability to be economically mobile by limiting access to quality education and health care, feeding into a negative feedback cycle that reduces health outcomes and educational attainment, particularly in low socioeconomic communities (Currie, 2011).

Historically, young people have been excluded from economic development discussions and decision-making, which are typically formal and

highly centralized processes. Redistributing development and peacebuilding funds to the local level, including to the municipalities of major urban centres and rural communities, would make them more reflective of, and responsive to, local needs. Young people at the local level should be engaged in social audits of their communities, as well as in the allocation of funds based on community priorities. For example, the Presupuesto Participativo Joven from the Argentinian city of Rosario has focused on youth participation in decision-making processes and budgeting at the city level (Del Felice and Wisler, 2007). To ensure transparency and public accountability of funds, young people must also be involved in financial monitoring and oversight mechanisms.

### **Emerging alternative economies**

Young people’s meaningful economic inclusion demands a reorientation in our understanding of what a functioning economy looks like. Interventions to improve young people’s economic stake in society must take a transformative approach, rather than focusing solely on opening up access to economic systems that they have historically been excluded from (and often have little trust in). Investing in the creation of alternative economies designed to address the intersecting and horizontal inequalities that define young people’s experiences is critical to developing a more inclusive and equitable economy.

Alternative economic models that have emerged over the past few decades include employee ownership, for-benefit businesses, social

enterprises, and social and solidarity economies more broadly. Often, but not always, these models are driven by a social purpose, give power to stakeholders over governance processes and place emphasis on the needs of community members ahead of maximizing profits. National and local governments and the private sector should work closely with, and support, young people who are leading the development of these models in their communities as an important step towards tackling their economic exclusion. In addition, international actors should work closely with unions and regulatory associations to increase young people's positive engagement with the state (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming), and demonstrate their support for young people's right to organize and participate in collective bargaining processes – this was specified in ILO Recommendation No. 205 on Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience, passed by the International Labour Conference in 2017 (ILO, 2017c).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Decreasing unionization rates spells trouble for gender equality, because unions have historically been a vital instrument for addressing pay inequality and the discriminatory treatment of women (Gould and McNicholas, 2017).

### **Social and solidarity economies**

A report from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development has demonstrated strong evidence for the “emancipatory potential” of social and solidarity economies (SSEs) (Utting, 2015). SSEs bring together social and economic objectives via collective action, offering young people a chance to gain greater control over resources and the decision-making that affects their lives.

Developed in 2005 by young African-Americans in Buffalo, New York, People United for Sustainable Housing emerged initially as a project to promote civic engagement, but was adapted soon after to include economic development and environmental awareness. Fostering local youth leadership to regain control of community planning and encouraging community-based economic growth (beyond individual economic advancement) were central to their approach. Through the creation of safe, inclusive community spaces for young people's civic engagement, members were able to develop successful collective strategies that led to economic growth and improved social outcomes (Mathie and Gaventa, 2012). In the Asia and Pacific regional consultation, young people offered examples of agricultural social cooperatives, as well as new opportunities in ecotourism, as

“ **Everything is upside down in this country. It is we, the young people of the deprived and poor regions, who have been the flame of the revolution. We are the ones who revolted for employment, development, dignity and freedom, but we have become poorer, without development projects, our infrastructure has deteriorated, unemployment is higher, and coastal regions and the rich are the beneficiaries [of the Revolution]. They gave us a bonus, [namely] terrorism.** ”

male, Tunisia  
(Tunisia FGD, p. 17)

“ They promise us that jobs will be given to us; that we will be integrated into state institutions both locally and nationally. Look today, those who are most struck by unemployment are youth, they are not represented in the institutions of decision-making even within the ministry that has the youth portfolio. ”

young person, Burundi  
(Burundi FGD)

ways to address economic inequality in their communities, and build stronger ties with each other and their environment (Asia and the Pacific consultation).

In Uganda, young people organized to form Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) to generate a community-based fund that provides capital for locally led income-generating activities. VSLAs brought together “reformed warriors”<sup>35</sup> and other youth in the community; this avoided fuelling resentment or being seen to reward reformed warriors for previously violent behaviour. The steady economic base and strengthened community relationships provided by VSLAs supported engagements in local peacebuilding activities by reformed warriors and other young people (Uganda CFR).

By bringing communities into dialogue with each other, SSEs can bridge intergenerational tensions, and address the stigma and discrimination that exist as a result of negative youth stereotypes. They promote collective economic advancement and community growth that is based on the needs, hopes and desires of all members of society. Moreover, the strong focus on community collective organizing means that the process is less likely to be subjected

to manipulation and capture by political elites. However, for this to be the case, it is vital that diverse young people are leaders and active participants in these processes, particularly young women.

To date, SSE projects have mainly been conducted at the grassroots level.<sup>36</sup> For SSEs to be successful at global and national levels, greater coherence across all sectors of youth programming, bridging rights-based, economic and sociopolitical approaches, is needed. International donors, national governments and the private sector must help scale up this approach, and use it to inform their policy and programmatic interventions, while staying true to its core values and objectives, and recognizing the abilities and bargaining power of young people.

Framing the approach to young people’s economic inclusion through the lens of their socioeconomic rights is paramount to ensure that the economic stake of young women and men is not defined solely by the parameters of macroeconomic policy, but is firmly in the realm of justice and equality.

<sup>35</sup> A phrase used to refer to young people who have given up violence in the Karamoja area of Uganda.

<sup>36</sup> There has been some support for SSEs from the international community, namely the ILO; however, significant gaps still exist between policy and practice (Fonteneau et al., 2011).



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### 3.3 Education

Education occupies a critical place for young people in relation to peace and security. From young men and women living in remote parts of the globe to those involved in transnational networks, education was seen as indispensable to building peace and preventing violent conflict. Education featured universally as a core peace and security concern for young people across all the consultations undertaken for the study – whether as an object of grievance and frustration, or as the embodiment of young people’s aspirations and hopes; whether as a place of social cohesion and belonging, or as an experience of fracture and exclusion. The education system – at primary, secondary and tertiary levels – is also a key interface that shapes and defines the relationship between young people and the state.

“ We need to engage young people at a younger age – the curricula for children should also include peacebuilding, so they grow up with this mindset. ”

male, Fiji

*(Asia and the Pacific consultation, p. 9)*

## A site of struggle

Education is a site of struggle, an ideologically and politically contested space, based on political affiliations, identity, religion, class and socioeconomic issues, and gender dynamics. Education can be a potential organizational base for the expression of grievances, and resistance to injustice and repression:

*Structural violence can be reproduced within exclusionary education systems which restrict meaningful access to privileged groups in society. In several contexts, such as Rwanda, Liberia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, research has shown that a lack of equitable access to schooling amongst the civilian population served as a grievance among warring parties and helped fuel armed conflict. (Dupuy, 2008, as quoted in Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 23)*

Qualitative studies show that educational institutions may be places of social cohesion, reconciliation and belonging, or flashpoints that exacerbate division and exclusion. Recent quantitative studies (FHI 360 and UNICEF,

2016) show, across five decades, a consistent statistical relationship between higher levels of inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups, and the likelihood that a country will experience violent conflict (UNICEF, 2017). This is an important challenge to the wishful assumption that education can single-handedly solve the problems of conflict and violence:

*Education by itself cannot be the sole panacea for conflict transformation and, paradoxically, particular dimensions of the education system or its location within the post-conflict cultural political economy may cause more harm than good. (Shah and Lopes Cardozo, 2014, as cited in Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 28)*

Education is a strategic arena of sovereign state power. Although education is often regarded as a tool of freedom by young men and women, it is an instrument of control, patronage and privilege for others. South Africa illustrates the ebbs and flows of education as a site of struggle between youth and the state (see box 4).

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Control over history curriculums and the shaping of a selective historical orthodoxy reflecting the dominant perspective on past conflicts are often key concerns of governments (Cole, 2004; Arthur, 2009). It is also noted by Lopes Cardozo and Scotto (TP, p. 18) that, following the United States,

some countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia have begun to see building schools and strengthening education in certain conflict zones as part of their military counter-insurgency strategy aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of civilian populations.

#### BOX 4

### South Africa: from “Bantu education” to “education for liberation” to “fees must fall”

South Africa illustrates the contested nature of education as a tool of control, and as a source of liberation across decades and successive youth cohorts.

In 1953, the Minister of Native Affairs and subsequent Nationalist Party Prime Minister of South Africa, H.F. Verwoerd, launched the Bantu Education Act No. 47 as a critical part of the architecture of the apartheid system. He made very clear that control over the black majority in South Africa – who, in his words, should be no more than the “hewers of wood and drawers of water” – was the unashamed objective of using education for racially exclusive political control and economic exploitation.

Despite this intention, the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) under Nelson Mandela, embedded in the ANC Youth League, was itself in many respects forged from below in schools, colleges and universities across the country.

In 1976, in response to a new attempt by the apartheid government to use the education system to control the increasingly urbanized black majority (through imposing Afrikaans rather than English in schools), students took to the streets in resistance. In this 1976 uprising and its violent repression, the future foot soldiers of the anti-apartheid liberation movement were born. Existing organizations such as the National Union of South African Students and newly formed ones such as the Azanian Students Organisation, established in 1979, were key to promoting the transformation of education systems in the country (Kline, 1985; Alexander, 2013). The catchphrase “Education for liberation” reflected the centrality of education in the transformation of the country.

In 2015, almost 25 years after liberation, students in South Africa have once again been on the streets, this time contesting the authority of a post-apartheid government over its alleged betrayal of young people and the failure to deliver affordable, quality tertiary education, accessible to all. Although some students have resorted to violence and threatened to burn universities, others have been building partnerships and developing sophisticated policy proposals for alternative financing models for affordable education. Student activism under the maxim FeesMustFall (Langa, 2017) resulted in negotiations with the government over stopping the ongoing increase in tuition fees.

Students’ frustration with the education system does not stop at fees and school affordability, however. Students have also been protesting against an education system that they believe has inherited many of the oppressive and “colonial” dynamics of apartheid. A recent report by UNICEF’s Research Consortium on Education and Peacebuilding echoed these perceptions (Sayed et al., 2016). According to FHI 360 and UNICEF (2016), and Sayed and Ahmed (2015), cited in the report, school quality and resources reflect deeply entrenched geographic, economic and racial disparities, and there have not been enough efforts or investment in redressing such inequities.

## Education under attack

Educational institutions are often among the first casualties of violent conflict. In the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, it is estimated that at least 1.75 million school-age children and more than 40 per cent of Syrian refugee children have lost access to school because of the ongoing conflict. This decimates not only education but hubs of wider social and community cohesion, social solidarity and even therapeutic spaces of recovery for young men and women: “By reestablishing a daily routine and helping to restore a sense of normalcy, the objective is for schools to become therapeutic spaces in the midst of destruction” (UNICEF, 2015, as cited in Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 22).

In the aftermath of violence, education and educational institutions can provide psychosocial recovery, the restoration of normalcy, hope, and the acquisition of values and skills for building and maintaining a peaceful future (Sommers, 2002, as cited in Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 43; see box 5).

Increasingly, there are deliberate attacks on schools as extremist groups and other warring parties seek to assert control over these spaces. They can include systematic targeting of “Western-style” education (which may mean secular education, institutions that educate girls, or just state-run institutions), as in the case of the Nigerian armed group Boko Haram, and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and Al-Shabaab; direct attacks on individual

### BOX 5

## Education in humanitarian settings

*“In conflict and crisis situations, higher education serves as a powerful driver for change, shelters and protects a critical group of young men and women by maintaining their hopes for the future, fosters, inclusion and non-discrimination and acts as a catalyst for the recovery and re-building of post-conflict countries” (New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants; A/RES/71/1).*

Young refugee populations often experience great difficulties in accessing education, particularly at secondary and tertiary levels, which has many adverse effects. Globally, about half of refugee children are able to attend primary school, compared with a global percentage of 90 per cent. Since the beginning of the war in Syria, 90 per cent of Syrian refugee children and youth aged 6–17 are estimated to be out of school (UNDP, 2016a, p. 142). Only 1 per cent of refugees attend university, compared with 34 per cent of general populations globally (UNDP, 2016a). Conflict-induced displacement also greatly diminishes young people’s chances of accessing continuing and vocational education (Muggah, 2000).

Education for refugees is often provided as a short-term or emergency requirement in these contexts, but frequently becomes a prolonged need demanding ongoing responses, particularly in the context of refugee camps. An alternative discourse in policy and research identifies education as an intervention aimed at capacity-building, and providing refugee individuals and groups with agency, rather than as an emergency response or requirement (Loescher et al., 2008; Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP).

Offering post-secondary education and training with a specific peacebuilding dimension to refugee youth can strengthen young people’s participation in processes of positive change, and contribute to the prevention of tensions and conflicts, both within refugees’ host societies and when they return to their countries of origin.

“Studying with top universities and being connected to the outside world of [academia] makes you feel part of something bigger – not just a number in a refugee camp” (UNHCR, 2017, p. 21), a Syrian refugee living in a refugee camp in Jordan, says. It also brings fresh perspectives on the future. “We learned about how the countries of Europe rebuilt after World War Two. And that gave me hope that we can do the same in Syria.”



students and teachers, such as Malala Yousafzai in Pakistan; the destruction (and deliberate targeting) of school buildings; or the strategic use of school premises by warring parties (Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 21).

In the Northern Triangle in Central America, it was reported that schools are magnets for violence because sons of gang members go to the schools to recruit new members; this leads many to abandon school without finishing their education (Northern Triangle CFR, p. 14). In South Africa, too, research shows that gangs deliberately used schools as recruitment grounds, as well as targeting markets for illicit goods (Mncube and Steinmann, 2014). In the United States, schools and issues of school safety have become a battleground over gun control, and the proliferation of gun violence affecting children and youth.<sup>37</sup>

### Education and violence

Policy panic associated with the threat of violent extremism has unhelpfully distorted the policy discussion and programmatic positioning of education in relation to YPS, based on unsubstantiated arguments that deficits in education feed recruitment into violent extremist groups (see section 1.3). For example, Kenyan policymakers and international organizations working in the country routinely prescribed education and subsequent jobs as the solution to turning “the reality of the youth menace ... [into] the greatest resource ... of this country” (Kenya National Assembly, 2010, p. 28, as cited in King, 2018). In Somalia, Mercy Corps’ research notes that “many existing strategies and programmes are based on conventional wisdom or anecdotal information on what are perceived to be the drivers of violence. Among these, lack of equitable, quality education, and political marginalization are often cited as drivers for youth joining violent groups” (Mercy Corps, 2013).

Although there is a vast and growing literature on the drivers of violence and violent extremism,

<sup>37</sup> See <https://marchforourlives.com/>.

“ **When I hear the explosions I get scared but when I’m in the classroom I feel safe. I just want to finish my schooling so I can become an engineer.** ”

male, Ethiopian refugee in Yemen

(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017, p. 20)

research has not focused as much on what prevents young people from engaging in violence or how they themselves forge alternative non-violent pathways. Some uneven results suggest that secondary education reduces support for violence, but there are multiple other variables at play that mediate the findings, including exposure to violence itself, and the seemingly vital link between education and opportunities for civic engagement and employment (Tesfaye et al., 2018). An earlier Mercy Corps (2016) study showed that, although improving access to secondary education reduced direct youth participation in political violence by 16 per cent, it increased support for political violence by 11 per cent. However, when combining secondary education with civic engagement, both participation in, and support for, violence dropped significantly – by 14 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively (Mercy Corps, 2016).

The assumption of a linear relationship between violence and educational deficits is also fundamentally challenged by cases in which highly educated and well-off youth are the ones joining armed groups (Krueger and Malečková, 2003). Violent extremist groups frequently specifically target educated youth “who bring technical skills ranging from video editing to engineering ... that are increasingly valued by militant groups with sophisticated media strategies and that are planning high-impact attacks” (Pakistan CFR, p. 13). And in Kosovo,\* even although poor quality of education and the frustration resulting from

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

the gap between educational attainment and employment appear to be related to recruitment into armed groups, 84 per cent of the foreign fighters interviewed by UNDP had completed high school (Kosovo\* CFR, p. 14).

These perspectives on the role of education in relation to peace and conflict can also be criticized for potentially “instrumentalizing” the role of education, as well as young people’s interests in it. King (2018) challenges the notion that a narrow economic logic is the driving force underlying young people’s interest in education: “The dominant discourse – focusing on education and jobs for predominantly material reasons – is too simple and reductionist; it may be fundamentally overlooking important components of what matters to youth” (King, 2018). Santos and Novelli are even more broadly critical of this narrow approach, noting that:

*Approaching education as a mere component of a pacification strategy to mitigate youth involvement in violence, risks it becoming part of an underlying narrative that simply posits youth as a threat. This risks overlooking young people’s legitimate concerns and aspirations.*

*(Santos and Novelli, 2017, as cited in Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 25)*

In many respects, this summarizes the way in which policy panic about violent extremism has misshaped the value of education in relation to peace and security. Lopes Cardozo and Scotto go on to criticize the way technical and economic motivation is seen to trump all others in efforts to understand the value and contribution of education for YPS:

*These studies point to a lack of focus on issues of recognition and on the reconciliatory potential of education. Investments in education are often tied to*

*economic strategies increasing the potential of youth as human capital in a narrow economic sense, rather than building social cohesion and reconciliation through a more holistic approach to formal and non-formal education. This mismatch can be perceived as a tragic paradox and, as evidence from students’ point of view ... that education in many situations fails to live up to its social justice potential.*

*(Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, pp. 30–1)*

Study participants largely reflected the prevailing view in much of the literature that vocational training was particularly important to peace and security in relation to particular groups of “youth at risk”. Emphasis was placed on the role of such training in reintegration, demobilization or disengagement of former combatants or gang members, or in war-to-peace transitions. Lopes Cardozo and Scotto nonetheless warn against the glib assumptions made about the impact of these interventions if they are not conflict-sensitive:

*Vocational training alone does not provide a quick fix to build peace sustainably. Rather, when [these] interventions are not designed in a contextually-aware, historically grounded and participatory way, there is a chance that they might do more harm than good by feeding into unmet expectations or reproducing existing injustices and inequalities.*

*(Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 41)*

In particular, the potential “expectation–frustration gap” that arises when created capacities cannot be used in situations of employment, or social and civic participation has widely been observed as counterproductive (Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 27 (see section 3.2).

Lopes Cardozo and Scotto (TP) make the point that the language of resolution 2250 could lend itself to a potentially narrow view of the role of education in supporting youth entrepreneurship and constructive engagement. They see much greater

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\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

potential for education in relation to the five pillars of the resolution. For instance, education is not directly included as an element of the protection pillar, which the authors argue is a crucial omission of resolution 2250. Students and schools rely on the international community to make specific commitments that recognize students' vulnerability and potential to be attacked during conflict, and to better redistribute resources that provide physical and psychological security, especially to marginalized groups of young people affected by conflict, discrimination and inequalities.

### Education for peace

The aspirations of young people around the world in relation to education and its role in peace were one of the most striking issues to emerge from the YPS consultations, and the area for which young people had by far the greatest number of recommendations. Young people expressed ambitious hopes for the role of education at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, as well as through informal learning, as potentially transformative endeavours that can support building peace and social cohesion. This was articulated not just as a way of "getting ahead" or finding a job, or as a defensive measure against extremist violence, but as a pathway to wider social contributions, well-being, reconciliation, trust-building, and social cohesion in conflict-affected and divided societies.

Findings from perception surveys undertaken in two school districts in Democratic Republic of Congo to investigate parental attitudes and youth's perception of education affirm the potential of education to "spur positive social engagement", and to contribute to various dimensions of social cohesion and "peaceful conflict resolution behaviors" (Vinck et al., 2017, p. 4). As one youth clearly stated, "Education has been important in helping me see the importance of civic engagement" (World Bank et al., 2018, p. 48). In Somalia, Mercy Corps points out that civic engagement activities, along with formal education, seem to "fulfill a common desire among youth – the desire to do something positive, meaningful and impactful" (Mercy Corps, 2016, p. 2).



**You can't teach good or bad to everyone. What you can do is teach empathy. You can tell them that they have to think about everyone as human.**



young person, Pakistan

(*Pakistan CFR*, p. 12).

Young women and men argued very strongly for greater local, national and international investments in "education for peace". For many, this was about the potential for education to foster mutual understanding or an appreciation of diversity in their societies, or to facilitate reconciliation. For others, it was a means to break intergenerational transmission and cycles of violence (Eastern Europe and Central Asia consultation). Reflecting a view that was repeated in every region of the world, one Abkhaz youth noted in a focus-group discussion that civic education could encourage tolerance and diversity, and allow young people to think more freely (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 21).

As highlighted by participants in focus-group discussions, "youth urged that the education syllabus teaches skills in self-criticism and reflection. According to them, peaceful societies need to be capable of serious self-critical reflection" (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 21). Young interviewees from Kosovo\* advocated for "teaching methods and curricula that would encourage critical thinking and encourage young people to develop their own opinions on issues, rather than being influenced only by opinions of others", and "developing the self-regulatory function of young people" (Kosovo\* CFR, p. 14). Others argued for the importance of "religious literacy" and comparative understanding of diverse religious views: "Youth should be educated and informed so as to better understand

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

religion and not misinterpret it, as this could lead to spreading of wrong beliefs” (Kosovo\* CFR, p. 12).

In other instances, overcoming segregated schooling (whether based on ethnicity, caste, class, religion, gender or other factors) in divided societies was seen as critical to addressing negative stereotypes and increasing social cohesion (Asia and the Pacific consultation). This came up in contexts as diverse as Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and the Western Balkans, among others, and is also supported by scholarly literature on the topic (Magill and Hamber, 2011; Emerson, 2012; Davies, 2014; Duncan and Cardozo, 2017).

Young people also stressed the importance of having a strategy for engaging younger children at the primary school level to contribute to building durable peace. As expressed by young participants from Central America:

*When one is young it is probably too late already. The young people who reach 16 years of age without joining a gang or becoming involved in illegal economic activities very possibly will never do it later.  
(Northern Triangle CFR, p. 60)*

These views by young people, calling for an integration of peacebuilding values throughout various levels of education, correspond to findings from a recent comparative study of youth perceptions on (in)formal education for peacebuilding in Myanmar, Uganda, Pakistan and South Africa (Lopes Cardozo et al., 2016). Young people across these four contexts expressed the need for structural reform of formal education. They also demanded support for teachers to transform teaching approaches and content to support recognition of diversity – including ethnic, linguistic, socioeconomic, sexual orientation and religious diversity – especially through civil and citizenship education, and the teaching of history. A comprehensive and conflict-sensitive education reform approach that prioritizes the training of teachers and

head teachers has been a key aspect of the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (UNICEF, 2016a).

## Education and gender

Access to education is still heavily restricted for many girls and young women around the world, largely as a result of gender-inequitable social norms that either outright ban them from attending school, make it unsafe for them to do so, or view their attendance as having little economic promise. During periods of violent conflict, “girls are 2.5 times more likely to be out of school than boys” (ODI, 2016, p. 8). Within refugee and host communities, the financial burden of displacement means that families are sometimes more likely to pay for their son’s education than their daughter’s (Iraq FGD, p. 8). Traditional gender roles significantly limit young women’s education: “Adolescent girls’ enrolment in school often declines sharply due to the need of their help at home or the fact that their education is considered less important than the education of their brothers or male peers” (UNDP, 2006, p. 17). Moreover, “young women [in conflict-affected countries] are nearly 90 per cent more likely to be out of secondary school than their counterparts in countries not affected by conflict” (UNESCO, 2015, p. 3). For these girls and young women, severely limited access to education has long-term consequences for their economic prospects and independence, increasing their vulnerability to early and forced marriage, abuse, trafficking, and child labour and exploitation (ODI, 2016).

Young people consulted in our research highlighted that inclusive and equitable access to education for both boys and girls can contribute to gender equality from a young age, thus creating societies that are more resilient to conflict. The African Union Youth Charter recognizes the importance of this by encouraging governments to “ensure that girls and young women are able to participate actively, equally and effectively with boys at levels of social, educational, economic, political, cultural, civic life and leadership as well as scientific endeavours” (African Union Commission, 2006, article 23). Aside from the moral imperative underpinning free and



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equal access to education, girls and young women with an education are more likely to participate in peacebuilding processes, and engage in civic and political life.

To address unequal access to education between boys and girls, it is necessary to work with children, youth, educators, community leaders and families to examine restrictive gender and social norms. Introducing positive, alternative and non-violent masculine identities, and mainstreaming the concepts of gender equity and equality into educational curriculums and within communities is a necessary step towards addressing violence and inequality. To this end, the YPS community can build upon, and benefit greatly from, UNICEF's Learning for Peace programme, which has sought to "[build] teachers' capacities to adopt conflict-sensitive, gender-transformative pedagogic approaches and [develop] complementary teaching and learning materials" (UNICEF, 2016b, p. 4).

### **Peace and conflict studies**

Many young people consulted for the study argued for the professionalization and building of the field of peace and conflict studies, highlighting that this would greatly benefit the individuals and youth

organizations involved in the field. They requested support in developing more accessible tertiary-level peace education courses, curriculums, and certificate or degree programmes. This was seen as a way to expand knowledge on YPS, cultivate youth thought leadership in this arena, and generate opportunities for entry-level and professional employment, as well as sustained participation by committed youth. A promising example is the recently adopted Law 1732 in Colombia (2014) that calls for including the topic of peace in all school curriculums (McGill and O'Kane, 2015, p. 89). The scope and quality of the implementation of such a policy require further examination over the coming years.

Young participants were clearly mindful of the gap between their aspirations and the limited capacities and political will of their governments and educational institutions to deliver on them. However, it was widely pointed out that national and international civil society organizations (including many institutions of scholarship), as well as youth-focused and youth-led peacebuilding organizations, have a long history in developing educational strategies and modules, curriculums, non-didactic and participatory educational



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methodologies, and teacher training tools and approaches for education for peace. To this end, young participants across the globe promoted the idea of building strategic partnerships focused on education for peace.

### 3.4 The central role of gender identities for youth, peace and security

#### Gender as equivalent to young women

The topic of gender was raised as an essential component of the YPS agenda by young people across almost all consultations and focus-group discussions. Where youth peace work related to gender was highlighted, it was primarily undertaken by young women or SGMs. Work that was viewed as gender-specific often focused on reducing violence against women, improving women's maternal and reproductive health, and promoting gender equality, all of which are important components of a gendered approach to YPS.

However, framing gender as it relates to youth peacebuilding as applying only to young women misses a valuable opportunity to engage in discussions around the gendered identities of young men and SGMs. Global YPS policy and programming that seek to promote gender equality as one of their core aims must engage with the gendered identities of both young men and young women, to support and promote positive, gender-equitable identities and roles. It is also critical that this approach builds on the evolving understanding of gender as a spectrum, rather than a binary between men and women, acknowledging the varied gender identities that exist.

#### *Experiences of young women*

Although it is essential to acknowledge that young women are disproportionately affected by violence (WHO, 2014; European Commission, 2016), it is necessary to take a closer look at how different types of violence affect young women, men and SGMs. This distinction can be seen most clearly in the forms of gendered violence that emerge in public and private spheres. Young women are most at risk in the private sphere, where they are

more likely to experience sexual and gender-based violence. For young men, the risk of violence is most pronounced in the public sphere, where they are more likely to become victims of homicide and violent death (Myrntinen et al., 2014). In contexts of insecurity, young women are likely to experience violence in both private and public spheres, particularly where sexual violence is employed as a weapon of war. For young SGMs, their exposure to violence, discrimination and stigma crosses this divide, irrespective of the peace and security context, highlighting their exacerbated vulnerability, and supporting the need for further research, policies and programmes to address this.

Over the past few decades, increasing attention has been paid to the role of women in peace and security, primarily as a result of resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions. The women-centred approach, adopted by the WPS community, has played a critical role in helping to identify the positive impacts women can and do have on peace in their communities (see section 3.1). It also allows a more nuanced discussion of the multiple and overlapping forms of violence that women are subjected to. Women of all ages are disproportionately affected by sexual and gender-based violence, and are the most targeted group when it comes to rape, sexual slavery, kidnapping, forced labour, torture, abandonment and human trafficking (UN Women, 2015; European Commission, 2016). Women (including young women) and girls are overwhelmingly (96 per cent) the victims of trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation (Mcalpine et al., 2016). Some of the most recent and well-documented cases include young Yazidi women in Iraq who were kidnapped by Daesh and forced to act as sex slaves, and young women abducted by Boko Haram in Nigeria who were subjected to sexual violence and forced marriage (Okeowo, 2015; OHCHR, 2016).

In our research, young people from the Eastern Europe and Central Asia regional consultation described forced and early marriages, bride kidnapping, domestic violence, violence against transgender youth, and the trafficking of women



**There is a lot of contribution from women in peacebuilding. But with a lot of challenges – religious, culture and beliefs ... often restrict interested women from participating in peacebuilding work.**



young person, Nigeria

(Nigeria FGD, p. 21)

and girls as some of their key security concerns. For young women in Yemen, violent extremism has restricted their mobility, freedoms, and access to employment and education, and led to an increase in child marriage and domestic violence (Yemen FGD – b, p. 2). Women's exposure to, and experiences of, violence can serve as important indicators of their status relative to men, and as significant predictors of a country's likelihood of experiencing violent conflict (Hudson et al., 2012; UN Women, 2015).

### **Young women's participation in violence**

The forms of violence that young women, men and SGMs are subjected to are closely tied to notions of femininity and masculinity in which the former is seen to denote submission, and the latter aggression and superiority. These understandings often feed into the stereotyping of young women as victims, who are deemed vulnerable and in need of protection. They also restrict our ability to recognize and engage with young women who either indirectly support violence or directly participate in violence. The former includes women who encourage men to partake in violence or provide services to combatants (El-Bushra, 2012). With regard to the latter, young women have made up a substantial proportion of combatants in many conflicts, including in Algeria, Colombia, Eritrea, Liberia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe (UN Women TP).

Globally, women are believed to comprise 10–30 per cent of armed forces and groups (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009, p. 13).<sup>38</sup> A variety of reasons are given for their participation, including revenge for family killings and destruction of houses; “keep[ing] life tolerable [by] marrying a fighter to assuage the organization [Daesh] and keep their families in favour” (Moaveni, 2015); protecting women and their rights; as a response to domestic exploitation and limited opportunities beyond domestic labour; and as a result of physical and/or sexual abuse (Specht, 2007; UN Women TP). In some instances, armed groups instrumentalize young women’s participation by using their social networks to increase the group’s influence, and to convey messages of progress and equality (Smeulers, 2015). Young women have also exploited gender stereotypes that portray them as peaceful to carry out suicide bomb attacks, and gather intelligence for terrorist groups and organizations (UN Women TP). For some young women, participating in violence is a way of subverting traditional and/or restrictive gender norms that relegate them to the home. However, many young women who participate in violence – whether military, criminal or political – often find themselves stigmatized and outcast by societies that view this transgression negatively (Berko and Erez, 2007; McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009).

Similar to participation in armed groups, young women’s motivations to participate – directly or indirectly – in gangs appear to be driven by overlapping social, political and economic factors, including early exposure to sexual and physical violence in the home, easy access to weapons and drugs, poverty, and elevated school drop-out rates (Aguilar Umaña and Ridders, 2012). All these motivating factors contribute to young women’s desire for community, protection and a sense of belonging. It is important to note, however, that

membership in these groups and participation in violence is often coerced or involuntary for many young women (and young men).

### **Young women as peacebuilders**

Young women are often active contributors to peace in their communities. Despite significant obstacles, young women find creative ways to organize and form networks, foster safe spaces for engagement and promote social cohesion (see section 2.3). However, peacebuilding work undertaken – often initiated and led – by young women demands greater attention and visibility. For many young women, their ability to participate in peacebuilding – in particular, their mobility – remains heavily restricted by traditional gender norms. In the Kurdistan region of Iraq, training was given to parents and tribal leaders to generate more support for young women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and public life, by describing the benefits of young women’s participation (Iraq FGD, p. 8). Making targeted investments in young women’s peacebuilding work, specifically their leadership, and listening carefully to them are important steps towards recognizing their central role in peace and security.

### **Youth as equivalent to young men**

Many studies on youth and violence assume a relationship that implicitly or explicitly refers to young men. This view of youth as equivalent to young men, and the perceived relationship between young men and violence, have led to the increased use of hard security approaches, the victimization of young women and SGMs, and making issues related to masculinities invisible (see section 1.2). Much of the research on gender and peacebuilding has focused on the gendered impacts of violent conflict, and relatively little attention has been afforded to the gendered drivers of violent conflict (Wright, 2014). Adopting a gender-transformative approach,<sup>39</sup> alongside a

<sup>38</sup> It is challenging to distinguish between women and young women, because existing evidence often lacks data that have been disaggregated by both age and sex.

<sup>39</sup> Gender-transformative approaches are those “that seek to transform gender relations making them more gender equitable, in an effort to free men and women from restrictive gender and sexual norms” (Myrtilinen and Daigle, 2017).





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women-centred approach, provides an important entry point for exploring the role that masculine identities may play in violent conflict and in peacebuilding among young people. This enables a better understanding of how young people's gender identities relate to violent conflict and peaceful alternatives.

The renegotiation of gender relations and identities requires peacebuilding that works simultaneously with young women, men and SGMs (Dworkin et al., 2015). All members of society have a role to play in helping to dismantle and transform gender identities. Working with young people alone is not sufficient; parents and caregivers (including teachers) can play a pivotal role in shaping the gender identities and roles of the children in their care. This means working with them to reflect positive messages of non-violence and equality in the home. Promundo and UN Women recently conducted a survey (International Men and Gender Equality Survey) in the Middle East and North Africa that found that young men who had "more equitable and involved fathers or life circumstances that forced men to take on new household roles were the drivers of more equitable attitudes and practices" (El Feki et al., 2017, p. 22).

### ***The importance of masculine identities***

Over the past few decades, violence prevention efforts have paid increasing attention to the ways in which norms and institutions underpin and reinforce gender inequality and violence (Barker et al., 2007). Although the global community has focused primarily on a women-centred approach, it is slowly beginning to examine the role that masculine identities play in sustaining gender norms that are inequitable (El Feki et al., 2017). With its focus on youth, the YPS agenda presents a valuable opportunity to open up a discussion on masculine identities. Youthhood and adolescence provide a window of opportunity when young people's gender identities are being shaped, promising great potential for the development of more gender-equitable, non-violent identities.

Identifying the persistent inequalities that limit young women's abilities to contribute to decision-making in the field of peace and security, and gain access to power and resources, and that increase their exposure to violence, is crucial to promoting gender equality and equity. This is particularly the case during periods of violent conflict and instability, when these inequalities are exacerbated. To address these inequalities and move the agenda forward, deeper engagement with the roles and lived experiences of young

men in all phases of the peace and conflict cycle is needed. Although men predominate in peace and security discussions and processes (and sometimes young men as members of warring factions), seldom does peacebuilding work consider how their gender identities contribute to, and are affected by, violent conflict. Only through examining masculine identities will peacebuilding be able to overturn the negative stereotypes surrounding both young men and women, which are deeply embedded in gender-inequitable norms and roles. As one man from Morocco, in work conducted by Promundo and UN Women stated:

“**Men are also victims of this masculinity and the patriarchal mindset. It affects men, as well, because the norms or the roles assigned to each sex, at the heart of society, are disadvantageous.**

*(El Feki et al., 2017, p. 141)*

The expectations young men have of themselves and their masculine identity are shaped by social norms. Although this identity can take different forms, often a dominant identity will emerge. Dominant masculine identities that link heterosexuality, aggression and the subservience of women have been shown to negatively affect the reproductive health and sexuality of young men, women and SGMs (Messner and Stevens, 2002; Myrntinen and Daigle, 2017). More recent research on the masculine identities of young men in Mexico, the United States and the United Kingdom found that young men who felt pressured to adhere to masculine identities associated with aggression, sexual prowess, self-sufficiency and rigid gender norms had particularly high rates of suicidal ideation, were fearful of appearing vulnerable, and were more

likely to participate in “risky behaviours”, as well as aggressive behaviours directed at both men and women, including sexual harassment (Heilman et al., 2017).

Promoting gender equality without engaging masculine identities has limited the transformation of broader systems and institutions that exclude or discriminate against women. Women-centred approaches have sometimes led to a backlash by men who feel neglected and perceive women’s empowerment as a threat to their own masculine identity, resulting in division within communities and families, and increases in violence against women (McAslan Fraser, 2012; Lwambo, 2013).

Following periods of violent conflict, in societies where young women may have made gains beyond their traditional roles (UNDP, 2012) and young men are often undergoing disengagement and reintegration, masculine identities emerge as an important contributor to feelings of disempowerment, self-hatred and anger (Breines et al., 2000). Violent masculinities may emerge when young men attempt to reposition themselves in relation to young women and reassert their dominance (Hamber, 2016). As a result, the form of violence may shift from large-scale conflict to criminal, social, and sexual and gender-based violence, as young men compensate for their inability to live up to notions of masculinity closely tied to their view as “providers” (UNDP, forthcoming). In Somalia, manhood is achieved when young men become elders; however, this is contingent on their employment status, and ability to marry and have children, which is particularly challenging in contexts of insecurity (Wright, 2014). For many young men in Uganda, high levels of poverty and violent conflict mean that they are unable to pay bride prices, hindering their ability to transition into adulthood and imbuing a sense of emasculation (Sommers, 2006). This has driven some young men to join the military, which is seen as an opportunity to “recover lost masculinity” and gain access to better wages (Wright, 2014).

### **Non-violent and gender-equitable masculine identities**

To date, much of the research that has been conducted on young men and masculine identities has concentrated on violent masculine identities. This focus may do more harm than good by framing young men as inherently violent and ignoring “the complex set of factors that give rise to violent masculinities beyond the reach of individual psyches” (Hamber, 2016, p. 25). For the small number of young men who do participate in violence, violent masculine identities provide a vehicle to regain agency and control, and overcome a sense of disempowerment and marginalization that is compounded by their socioeconomic background, race, ethnicity, age or rural/urban setting, among other factors. Hence, it is vital that youth peacebuilding work does not fixate on harmful individualized masculine identities to the exclusion of deeply entrenched social and structural inequalities (Connell, 1995; Messner, 1997).

Youth peacebuilding is a powerful and creative conduit for promoting non-violent and gender-equitable masculine identities across all societies. Young men who are engaged in peacebuilding work may help increase its credibility among their peers, and the involvement of other young men who remain sceptical about how it contributes to their “manliness” and image. For example, young men from regional consultations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and West and Central Africa described conducting advocacy and awareness-raising on sexual and reproductive health with young men and women (Latin America and Caribbean consultation). Other young male peacebuilders highlighted their work on providing socio-emotional learning to young men and boys by creating safe spaces for them to express their emotions and feelings openly with one another (West and Central Africa consultation).

A considerable body of programmatic work has already been carried out to promote positive, gender-equitable masculine identities that the YPS field can expand on (see section 2.3). In Brazil,

Promundo’s “Once upon a boy” cartoon, which follows a young boy through adolescence and into early adulthood, examining how his identity is constructed in relation to social processes, has been included in the official school curriculum in the state of São Paulo (Wright, 2014). In the Western Balkans, CARE International created the Young Men Initiative to engage young men in gender equality and violence prevention. As part of this initiative, young men participated in group education workshops and campaign activities to engage in “critical reflections about the ways in which society influences their attitudes and behaviours and to help them develop the necessary skills to overcome harmful or restrictive social expectations and to act in more equitable and non-violent ways” (CARE International, 2012, p. 13). The impact evaluation study of the pilot intervention’s effectiveness found that “exposure to or participation in the campaign was significantly associated with more gender equitable attitudes and decreased use of violence over time” (CARE International, 2012, p. 24).

Lessons learned from this programming have demonstrated that sustained interactions over a prolonged period of time tend to be more successful in fostering self-reported changes in behaviour and attitudes (Barker et al., 2007). In her review *Masculinities, Conflict and Peacebuilding*, Wright (2014) identified three prominent approaches to promoting gender-equitable masculine identities for peace: group education, community outreach and integrated services. In terms of the content of these educational strategies, practitioners and researchers have found that messages emphasizing personal and shared responsibility are more effective than those that promote guilt, which are likely to provoke defensive responses. Young women are not immune from internalizing inequitable views and can also reinforce patriarchal masculine identities. Therefore, young female peacebuilders must be engaged in programming on gender identities, to change the expectations that both young men and women have of each other (see example from Ethiopia in box 6).

## BOX 6

### Redefining masculine identities in Ethiopia

“One of my projects is called ‘Arif Wond/Cool Man’. We work on violence prevention by redefining masculinities. It came about as a result of a particularly bad streak of violence in Addis. We meet every week and discuss norms of masculinity and how they affect us.

“My father told me about a colleague that came into university saying that he beat his wife. And he asked people to ask him why he did it. He said his neighbour was beating his wife and he felt bad because he was not a man, so he woke up and did it too. We also speak about men’s roles in the family and childrearing, street harassment, etc. The men reflect and teach us a lot. You get a whole new perspective when you hear it from the men’s side.”

*Female, Ethiopia (East and Southern Africa consultation)*

## BOX 7

### Young transgender women promoting peace and security in Brazil

In Brazil, ULTRA (the Libertarian Union of Transgender Women) is working to protect and advocate for the rights of transgender youth, who face violence and discrimination throughout the country. ULTRA conducts research on the impact this has on the ability of transgender youth to have safe and equitable access to education and the formal labour market.

In 2017, to address misconceptions about transgender youth, ULTRA launched a national campaign called “Trans is not an illness” that contributed to the right for trans youth to self-identify their gender on identification documents. Their work also focuses on strengthening relationships between transgender civil society and government institutions and international organizations, to promote the overall health and well-being of transgender youth.

A significant body of research supports the efficacy of gender-sensitive and transformative approaches in comparison with gender-neutral programmes, and is able to demonstrate statistically significant reductions in violence against women (Barker et al., 2007; Dworkin et al., 2013). For example, when applied by the World Health Organization in 2007, six out of eight interventions targeting violence against women that adopted gender-sensitive or transformative approaches demonstrated statistically significant reductions in the perpetration of violence. In 11 out of 12 gender-transformative interventions, men demonstrated a statistically significant change in their attitudes towards gender norms (Dworkin et al., 2013). This suggests that it is worthwhile to invest in youth peacebuilding work focused on promoting positive, gender-equitable masculine identities.

### Sexual and gender minorities

By opening up a space in youth peacebuilding for discussions on masculine identities, issues affecting SGMs can also be addressed (see box 7).<sup>40</sup> Dominant masculine identities, as previously mentioned, are often based on heterosexuality and gender-binary identities that are viewed as the norm, meaning that any sexuality or gender identity that falls outside this is deemed deviant. As explained by young people in the East and Southern Africa regional consultation, LGBTI youth experience significant stigma and discrimination, which makes it difficult for them to fully and safely participate in peacebuilding. In El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, LGBTI youth described the multiple forms of discrimination and violence they experience as their number one peace and security concern (Northern Triangle CFR, p. 35). A prevailing culture of machismo and admiration for violent masculine identities by some in the community contributes to intolerance and violence.

<sup>40</sup> Building on the work of other United Nations entities in this area, including the Free & Equal campaign spearheaded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2013.

Attention to masculine identities has been gaining traction in mainstream popular discourse, but has yet to be fully embraced by policymakers in the field of peace and security. In spite of this, a continually expanding body of evidence and growing rights-based argument mean that the construction of young people's gender identities offers a timely and unique entry point for innovative solutions for peace.

### 3.5 Dealing with injustice and human rights

Without falling into the trap of stereotyping youth as victims of violence, addressing young people's exposure to violations and their experience of injustice is central to the YPS agenda. This demands making the important shift "from the normative to the transformative" (Simpson, 2017) in the relationship between a rights regime and building sustainable peace for and by youth. Chapter 1 positioned YPS within a broader human rights framework, specifically noting that the problem for youth is not a normative deficiency in the global human rights regime but a "rights realization gap". In every region of the globe, young people described both the importance of their needs for protection by institutions of the state and the pervasive concern that they also saw themselves as the primary targets of the arbitrary actions, intimidation, violence and abuse of power of these institutions (see sections 1.2 and 2.1). Young people often described their own governments as among the greatest sources of risk or threat of violence – often pre-emptively because of the assumptions about the dangers posed by "youth bulges", youth migration patterns, or the spectre of recruitment of youth into violent extremist activities.

#### Addressing victimization and violation

To ensure protection and accountability, it is critical to address the issues of civic trust and the rule of law; abuse of power by security institutions; and the realization of full socioeconomic, cultural

and political rights for young people. This can make a vital contribution to guarantees of non-recurrence and sustainable peace (UNHRC, 2015).

The unresolved frustration and grievances that the denial of rights have produced are a key concern in young people's readiness to resist, and perhaps even to take up arms or join criminal gangs (Olonisakin and Ismail, forthcoming). Throughout our research, young women and men were vocal about a primary concern over broader rights deprivations, and their structural exclusion through the denial of their socioeconomic and cultural rights (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). This was widely and specifically described by young people participating in the study as a fundamental experience of injustice.

A second dimension of young people's experience of injustice has a more institutionalized focus. It relates to the critical interface of youth and the state through the administration of justice, and the institutional forms this takes. This has been described as the everyday lived experience of injustice to which youth are exposed across the globe. It includes the violations often taking place within the justice and penal systems, the failings of juvenile justice, hard policing, and arbitrary arrest and incarceration (Muggah et al. TP; Brazil CFR; Jamaica CFR; Northern Triangle CFR; South Africa CFR; United States CFR). For example, young people from all over the world testified to the harassment and violence they regularly experienced at the hands of the police. One young person from Chicago said, "The fire department



**We can't talk about peace and security with groups that do not have basic rights. We first need to secure people's basic rights.**



young person, Arab States

*(Arab States consultation)*

can be trusted to put out a fire, but the police department may make a violent situation more violent” (United States CFR, p. 17).

A third area in which young people experience human rights violations relates to the gap in the realization of rights that should protect young women and men in their work on building peace. Much of the discussion about youth and violence focuses on the vulnerability of young people to the direct impacts and consequences of physical violence, and the associated trauma. Although this is important, it is also essential to be wary of simply applying a child protection type of discourse to youth, which denies the agency of young people. It may also skew programmatic responses too narrowly in favour of trauma management and curative psychosocial intervention models, in lieu of approaches to livelihoods, education and civic/political empowerment rights for young people. It is vital to focus on the complementary preventive value of protecting the space and enabling environment for youth peacebuilding – rather than exclusively on the symptomatic dimensions of the victimization of young people. These approaches should also be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive:

The protection of these rights is necessary to provide an enabling environment for young people, and their work in building and sustaining peace. Young men and women involved in our research clearly articulated how repressive conditions and state action affected their collective freedom of movement, assembly and expression, and closed down space for their peacebuilding, social cohesion, violence prevention, or dialogue and reconciliation work (Nordås and Davenport, 2013; Boukhars, 2017). In very diverse contexts and countries across the globe, young people described how peaceful political organization and legitimate organized political protest were frequently shut down in the name of counter-terrorism or the prevention of violent extremism. This is an arena in which a human rights framework has a vital protective role in guarding the space of youth movements by guaranteeing these freedoms, as well as the wider range of civil and political liberties necessary to running and supporting young people’s organizations and practices. “My fear stems from the absence of the rule of law that is not being enforced here, and the restrictions imposed by the government on us as young activists” (Palestine FGD, p. 13).



**Young peacebuilders who are working in the conflict-affected areas are risking their lives and working for peace, there should be a mechanism/process for safety of young peacebuilders. Agenda of youth, peace and security should not be used to shrink spaces for youth-led civil society organizations but should be used to create more civic spaces.**



young person, Cameroon  
(UNOY and SfCG mapping, p. 9)

## Transitional justice

From the perspective of transitioning societies (as well as many more peaceful societies dealing with legacies of past violence), young people, as the purveyors of historical memory, have an invaluable role to play in designing and implementing transitional justice mechanisms. This is a fourth dimension of justice that has particular relevance to YPS. Youth are a critical stakeholder group for transitional justice (International Center for Transitional Justice TP), which is about how societies emerging from conflict or addressing unresolved legacies of past violence deal with the past through processes of truth-seeking, reparation, accountability, institutional reform, building civic trust, memory and memorialization.

From the perspective of societies transitioning from conflict to peace, or from autocracy to democracy, youth are critical to the future, even if they have been marginalized in the present. Young men and women are potential purveyors of both historical memory and residual trauma to the next generation. As such, they are among the most strategically important constituencies in the transitional justice exercises of truth-telling and truth-seeking, rebuilding civic trust associated with institutional reforms, and ensuring that past crimes cannot be repeated. They are also the potential primary beneficiaries of reparations for past violations, and the arbiters of accountability or impunity for past violations.

On this basis, one would expect youth to have a key role in these processes, although this has seldom been the case (International Center for Transitional Justice TP). As with peace processes more generally, transitional justice processes may offer youth a vehicle for active participation; an opportunity to alleviate their suffering, tell their stories and potentially address their trauma; or even a means to access reparations for past violations. Young people's role in the design and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms has the potential to transform the very shape and orientation of



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these instruments for dealing with the past and shaping the future. Youth involvement can help to move truth-seeking and other transitional justice tools away from elite-led and externally driven processes and approaches. This must involve “creating opportunities within transitional justice mechanisms for youth to talk to each other and their leaders about a violent and often controversial past, and to face and reflect on uncomfortable truths and realities” (McEvoy-Levy, 2011, p. 173).

## From rights-holders to human rights defenders

It is important to recognize that young people are holders of rights with legitimate expectations and entitlements. However, it is equally important to acknowledge that young men and women are themselves active and creative protagonists in human rights protection and realization, from monitoring and documenting violations

“ Personally, I feel like I do not know myself, and I act in a way that sometimes surprises me. I do not know why. ”

male, Palestine

(Palestine FGD, p. 17)

of human rights and humanitarian law, to supporting the design and implementation of protection measures, building networks and support structures for victims, and working as human rights defenders – including fighting for recognition of their civil, political and socioeconomic rights. For example, in Yemen, a project run by the Youth Transparency and Building Foundation aims to document human rights violation in Taiz, a city in south-western Yemen. “It is important to grant a fair transitional justice, which is why documentation is crucial at this point”, noted one of its founders (Yemen FGD – a, p. 10).

### Trauma and psychosocial services

Violence, uncertainty and instability discourage young people from investing in their future. Unless addressed, they can lead to self-destructive coping mechanisms that undermine young people’s positive resilience. Exposure to violence, especially at a young age and at the hands of the very institutions that are supposed to protect young people, is a key factor in escalating cycles of violence across generations. A significant body of research demonstrates the link between young people’s exposure to violence – including child abuse (Herrenkohl et al., 2008), community violence (Lynch, 2003), parental violence (Holt et al., 2008) and bullying or harassment in school (Eisenbraun, 2007) – and negative outcomes among youth (Wright et al., 2016).<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> It is important to note, however, that this research points to an increased likelihood of negative outcomes and is not deterministic – that is, not all young people exposed to violence will become violent themselves.

Young people’s exposure to protracted violence has a detrimental impact on their psychosocial health and well-being. Historically, much of the research in this area has focused on the impact of exposure to violence in a single “life domain”. However, increasing attention is being paid to the cumulative effects of multiple and overlapping forms of violence and trauma across different dimensions of young people’s lives. Young people exposed to violence in one arena of their lives are likely to experience violence in another (Finkelhor et al., 2007; Mrug et al., 2008). When violence cross-cuts these different dimensions of young people’s lives, the number of “safe havens” decreases, making it challenging for young people to sustain positive coping mechanisms. As a result, young people who are exposed to violence across multiple life domains develop negative coping mechanisms, resulting in internalizing problems (anxiety or depression) or externalizing them (aggressive behaviour or social withdrawal). As a teacher in India and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir explained, for young people exposed to protracted conflict, the constant threat of violence has had devastating consequences:

*Today youth live under such insecurity and pressure, they have no faith in society and very limited patience to wait for long-term solutions. So many of them resort to the use of drugs, a lot of them suffer from chronic and serious psychiatric disorders. (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 11)*

Diminished trust in their governments and the pervasive sense of hopelessness discourage young people from investing in their future and lead to a short-term outlook on life. As described by a young person from the Georgian-Abkhaz context, “Young people are lost, and our thinking is broken. We do not think of the long-term perspective as we are not sure about our own future” (Conciliation Resources FGDs Summary Report, p. 12). This also emerged strongly from a focus-group discussion with Palestinian youth: “Fear of the future is one of



the most appalling fears haunting young people. For them, the future is more of a threat than a time for seeing their ambitions and aspirations realized. According to them, thinking of the future makes them anxious and stressed. They look to the future without motivation” (Palestine FGD, p. 13). Communities that are affected by prolonged violence may struggle to maintain a shared set of values and social cohesion (Kawachi et al., 1999), making it even more difficult for young people struggling with trauma to access social support structures and other protective factors (Turner et al., 2013; Betancourt et al., 2014).

For Indigenous youth in Canada, their experiences of violation, based on a history of exclusion and oppression, have resulted in disproportionately high levels of suicide (Health Canada, 2018). In 2016, the Attawapiskat First Nation declared a state of emergency in response to a staggering number of suicides among the youth in their community. For these communities, the complex web of factors responsible for the deaths of their youth may not be fully addressed without acknowledging the invaluable role of social and cultural practices in the healing process. Supporting young people’s psychosocial well-being through culturally relevant and context-specific community interventions is essential. However, the use of culture-as-treatment should not distract from the continuing economic and political disenfranchisement young people face.

Acknowledging the impact that diverse forms of violence have on young people (see section 1.2) is a necessary prerequisite for developing more effective services and interventions. This means moving beyond a discussion based on biomedical descriptions of trauma (anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder), which is limited in its ability to address the mistrust that is produced when societies or particular groups experience collective trauma. Even more importantly, for many youth, such descriptions do not always resonate, and an exploration of social, cultural and historical

trauma may be more relevant (Moghimi, 2012). These interpretations of trauma allow a more holistic view of young people’s experiences and the different challenges they encounter. Rather than viewing young people as separate from their surroundings, explanations of social, cultural and historical trauma recognize that young people are influenced and affected by a broader set of social issues (Hamber, 2009). This orientation supports the use of community interventions that are better able to address the violence of exclusion and marginalization that young people endure (Gone, 2013).

Psychosocial services that adopt a positive youth development approach have been shown to support young people’s resilience and lead to better outcomes (Scales et al., 2006; Sanders et al., 2015). Key components of this approach include developing positive relationships with people and institutions based on mutual respect (Heinze, 2013), supporting young people’s ability to draw upon their innate strengths and respond to the challenges in their surrounding environment (Schofield and Beek, 2009), and providing at-risk youth with opportunities to exercise their agency in a prosocial way and participate in decision-making (Duncan et al., 2003). Young people’s resilience is determined not only by their intrinsic capacities but also by their ability to “navigate their way to the resources they need during crises, and their ability to negotiate for those resources to be provided in meaningful ways” (Sanders et al., 2015).

Social services are a crucial component of the state–society relationship. They are, therefore, a logical arena in which states and institutions can enhance their legitimacy and work to regain young people’s trust, including in addressing the consequences of young people’s exposure to violence. The equitable provision and delivery of social services, including sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial and other services that are particularly critical for young people, are necessary to promote social cohesion and ensure that all young people have an equal start in life.



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### 3.6 Disengagement and reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a well-established and expansive field of practice, policy and scholarship. It was not the intention, nor would it have been possible, for this study to fully cover the work being done in this arena. However, considering that the vast majority of former fighters are youth, it is important to reflect on the extent to which the DDR field has had a specific youth focus, as well as how a youth-specific approach can improve reintegration programmes. Resolution 2250 focuses on disengagement and reintegration (DR) as one of its five pillars. This opens new avenues for contemplating different forms of DR, through attention not only on former combatants, but also on youth participating in different types of organized violence, such as former criminal offenders, prison inmates, gang members, terrorists and violent extremists. This approach also encourages attention to DR processes that are not necessarily dictated by, or orchestrated through, formal peace agreements.

It must be acknowledged that the research for the study had limited (yet important) exposure to former combatants, gang members and prison inmates. Some of these voices were present in the focus-group discussions, and others in country case studies. Additional work must be done to capture the experiences of youth who are directly involved on both sides of the divide: facilitators of DR, and those who have been, or are, involved in violent underworlds. There is often a reluctance to speak to or listen to these groups, who are regarded as threatening, and sometimes there are even legal or security impediments to doing so. But this is a vital and underdeveloped area of exploration. What follows in this section is indicative, but also reflects both the limitations of the research and the need to deepen this area of endeavour.

Important lessons can be learned about the sources of social cohesion, belonging and status that reward young people involved in various forms of organized violence. Rather than seeking to dismantle these because of their negative consequences, we must better

understand them from the perspective of young people themselves, and harness them to foster positive manifestations of youth resilience, as well as social and civic engagement in support of sustaining peace.

## Disengaging from violence and violent groups

The primary issue facing young people who are attempting to disengage from violence and reintegrate into society is the marginalization, stigmatization and exclusion they experience, often associated with distrust about disclosure or accountability for their past deeds. Many of the challenges identified by the young peacebuilders we spoke with (education, economic inclusion, political participation) are relevant, and compounded, for disengaging youth. For these young women and men, their violent transgression of social norms, their stalled education, and their withdrawal from non-violent economies, as well as their frequent disdain for formal governance mechanisms, contribute to the challenges associated with their peaceful reintegration into society. Disengagement from violence and reintegration into society rest fundamentally upon the rebuilding of trust – at community and societal levels.

In addition to understanding what may have drawn or driven some young people to participate in violence (discussed in a previous section), it is necessary to uncover the “mechanisms of retention” into violent groups (Gates, 2011). For example, for a young former combatant from Nepal, her participation offered a chance for personal growth and discovery: “I feel joining the Maoists has empowered me. I can do public speaking, and I got a chance to explore many places. It has helped me enhance my knowledge of different issues, I have become smart and intellectual” (Nepal CFR, p. 17). The opportunity to develop leadership skills is particularly valuable for young women engaged in violence who would not otherwise have the chance to develop these skills or take on these roles.

It is important to recognize the various roles young people hold in violent groups, and the authority or leadership they may come to wield – beyond their direct participation in organized violence – including in information-sharing, consultation, decision-making, implementation and resource control (Hart, 2004). Despite gangs, terrorist or extremist groups, or other violent networks often being coercive, their socially cohesive worlds offer alternative status, power, hierarchy and upward mobility, as well as a sense of belonging and meaning for young people. These bonds and structures are often difficult to disconnect from, and equally difficult to replicate in the outside world, where strictly enforced pre-existing hierarchies often continue to exclude young people based on age.

Disengagement from organized violent groups can take multiple forms, including continued participation in the group with diminished roles and responsibilities, a physical separation but continued contact and relationships with the group, or a “complete break with the social norms, values, attitudes, relationships and social networks” of the group (Horgan, 2009, pp. 29–30). It is important to recognize that, for young people, DR is not always as clear-cut as formal disarmament and demobilization might imply. This is especially the case in societies where there has not been a formal peace process, where the terms of a peace agreement may not have trickled down fully to the local level, in situations where DR is taking place in the course of ongoing conflict, or where there is the sustained and pervasive presence or threat of gangs.

For young people wishing to disengage from violence or violent groups, the reasons are varied. They may relate to disillusionment with the leaders, ideology or other members; a feeling of no longer belonging; burnout; the excessive use of violence; excommunication from the group; or external pull factors (for example, having a family or a relationship, or returning to a career) (Reinares, 2011; Ferguson et al., 2015). This is by no means

an exhaustive list, but often these reasons are overlapping and have a cumulative effect, demonstrating the complex and non-linear nature of young people's disengagement from violence. Barriers or disincentives to disengagement can include fear of being rejected by the community; negative stereotypes regarding disengaging youth; competition for resources and jobs with other more qualified, educated or experienced youth; and distrust of political leaders and institutions (Ferguson et al., 2015). The coercive power and sustained presence of the organization also often acts as a disincentive – for example, in the case of street or neighbourhood gangs.

### **Reintegration into wider society**

Given the intricacies of disengagement, reintegration is equally multidimensional. One of the biggest challenges facing the successful reintegration of disengaging youth is the perennial tension between accountability for crimes and the pragmatic objective of building peace, and preventing ongoing or recurrent violence. The demobilization and reintegration of former fighters, gang members or other participants in organized violence is often viewed as essential to this objective, but in tension with concerns about justice and impunity.

For some communities severely affected by violence, a failure to punish disengaging youth can contribute to feelings of frustration and resentment, by appearing to undermine the rule of law and fostering impunity. On the flip side, heavily enforced punitive justice approaches discourage young people from exiting violent groups. Worse still, they offer little prospect of meaningful rehabilitation or social reintegration. Evidence suggests that imprisonment may do more to consolidate than to address violent identities, as well as membership and recruitment into organized violent groups (UNODC, 2016).

With this in mind, restorative justice approaches often associated with local reconciliation endeavours (UN IAWG, 2006, module 4.30,

p. 41) – although not without controversy – are gaining prominence and traction in DR theory (provided they are compliant with international legal obligations), although their practical implementation remains limited. Key to this approach is ensuring that victims or victimized communities are acknowledged and their needs addressed, and that the obligations of the perpetrators are enforced.

For reintegration processes and programmes to prosper, they must demonstrate an intimate understanding of the impact that exposure to violence has had on both disengaging youth and the community into which they are being reintegrated. This is no small task. It requires reintegration processes that align with or accommodate the economic, social, political and psychosocial needs of all those involved. The reintegration of young people disengaging from violence must be gender-sensitive and reflect their diverse needs, including for physical protection; provide trauma and healing services for survivors of sexual violence; and restore decent economic livelihoods and education for those who have been displaced or whose schools and homes have been destroyed (McEvoy-Levy, 2001, p. 8). Generally, reintegration programming falls into two broad categories: economic and sociopolitical (including psychosocial).

### ***Economic reintegration***

Economic reintegration typically focuses on livelihoods and jobs, whether through strengthening the employability of disengaging youth or developing an enabling environment that is able to absorb them as a newly incoming workforce. This is challenging for a number of reasons. Local economies that have been hard hit by violence and conflict suffer high unemployment rates, destroyed infrastructure, limited cash flow and increased competition (Specht, 2010). As well, resilient war-based sub-economies continue to dominate markets and available opportunities. Access to land, capital, technology, natural resources and markets

needed for economic reintegration may be severely limited.

For young people exiting violent groups with few marketable skills, it can be overwhelming to arrive in a community with different social rules, without any reliable sources of support or clear guidance on how to build a new life. As described by a young Liberian member of the Margibi Youth Secretariat, “If I was born in the 1980s, what kind of experience do I have? All I have is AK-47 experience” (Maclay and Özerdam, 2010). In communities where disengaging youth have returned home with little or no job prospects, and without the benefits associated with DR programmes, receiving communities may view them as “futile or even a burden”, thus compounding their alienation (Willems and Van Leeuwen, 2014).

Economic opportunities may be more effective if they target social reintegration objectives by fostering social interactions and civic engagement, and providing disengaging youth with a chance to contribute to their community. For example, in Darfur, UNAMID’s (2016) DDR section implemented a programme called community-based labour-intensive projects, which included the construction of youth centres and schools, vocational training and infrastructure development, in an effort to foster reconciliation. The challenges described here, as well as the strategies for integrating economic opportunities and spaces for civic engagement, apply equally to former gang members, prisoners or extremist recruits, as to former combatants.

Economic opportunities, especially where they are linked to civic engagement and social reintegration objectives, do seem to be important to the reintegration of disengaging youth. This value is not just in the financial compensation they provide, but, more importantly, because they lend status and are viewed as an essential building block in developing a sense of identity (Altier et al., 2014). However, economic reintegration is often premised on a view

that young people’s economic deprivation is the driving force behind their participation in violence (see section 3.2). Although employment and vocational training opportunities may help in the short term, they cannot substitute for longer-term psychosocial and economic support.

DR processes that encourage the use of economic interventions must also be careful not to appear to reward youth who have previously participated in violence by providing them with economic opportunities to the exclusion of youth from the home community. DR programmes can themselves generate conflict if they are seen as privileging youth who have formerly been involved in violence over the communities they often victimized, or prioritizing investment in young men at the expense of young women. As described by a young man from Niger, the anger this creates bubbles below the surface: “We continue to see ex-inmates with jobs created by the government, while we are struggling. There will be some consequence” (Niger FGD, p. 33).

### ***Sociopolitical reintegration***

For the vast majority of disengaging youth, reintegration requires that they learn to rebuild social relations, find alternative coping mechanisms, reconstruct a new non-violent identity, and embrace new ideas and difference, in order to peacefully coexist with community members. It is clear from existing evidence that economic reintegration is not sufficient to effectively reintegrate youth formerly involved in violence (Gilligan et al., 2013), and that adopting this exclusive focus fails to address broader social and political issues related to their exclusion and marginalization.

Effective sociopolitical reintegration encompasses a wide variety of methods to support young people in their re-entry into society. These may include psychosocial assistance, education, community-based activities that promote dialogue and reconciliation, political participation and family reunification. For young people disengaging from violence, the drastic change in

their role in society often requires some form of identity transformation (Altier et al., 2014) – this is an important consideration for reintegration programmes and processes.

It is critical, however, that these approaches balance and address community grievances as a whole, rather than only ministering to young people who were formerly involved in violence. DR processes and programmes have historically focused primarily on disengaging youth. Although these young people are still considered the primary beneficiaries, there is an increasing emphasis on horizontal reintegration (family and peer relationships) and vertical reintegration (relationships with government and institutions).

Recent policies and programming have implemented holistic interventions that work with local communities to better understand their needs, and to address the stigma and discrimination disengaging youth experience. Community-based reintegration is one such example, which gains its strength from fostering community-based relationships that are key to the successful reintegration of disengaging youth (Specht, 2010). The importance of reconnecting disengaging youth with their communities was illustrated by a member of the Network for Empowerment and Progressive Initiatives in Liberia (formerly called the National Ex-combatant Peace Initiative) who explained that “the issue of self identity and recovery is very important. Once you understand what you can offer to society, you will find opportunities available” (Maclay and Özerdem, 2010, p. 353). In Sierra Leone, Wessels and Davidson (2006) described the reparative impact of a programme that aimed to “encourage reconciliation through cooperation between ex-combatant and civilian youth on community-selected civic projects” (Wessels and Davidson, 2006, p. 40). Through a combination of civic works projects, dialogues on reconciliation and psychosocial workshops, barriers between community members and ex-combatant youth slowly dissolved, with community members describing the “humanizing effect of the project”. For a young reformed warrior in Uganda, community dialogue played a critical part in their reintegration.



**When we came back from South Sudan, these meetings helped because the people wanted to kill us, so the meetings helped us gain confidence. We were integrated into the community through these dialogues, pleading forgiveness, and now we're here. So we feel the meetings are very good.**



young person, Uganda

*(Uganda CFR, p. 7)*

In Haiti, the community violence reduction programme of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has four core objectives that demonstrate its holistic approach: livelihoods, reconciliation, dialogue and recovery. The programme supports at-risk youth, alongside the community, with psychosocial assistance, civic education, and access to vocational training and leadership opportunities. It also assists ex-prisoners in their economic and social reintegration, and encourages broader civilian–military dialogue (Voordouw, 2016). Youth-sensitive psychosocial services help to reintegrate youth disengaging from gangs and young people who have been in corrections facilities. Similar community violence reduction programmes have gained traction in recent years, and are currently mandated by the Security Council in Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, and implemented in Mali and Darfur by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Community-based reintegration varies, depending on the extent to which it is youth inclusive or youth



© UN photo/Sylvain Liechti

centred. In societies that are heavily controlled by elders, and where young women and men are often excluded from community structures and political processes, there is little guarantee of a youth focus or inclusion in these community structures. This may compound young people's sense of alienation from the community and potentially reinforce some of the factors that led them to engage with violent groups in the first place. In some instances, the term "reintegration" may be a misnomer for many young people who never felt "integrated" in their communities or society to begin with.

Educational opportunities may be of considerable value in youth reintegration programmes, with their dual potential to empower reintegrating youth and simultaneously resocialize them. Education has the potential benefit of "foster[ing] social cohesion over segregation, and inclusiveness over competition and exclusion" (Lopes Cardozo and Scotto TP, p. 13). In countries where peace agreements have been signed, ongoing education is essential to ensure that hostilities do not resurface and to prevent young people from re-engaging in violence (see section 3.3). In Northern Ireland, the Prison to Peace programme was developed "to explore ways in which ex-political

prisoners could use their narratives to engage with young people in order to de-mythologize the conflict and the prison experience, and to encourage them to make a positive contribution to their communities" (Emerson et al., 2014, p. 17).

There are also important lessons to be learned from the field of criminology, where similar mentorship approaches with ex-political prisoners have been particularly successful:

*In Northern Ireland, ex-prisoners have been central actors not only in the efforts directed to assist the ongoing processes of disarmament, disbandment and reintegration, but also in the broader efforts to embed the peace process more firmly in the communities most affected by violence. (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009, p. 39)*

These community-level, horizontal relationships are indispensable to disengaging and reintegrating youth who have become involved in violence, or come into conflict with the law. However, if the vertical relationships between disengaging youth and their governments, the security sector and international actors are not also strengthened, the underlying causes of marginalization, victimization

and exclusion – and ultimately of the resort to violence itself – may remain. This omission can undermine the success of even the best designed and most innovative reintegration efforts, especially in situations of protracted conflict and violence. Where there are no signals of potential change and where political reintegration is not included, this may even contribute to a continued sense of institutional betrayal on behalf of young people. Involving disengaging youth in two-way dialogue with these actors and including them as stakeholders in decision-making processes can help build trust; cultivate a sense of agency, ownership and leadership in young people; and ultimately support their economic and sociopolitical reintegration.

### **Youth-led and youth-facilitated disengagement and reintegration**

Instead of seeing youth who have previously been engaged in violence as passive beneficiaries of DR programmes, young people who are disengaging and being reintegrated should be viewed as essential partners, and an invaluable resource for the long-term effectiveness of such programmes and the process of sustaining peace.

Young people have a critical role to play in supporting the DR of their peers, whether former prison inmates, combatants, gang members or violent extremists. Positive peer-level interactions are crucial for disengaging youth from various violent underworlds, and can help develop their social capital, support their recovery and identity formation, and encourage accountability and the condemnation of violence (Colleta et al., 1996; Maynard, 1999). With the loss of trust in their parents and state institutions, it is inevitable that disengaging youth may remain skeptical of state-run or even internationally supported programmes. Mentors who are themselves disengaged youth, and youth organizations, are therefore uniquely positioned to play an active and potentially seminal role in DR.

Although youth-based peer-to-peer or mentorship methodologies have not been prioritized or

adequately invested in, there are some instructive illustrations of how these approaches may contribute to the resilience of both those being reintegrated and those facilitating and supporting these processes (see section 2.3). They may serve as a powerful bridge between disengaging youth, their victims and the community. These initiatives are also flexible: they can take place at different phases of the conflict cycle and not necessarily as part of the institutionalized processes organized in the wake of formal peace processes. In the United States, for example, former members of white supremacist groups established the Life After Hate organization, which aims to prevent racially motivated violent extremism and create channels for the disengagement of white supremacists through individual engagements based on demonstrating compassion, empathy and forgiveness. The youth-led Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center works directly with families and communities to prepare a safe and stigma-free environment for the reintegration of former extremists. It focuses on protecting the human rights of former violent offenders, which has been shown to act as an incentive for other young people to disengage (Williams et al., 2016). Fambul Tok in Sierra Leone, although community driven rather than youth led, has orchestrated community reconciliation processes, often involving the reintegration of former child soldiers, through engaging with traditional leaders and participating in local community development programmes.<sup>42</sup>

Youth peacebuilding programmes have also been extensively involved in reintegration and diversion programmes for young offenders and gang members in various country contexts. For example, in Honduras, the organization Jóvenes Hondureños Adelante is adopting a prevention approach by offering alternatives to youth participating in gangs and developing rehabilitation programmes for former gang members. It also advocates against police

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42 [www.fambultok.org/](http://www.fambultok.org/)



violence, corruption, governance deficits and drug trafficking (Central American and Caribbean CFR). In Timor-Leste, where members of martial arts gangs – numbering as many as 90,000 young people – were terrorizing communities, former gang members established an organization called Ba Futuru to teach non-violent conflict resolution skills to current gang members.<sup>43</sup> Developing a highly innovative approach, the organization Esperanza Social Venture Club in Panama City<sup>44</sup> co-opted cohesive gang structures and leadership (rather than seeking to break up gangs and wean individual gang members) by bringing members in as service providers within mainstream urban development programmes. Young people have also developed a rich array of harm and risk reduction programmes. These include the Peace Management Initiative in Jamaica,<sup>45</sup> which uses

a multidisciplinary approach to train young “violence interrupters”, who are deployed across approximately 50 communities, tasked with proactively identifying high-risk communities.

These examples (see also box 8) – in very diverse contexts and using different methods – demonstrate the potentially invaluable contributions of youth as critical agents of the DR process. A priority should be placed on supporting further initiatives in this arena, to create meaningful opportunities for disengaged youth to participate in the design and implementation of DR programmes. Unfortunately, little attention has so far been given to the gendered dimensions of youth-led DR. Drawing on young women in these active roles has great potential to optimize the DR of young women, and possibly to address some of the issues related to gender identity for young demobilizing men.

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43 <http://bafuturu.org>

44 [www.esperanzasvc.org/](http://www.esperanzasvc.org/)

45 [www.facebook.com/Peace-Management-Initiative-Ltd-669708913168929/](https://www.facebook.com/Peace-Management-Initiative-Ltd-669708913168929/)

## BOX 8

### Disengagement and reintegration of former fighters in Somalia

The Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre<sup>46</sup> in Somalia has been supporting disengaging youth with their “Drop the gun, pick up the pen” initiative since the 1990s. This initiative focuses on the socioeconomic rehabilitation and reintegration of disengaged combatants from across the country.

Key to the success of this initiative, and the centre’s disengagement to reintegration (D2R) programmes, has been the inclusion of disengaged combatants in mentoring newly disengaging youth and sensitizing communities to the reintegration of these youth. Reintegrated combatants play an integral role in the implementation of these programmes by connecting returning youth with a positive network in their communities that they can trust and look to for support. Empowering reintegrated youth to take on leadership positions, and facilitate dialogue between disengaging youth and their communities has contributed to the sustainability of these efforts.

Recognizing the importance of a holistic approach, the centre also supports community cohesion and local economic development, assists in the creation of local non-violent conflict mediation and dialogue structures, and provides training to civil servants and local authorities on D2R.

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46 <http://elmanpeace.org/>



© UNV/Momoko Sata & UNDP/Tim Jenkins

“

What motivates me is [to] show them that we can also do very important things for our communities, that we have a voice and are willing to build a better future.

”

male, Colombia

(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees FGD)


## Chapter 4

# From a demographic dividend to a peace dividend

Young people's work on peace and security is the "connective tissue" that bridges the silos of development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, and peace and security. Even when they act locally, young people have critical contributions to make at the national, regional and global levels. To amplify young people's impact, they need to have opportunities to participate directly at national, regional and international levels, as well as in peer-to-peer learning and horizontal exchanges across country contexts. The work of young people on peace and security – across different phases of conflict, types of violence and regions of the world – is vital: if the right investments are made in the positive resilience of youth, and their peacebuilding work is recognized and nurtured, societies may reap a

significant peace dividend. This study argues that this is the critical "missing peace".

Realizing this peace dividend requires a commitment to ensuring that youth initiatives, organizations and individuals can operate in an environment that values and respects them, rather than one that controls or represses them. This can be achieved by providing the political, financial, legal and social means for optimizing and multiplying young people's initiatives so that they may fully reach their potential to contribute to peace and security in their societies. Young women and men in general, and those investing in peace and the prevention of violence specifically, should be seen as indispensable allies in the quest for peace and security.




Building and sustaining peace through the transformative potential of young people demands a seismic shift and bold reorientation from governments and the multilateral system, for which resolution 2250 planted the seed:

- First and foremost, it requires a shift from reactive and remedial security responses, often informed by policy panic, to a comprehensive violence prevention approach with young people at its centre. Systematically addressing the violence of exclusion is the best means to prevent violence, including all forms of extremist violence, thus building and sustaining peace across the full peace and conflict continuum.
- The prevention approach demands that governments and international organizations prioritize support for, and investment in, the positive resilience of the majority of young people, rather than exclusively reacting to the risk represented by just a few.
- Governments and multilateral organizations must commit to partnerships based on trust with diverse civil society partners working on peace and security, and, specifically, organizations led by, and focused on, youth. These partnerships will need to demonstrate sincerity, and go beyond tokenistic and cursory endeavours.
- These changes demand the transformation of deeply entrenched attitudes and practices. It is therefore imperative to build on the foundation offered by resolution 2250 in developing new societal norms and behaviours regarding YPS. A combination of measures can be used, including incentives and benefits for governments and multilateral organizations to build youth-inclusive systems, dialogue and accountability mechanisms that demand compliance and commitment by governments, training and capacity-building on YPS within national and international organizations, and ensuring that resolution 2250 is fully socialized and integrated at the national level.

# Recommendations

**For societies and countries to fully harness and support the innovation of young people's contributions to peace and to begin to work towards the seismic changes set out above, three mutually reinforcing strategies are needed:**

- It is critical to invest in young people's capacities, agency and leadership, and facilitate an enabling environment for youth organizations and initiatives through substantial funding support, network-building and capacity-strengthening. This approach needs to recognize the full diversity of youth and the ways young people organize (including the fact that many youth initiatives are not formally structured or part of a registered organization).
- The systems that reinforce exclusion must be transformed to address the structural barriers limiting meaningful youth inclusion and participation in peace and security.
- Partnerships and collaborative action, where young people are viewed as equal and essential partners for peace, must be prioritized.



# INVEST

## Investing in the capacities, agency and leadership of young people

**To ensure a substantial increase in financial resources to support youth organizations, initiatives and movements focused on peace and security, Member States, donors, international financial institutions, other international organizations and the private sector should:**

- allocate US\$ 1.8 billion, representing an investment of US\$ 1 per young person, by 2025 for the 10th anniversary of resolution 2250 (2015)
- provide flexible funding designed with the specific needs of youth organizations, initiatives and movements in mind. The funding should include opportunities for small-scale projects and initiatives, and innovative, risk-taking programmatic approaches
- create dedicated YPS windows under existing funds, similar to the Youth Promotion Initiative of the Peacebuilding Fund, seeking to expand access for small, grassroots organizations focused on local or national-level peacebuilding
- establish a funding target for all United Nations–managed peacebuilding funds to ensure that a significant percentage is allocated to interventions facilitating youth participation, as well as youth-led and youth-focused civil society organizations. This should include a minimum percentage of funding going directly to local youth-led organizations working with young women and on gender equality issues, as well as directly to organizations led by young women
- ensure that diverse youth organizations, initiatives and movements are financially supported, to maintain a diverse ecosystem of organizations that are able to optimally engage different youth constituencies and promote a variety of approaches to peace
- include a mandatory requirement that any funding support for YPS programming must include partnership with at least one youth-led organization. Youth-led partner organizations must be recognized by, and accountable to, the young people for whom and with whom they work. Working with informal youth groups and movements should not be precluded, as not all young people work in registered organizations
- include young people in decision-making in the allocation of related grants, including within governmental, bilateral, multilateral and private funding agencies
- prioritize, as part of any funding support to youth organizations, the building of organizational capacities to increase their financial sustainability and the impact of their work. Support should include:
  - guidance and tools for project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
  - specific allocations for capacity-building, monitoring and evaluation
  - mentorship opportunities with young professionals and collaboration with more experienced youth-led organizations, where relevant
- invest in the leadership of young women and men working on peace and security, recognizing that young leaders are not only in youth-led organizations but also embedded in communities and other organizations working on peace and security. This could, for example, be done through supporting youth workers, who often play a strategic role in supporting youth leadership and capacity-building
- promote volunteerism through investment at national and subnational levels, with an emphasis on diversity of participation, including gender parity and access for less-privileged youth, and develop skills and leadership of volunteers



- encourage private sector companies to support peace and security initiatives and movements run or led by youth. For example, technology companies can invest in young people's online initiatives and technological innovations for peace.

**To ensure that the capacities of youth organizations are enhanced, the leadership of youth is acknowledged and youth networking is nurtured, Member States, and international and civil society organizations should:**

- support the establishment or strengthening of national, regional and global youth peace networks – online and offline – for young people and their organizations to connect; organize for action; and exchange experiences, knowledge and resources. These youth peace networks should provide opportunities to partner with (inter-)governmental actors, international NGOs and donors; scale up existing youth-led projects to the national, regional and global levels; and support innovation and participate in peace and security policymaking at all levels
- make every effort to ensure that programmes related to YPS are designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated with and by young people themselves
- acknowledge and highlight the positive work of young women and men working on peace and security through the allocation of awards, grants and honours
- prioritize capacity-building within their own organizations, for government employees and development aid professionals, by engaging young leaders and members of youth organizations in training and sensitization sessions on YPS.

### POLITICAL INCLUSION

#### **To ensure the meaningful and inclusive political participation of youth and increased civic trust, Member States, and international and regional organizations should:**

- adopt and support the use of quotas for the direct and gender-equitable participation of young people in all phases of formal peace and political transition processes, from pre-negotiation to implementation, including in national dialogues, constitution-making, transitional justice and other political processes related to peace and security. These processes should include mechanisms for sustained interaction with a wide diversity of young people and organizations, paying particular attention to the inclusion of young women, refugee and displaced youth, and other marginalized youth. This includes ensuring that funding and security measures are in place for the participation of young people
- institutionalize measures to close the gap between the youth population and the representation of youth in local and national governance institutions and processes by adopting youth quotas; establishing youth advisory boards and councils, and youth adviser roles; and facilitating young people's access to elected positions by aligning the age of eligibility to run for office with the voting age
- involve young people, including young women, as key stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of transitional justice processes, including truth-seeking, reparation and reconciliation programmes, institutional reform processes aimed at rebuilding civic trust and preventing repeat violations, criminal justice and accountability for past violations, and memory and memorialization programmes aimed at future generations. Youth-friendly information about the functions, roles, responsibilities, scope and reports of various transitional justice mechanisms should be made available to young people on as broad a basis as possible, with special attention given to those most affected by the conflict, and those harder to reach, or less involved in civic and political processes
- include young people in social auditing, participatory budget design, monitoring mechanisms, accountability and decision-making related to the allocation of public expenditures in local and national contexts, particularly when related to peace and security, as well as development and peacebuilding funds
- expand digital networks to remote communities to support the meaningful and inclusive participation of young people; and design youth-friendly, online participatory political processes that are connected to formal political processes
- where participation mechanisms are in place, improve the visibility and accessibility of these mechanisms for marginalized youth – in particular, by active outreach and engagement strategies and campaigns
- invest in innovative approaches and incentives to address youth who are not already involved in the political or civic space, and for those who may be at risk of engaging with violent groups; the aim should be to prioritize their participation in intercultural and interreligious dialogue to promote diversity, prevent violence and enhance social cohesion.



### **To improve the relationship between security forces and young people – an essential condition to young people’s sense of safety and security – and to allow their participation in public life, Member States, and rule-of-law and security organizations should:**

- preserve the integrity of rule-of-law institutions by protecting young people’s human rights, including safeguarding them from arbitrary arrest and incarceration, ending impunity, ensuring youth-sensitive judicial proceedings and investigations, and ensuring equal access to justice and accountability. When juveniles are detained, they should be separated from adults. Interventions should support the establishment of restorative justice and promote the effective reintegration of juveniles into society
- prioritize young women and men as key interlocutors and stakeholders, including in the design and implementation of security sector, penal and criminal justice reform processes. In particular, the role of youth should be reflected in the design and implementation of democratic policing processes, justice system reform (including juvenile justice), penal reform and military reform. Specific attention should be given to prevention-based approaches to youth at risk, and diversion from incarceration of young non-violent offenders. This may entail:
  - strengthening accountability mechanisms for law enforcement conduct towards youth to regulate the use of force, and limit abuse of power and discriminatory practices
  - creating youth-friendly and gender-sensitive community grievance and reporting mechanisms
  - providing opportunities for law enforcement, and young women and men to engage in constructive dialogue with one another to build trust, whether through formal or informal community dialogue, or grievance mechanisms
  - creating a youth ombudsman to hold police and security forces accountable
  - including the relationship between youth and the police on the agenda of parliamentary committees focused on law enforcement.

### **To maximize the protection of young people from violence and guarantee the realization of their rights, Member States, international organizations and human rights actors should:**

- respect, protect and uphold young people's universal and fundamental rights of freedom of organization, peaceful assembly, association, opinion and expression, and participation in public affairs, to foster an enabling and safe environment for young people working on peace and security, and ensure that they do not face reprisals for their work. The United Nations and human rights actors should give this utmost priority and support Member States in upholding those inalienable rights
- broaden the engagement of human rights institutions and processes with young people by mainstreaming the rights and participation of young people into the work of the human rights treaty bodies, special procedures and other human rights mechanisms. This may include:
  - for United Nations treaty bodies, a greater focus on youth in reporting guidelines and the lists of issues sent to states, as well as specific sections on youth in concluding observations. At least one young person should be a member of each treaty body. A select group of United Nations treaty bodies should consider issuing a joint General Comment on the rights of young people
  - for commissions of enquiry of the Human Rights Council, the inclusion of a youth expert on commissions, and a specific focus on human rights and protection issues affecting young people in the terms of reference, with particular attention to the needs of young victims and witnesses
  - for the Human Rights Council, the establishment of a consultative mechanism for young people, which should meet annually and make recommendations on all issues on the agenda of the council. This mechanism could explore whether existing international norms and standards adequately address the specific rights of youth, or whether there is a normative gap requiring the creation of a new binding legal instrument
  - for the Universal Periodic Review, consideration of issues relating to youth rights, and facilitation of the engagement and direct participation of youth organizations and young human rights defenders. Dedicated funds are needed to support the participation of youth in the review – for example, through a voluntary fund
  - at the national level, specific provisions for the full representation and participation of youth in national human rights instruments, including Human Rights and Youth Commissions, and including specific mechanisms and safe access points for youth input, grievance procedures and testimony
  - protection of young peacebuilders, human rights defenders and youth organizations. This should be given utmost priority to ensure that young people do not face reprisal for engaging with human rights mechanisms
  - prioritization of the mental health and well-being of young people through increased funding and the provision of age- and gender-sensitive, non-discriminatory and comprehensive health services, including psychosocial, and sexual and reproductive health services.

## REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED YOUTH

**To ensure that young refugees, internally displaced youth and young people from host communities are fully engaged as key contributors to humanitarian relief and the resolution of humanitarian crises, Member States; the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance); and international, regional and non-governmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work should:**

- prioritize opportunities for young refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants, and young people from host communities, to share their peace and security challenges through intergenerational dialogue and consultative forums, and to take part in decision-making processes to ensure that their needs are addressed
- identify, fund and partner with youth organizations, initiatives and movements providing humanitarian support, with unique access to local communities
- include in the terms of reference of humanitarian coordinators and humanitarian country teams the meaningful participation of people from diverse backgrounds – including young refugees, internally displaced youth and youth from host communities – in humanitarian assessments, as well as in humanitarian programming design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
- institutionalize a focus on youth as an integral part of the humanitarian cluster system and refugee coordination mechanisms, by requiring that each cluster/sector includes an expert on youth issues
- in refugee situations, ensure that the lead international organization has, at the country level, a youth advisory group made up of refugee youth, including young women and host community youth, to advise on the local peace and security needs
- ensure that refugee hosting states establish mechanisms to listen to, and understand, the specific peace and security challenges that young refugees and asylum seekers face, and how these affect their engagement and positive cohesion with the state and host communities.

## ECONOMIC INCLUSION

**To support young people's meaningful broader economic inclusion and advance the development of conflict-sensitive, inclusive and youth-centred employment programmes, Member States, international financial institutions, other international organizations and civil society organizations should:**

- invest in the creation of safe community spaces for civic dialogue so that young people can collectively identify peacebuilding and development priorities for action within their communities, and participate in decision-making on the allocation of related funds
- prioritize and foster the participation of diverse young people in economic development planning, and the development of fair and inclusive labour policies at all levels, particularly at the local and national levels
- continue to support inclusive labour policies and practices that ensure equal access for all young people to the labour market, and the enjoyment of fundamental principles and rights at work; remove structural barriers for marginalized youth; bolster social protections in both the formal and informal economies; advance gender equality; and adopt a life cycle approach

- engage young people, alongside community members, in an assessment of their economic needs before the design of any employment intervention, as well as in the design itself, and in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of employment programmes
- reach out proactively to the most marginalized young people to ensure that they are the primary target of employment and livelihoods programmes. This is essential to avoid the delivery of these programmes to youth privileged with economic and social capital, thereby exacerbating inequality
- ensure that youth employment programmes address gender-inequitable norms that contribute to the economic and social exclusion of young women, and SGMs. Youth employment programmes must be designed in a gender-sensitive manner and must be careful not to reinforce gender stereotypes. Programmes should promote young women’s participation in non-traditional work and high-income-generating activities
- integrate conflict-sensitive and “do no harm” assessment methodologies into the design and planning of vocational training programmes for young people, based on the participation and needs of youth from diverse backgrounds, including marginalized youth. These programmes should be designed with sustainability at their core, and should provide young people with the tools they need to succeed, including access to financial capital, regular mentoring and business management skills
- develop comprehensive monitoring and evaluation tools for employment programmes that prioritize the collection of age- and sex-disaggregated data, assess their peacebuilding impact, take into consideration economic inequality and broader social and political factors, and examine the relationship between youth participation in employment interventions and other violence prevention efforts.

## DISENGAGEMENT AND REINTEGRATION

### **To ensure that the disengagement of youth from violent groups is effective and that social reintegration is sustainable, Member States, international organizations and civil society organizations should:**

- partner with young people to design and implement DR processes – for example, by establishing official cooperation agreements between youth organizations and security institutions that clearly define roles and responsibilities
- support pathways for young people to identify relevant strategic priorities, policies and programmatic approaches to DR
- invest, through earmarked funding, in the development of the knowledge and capacity of young people who are supporting DR processes within their communities
- ensure that young women can contribute at local, national, regional and global levels in the design, implementation and monitoring of DR interventions
- directly engage young women and men in the revision processes of DDR standards, handbooks and guidance, to ensure that they reflect the positive contributions of youth
- ensure that United Nations missions with a DDR mandate set up a committee of local youth experts, who may provide advice on mediation processes, negotiations and language for agreements, and identify entry points for DDR programmatic engagement.

## EDUCATION

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**To ensure that education is optimized as a tool for peace and that educational institutions are protected from violence, Member States, educational institutions, the private sector, and international and civil society organizations should:**

- make specific investments in education at the early childhood, primary, secondary and tertiary levels that is inclusive and based on positive values, as well as in non-formal and informal educational initiatives. There should be a focus on the development of context-specific critical thinking skills, the values of diversity and non-violence, socioemotional learning and conflict resolution, and digital literacy. The investment should be supported through multi-stakeholder “peace education partnerships”
- develop educational content and curriculums at primary and secondary school levels on civic participation skills, and the basic tenets of human rights and the rule of law
- prioritize the protection of primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions as spaces free from all forms of violence, and the preservation of educational institutions as hubs of community interaction and social cohesion
- ensure that educational institutions and content are equitably accessible to all young people, including young women, forced migrants and other marginalized youth, and male and female youth that are disengaging from violent groups and being reintegrated into their communities. The participation of specialized and professional youth workers should also be actively facilitated
- strengthen the field of professionalized peace studies through interdisciplinary research and teaching curriculums at tertiary educational institutions, as well as through non-formal and informal educational initiatives, both online and offline.

## GENDER IDENTITIES

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**To ensure that the unique experiences of young women and SGMs in peace and security are addressed, and to support gender-equitable identities among young people, Member States, and international and civil society organizations should:**

- systematically apply a gender and age lens to all conflict assessments and peacebuilding programming
- recognize and address harmful patriarchal attitudes that affect the rights, integrity and agency of young women and SGMs, and always seek to create inclusive terms of engagement
- invest in youth peacebuilding work focused on promoting positive, non-violent and gender-equitable masculine identities that challenge restrictive social norms, including by working with traditional and religious leaders.

## YOUTH, PEACE AND SECURITY COALITIONS

### To support the implementation of resolution 2250, Member States, the United Nations system and non-governmental stakeholders should:

- prioritize the creation of YPS coalitions to ensure a collective impact on YPS at local, national, regional and global levels. Such coalitions should be multisectoral and cross-cutting partnerships between young people; youth organizations; and multilateral, government and civil society actors, including the private sector, religious communities, private foundations and educational institutions
- consult and actively include young people in defining concrete objectives, and global and country-specific indicators to monitor progress and measure the impact of the implementation of resolution 2250.

## RESEARCH AND DATA

### To support further research and data collection on YPS, Member States, and international and civil society organizations should:

- support qualitative and quantitative research and data collection on YPS (including, where feasible, youth perception data) at the national, regional and global levels by allocating sufficient technical, financial and human resources. The information should be integrated into existing statistical efforts, stored in a central online repository and made publicly available to facilitate knowledge-sharing and good practice. This work should be undertaken through the participation of local youth researchers and young peacebuilders who are conducting grassroots peacebuilding initiatives
- systematically disaggregate relevant data and national statistics by age, sex, socioeconomic background and location
- prioritize knowledge-sharing and exchange of information with youth organizations, community leaders and members of civil society to assist young people's work on peace and security, enhance collaboration and eliminate overlap.

## IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 2250

### To support the implementation of resolution 2250 at the national level, governments should:

- appoint a YPS focal point to lead and promote efforts at the national or regional level to implement commitments on YPS. The YPS focal point should be responsible for coordinating the national YPS coalition, and should be in regular contact with other Member States' focal points to exchange good practices and harmonize international efforts. YPS focal points should regularly consult with diverse young people and youth organizations
- establish safe spaces for, and maintain regular and ongoing consultations with, diverse young people to identify their peace and security needs and priorities

- review the impact of their peace and security policies and practices on young people. This may include participatory national diagnostic assessments of the situation of diverse young people, followed by comprehensive audits of existing laws, regulations and policies from a youth perspective to inform targeted reforms
- ensure synergies with national plans on the implementation of the SDGs and of Security Council resolution 1325, and define regular reporting and accountability mechanisms to monitor progress on implementation
- integrate SDG targets related to peace, justice and inclusivity (“SDG16+”) into national development strategies, and work with young people from diverse backgrounds to identify and support appropriate implementation opportunities and accountability mechanisms at local and national levels.

### **Regional bodies and mechanisms should:**

- support the development of policy frameworks that address YPS issues, led by regional organizations, networks and alliances of young peacebuilders working in partnership with other stakeholders to facilitate knowledge-sharing and information flow between countries
- conduct a baseline assessment on their current support to youth-focused peacebuilding work, identifying any gaps and the potential to support youth participation in peacebuilding.

### **At the global level, the United Nations system must create new mechanisms for dialogue and accountability so that the voices of young men and women are heard, and their priorities are included in international responses to conflict and violence. This should be done by:**

- putting in place a tripartite monitoring structure to provide a common platform for Member States, the United Nations and young people to report on the implementation of resolution 2250. In writing their reports, Member States need to consult diverse young people and include them in the drafting process. Member States and the United Nations should also provide financial support to youth-led and youth-focused organizations to develop “shadow reports”
- creating an informal expert group on YPS composed of a diverse group of young people, selected transparently with youth organizations, to track a clearly defined set of issues and mainstream resolution 2250 in the work of the Security Council
- making it a priority of hearing directly from young people living in countries on the Security Council’s agenda, through standard briefings or Arria Formula meetings
- including specific references to resolution 2250 in the mandates and reports of peacekeeping and political missions
- appointing an elected Security Council member to co-lead, alongside a permanent Security Council member, the monitoring of progress on the implementation of resolution 2250 to guarantee that key youth issues are raised in closed consultations with Council members
- requesting the Secretary-General to report annually to the Security Council on United Nations–wide efforts to implement resolution 2250, within the framework of an annual open debate during which young peacebuilders will brief the Security Council.

## The United Nations system should reform its internal mechanisms to broaden the participation of young people, by taking the following measures:

- developing a toolkit and checklists for the use of United Nations peace operations to enable youth-sensitive interventions, and the sensitization and training of United Nations staff, partners and beneficiaries
- institutionalizing the inclusion of youth into context and conflict analyses carried out by the new United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
- continuing to train young people in mediation and preventive diplomacy, and establishing a junior mediator programme
- making youth advisory boards and youth advisers a standard practice for each United Nations country presence and humanitarian country teams, working in direct collaboration with United Nations leadership in both mission and non-mission settings, as well as for humanitarian country teams
- placing a youth adviser in the lead offices of the United Nations in all countries, in the executive offices of the Secretary-General and in all United Nations entities to ensure that youth are a core focus of all the work undertaken by the United Nations for peace and security
- ensuring that dedicated capacities and expertise are in place to engage young people and youth organizations in sustaining peace at the national, regional and global levels. This may include
  - leading a systematic review of the work of child and women protection advisers to assess any existing work being undertaken with young people
  - expanding existing profiles and rosters, and prioritizing capacity-building to ensure that the United Nations is equipped at country, regional and global levels to partner with youth on sustaining peace
  - developing dedicated training curriculums and tools for United Nations staff, including civilian and military personnel in peacekeeping operations, staff in special political missions, and United Nations country teams, including Resident Coordinators and Country Representatives
  - including in the terms of reference of the Peace and Development Advisers (PDAs) an emphasis on ensuring that the conflict prevention initiatives undertaken by the PDAs include consultation with young people, and respond to their concerns and priorities
- earmarking budget to support a diversity of young people working on peace and security to participate in local, regional and global events related to resolution 2250
- developing a system-wide road map on YPS to facilitate joint action, coordination and coherence in resourcing across all entities working in this area.





## In conclusion

These recommendations are the starting point and stepping stones necessary to achieve the larger-scale transformation and seismic shifts set out at the beginning of this chapter. They offer a framework for action within which young people, governments, multilateral organizations, civil society and other actors can work together to support young people's innovation and resilience, and build sustainable peace.

This study is a testimony to the voices of the thousands of young people who have taken the time to speak to us and who have trusted us to listen. We hope that we have fulfilled our promise to them that they can see themselves and hear their voices in what is presented to the Security Council and to Member States. To those young people, and all the partners who helped facilitate our access to them, we owe an enormous debt of gratitude.



# Annex 1: Commissioned and submitted research for the Progress Study<sup>47</sup>

## ADVISORY GROUP OF EXPERTS

Meeting Report #1: New York, United States; 18–21 October 2016.

Meeting Report #2: Brussels, Belgium; 24–26 March 2017.

Meeting Report #3: New York, United States; 12–14 December 2017.

## MAPPING

United Network of Young Peacebuilders and Search for Common Ground (2017). *Mapping a Sector: Bridging the Evidence Gap on Youth-Driven Peacebuilding*. The Hague.

## CONSULTATIONS

### Regional

Arab States: Amman, Jordan; 4–6 December 2016.

Arab States (subregional: Northern Africa): Hammamet, Tunisia; 31 March – 2 April 2017.

Asia and the Pacific: Bangkok, Thailand; 16–19 May 2017.

East and Southern Africa: Johannesburg, South Africa; 1–3 August 2017.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Istanbul, Turkey; 23–25 May 2017.

Europe: Brussels, Belgium; 25–27 September 2017.

Latin America and Caribbean: Panama City, Panama; 29–31 May 2017.

West and Central Africa: Cotonou, Benin; 11–13 September 2017.

Final Validation Consultation: New York, United States; 18–19 November 2017.

### National

Canada: Vancouver, Canada; 14–15 December 2017.

Colombia: Bogotá, Colombia; 25–26 February 2017.

Kosovo:\* Pristina, Kosovo;\* 28–29 June 2017.

Libya: Multiple provinces; multiple dates, 2017.

Myanmar: Yangon, Myanmar; 23–24 March 2017.

Sri Lanka: Multiple provinces; April–July 2017.

### E-consultations

E-Consultation #1: “The role of young people in preventing violent extremism”; 7–27 April 2017.

E-Consultation #2: “Young people’s involvement in peace processes”; 28 April – 18 May 2017.

E-Consultation #3: “Young people’s participation in peacebuilding throughout the electoral cycle”; 19 May – 8 June 2017.

E-Consultation #4: “The role of education in peacebuilding”; 9–29 June 2017.

E-Consultation #5: “Gendered dynamics of youth peacebuilding”; 30 June – 20 July 2017.

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Colombia (2017a): AC4. Fisher-Yoshida, B. and J.C. Lopez. *Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security: Medellín Case Study*.

Colombia (2017b): Butti, E. *Involving Non-organised “Outcast” Youths in Peacebuilding: Existing Challenges and Lessons Learned in the Colombian Case*.

Colombia (2017c): Organization of American States. *The Consequences of Social Exclusion and Inequality: Youth, Peace and Security in the Americas. Training School of Empirical Arts – Resolve to Build Peace*.

Colombia (2017d): United Nations Development Programme. *Case Study: Schools of Youth Leadership for Social Transformation in the Department (Region) of Nariño, Colombia*.

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Democratic Republic of Congo (2017): Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Engagement with Youth: MONUSCO Case Study*.

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Jamaica (2017a): Commonwealth Secretariat. *Youth Perspectives on Social Participation: The Missing Link in the Development of an Anti-Gang Strategy in Jamaica?*

Jamaica (2017b): Ward, E., K. McGaw and C. Marsh. *Youth, Peace and Security Case Study, Jamaica*.

Japan (2017): Soka Gakkai International. *Disaster Recovery and Youth, Peace and Security: Examining the Project, “The SOKA Global Action”*.

Kenya (2017): Ismail, O. *Youth, Peace and Security in Kenya*.

Kosovo\* (forthcoming): United Nations Development Programme. *Frontlines: Young People at the Heart of Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism – Kosovo\* Case Study*.

Libya (2017): United Nations Population Fund. *The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges*.

Myanmar (2017): Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. *Youth and Peacebuilding in Myanmar*.

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

<sup>47</sup> Most of the research is available on [www.youth4peace.info/ProgressStudy](http://www.youth4peace.info/ProgressStudy).

Nepal (2017): Search for Common Ground. "Aaba Hamro Paalo" (It's Our Time Now): Youth Experiences of Conflict, Violence and Peacebuilding in Nepal.

Northern Triangle (2017): Interpeace. *Youth, Peace and Security in the Northern Triangle of Central America*.

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Philippines (2017): Alar, M.F.A. *Young People and Their Role in the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Negotiations*.

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Tunisia (2017): Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Bourhrous, A. and S. Smith. *Strengthening Youth Engagement in Post-Jasmine Revolution Tunisia*.

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Yemen (forthcoming): United Nations Development Programme. *Frontlines: Young People at the Heart of Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism – Yemen Case Study*.

### Summary reports of multi-country-focused research

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (2017): Smiths. *Leaders of Today: Engagement of Youth in Sustaining Peace* (summary report: Myanmar, Liberia and Tunisia).

United Nations Development Programme (2018): *Frontlines: Young People at the Heart of Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism* (summary report: Kosovo,\* Pakistan and Yemen).

### FOCUS-GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGD)

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Burundi (2017): unpublished.

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India (2017): unpublished.

Iraq (2017): Kelly, M. and others. In *Progress Study on UN Resolution 2250: Youth, Peace, and Security: Focus Groups with Hard to Reach Youth in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*.

Kyrgyzstan (2017): PeaceNexus. In *Youth, Peace and Security in Kyrgyzstan*.

Niger (2017): Search for Common Ground. In *Youth Consultations on Peace and Security: Findings from Focus Group Discussions and Individual Interviews Including Hard to Reach Youth in Niger*.

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### FGD summary reports

Conciliation Resources (2018): *Youth Aspirations for Peace and Security* (summary report on FGDs in Afghanistan, Georgia, India and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, and South Sudan).

Search for Common Ground (2017): *Youth, Peace and Security: Insights from Engaged and Disengaged Young Women and Men in Nepal, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia*.

### KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KII)

Anonymous #1 (South Sudanese youth leader): interview by Ali Altiok; 26 March 2018.

Anonymous #2 (Yemeni youth leader, independent youth participant at the National Dialogue Conference): interview by Ali Altiok; 28 March 2018.

Anonymous #3 (youth participant): interview by Graeme Simpson; 6 December 2018.

Badwi, Ehab (President of Syrian Youth Assembly): interview by Ali Altiok; 29 January 2018.

Barry, Dylan (South African student): interview by Graeme Simpson; 2018.

Vuni, Foni J. (UNHCR Global Youth Advisory Council member): interview by Ali Altiok; 26 March 2018.

Wani, Michael (Executive Director of Okay Africa Foundation): interview by Ali Altiok; 23 March 2018.

## THEMATIC PAPERS (TP)

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## Annex 2: Overview of youth consulted

### Total youth consulted

(Note: These figures are minimum estimates.)

Total youth consulted	4,230
Total females	2,070
Total males	2,159
Non-identified	1
Total countries included	153

## Focus-group discussions

Country/territory	FGDs	Age	Number of participants	Female	Male
Afghanistan	9	Not specified	180	90**	90**
Burundi	18	15–34	170	81	89
Cameroon	1	19–35	20	10**	10**
Chad	1	19–35	20	10**	10**
Colombia	3	19–30	9	3	6
Côte d'Ivoire	3	17–35	33	10	23
El Salvador	6	18–29	92	46**	46**
Fiji	2	Not specified	18	9**	9**
Georgia (Abkhazia)	9	17–33	99	45	54
Guatemala	8	18–29	97	48**	49**
Honduras	9	18–29	131	65**	66**
India- and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir	10	18–30	111	59	52
Iraq	3	15–29	74	37	37
Italy	1	Not specified	9	4**	5**
Jamaica	12	18–29	99	42	57
Japan	2	Not specified	10	5**	5**
Kenya	1	Not specified	10	5	5
Kosovo*	5	16–29	39	25	14
Kyrgyzstan	6	Not specified	54	31	23
Libya	45	Not specified	329	138	191
Nepal	14	15–34	175	57	118
Niger	19	18–35	155	76	79
Nigeria	10	15–34	111	53	58
Palestine	3	15–33	63	31	32
Philippines	1	Not specified	118	59**	59**
South Africa	5	19–42	118	61	57
South Sudan	10	17–35	106	34	72
Sri Lanka	4	18–28	88	44**	44**
Sweden	2	18–32	19	9**	10**
Tunisia	14	15–35	163	75	88
Uganda	7	18–30	62	31	31
United Kingdom (Horn of Africa)	2	15–35	30	15	15
United States	7	18–29	65	32**	33**
Yemen	11	18–30	124	61	63
Refugee settings***	18	14–29	122 (estimated)	61 (estimated)	61 (estimated)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>	<b>3,123</b> (estimated)	<b>1,462</b> (estimated)**	<b>1,661</b> (estimated)**

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

\*\* Estimated numbers assume there was gender parity in those groups where the gender balance of participants was not specified.

\*\*\* See next table.

## Refugee settings (UNHCR)

Country	Number of FGDs	Age	Number of participants	Female	Male
Algeria	1	Not specified	12	6	6
Chad	1	21–33	13	4	9
Colombia	1	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	
Eritrea	2	Not specified	14	6	8
Ethiopia	3	18–24	21	13	8
Kenya	2	17–22	24	13	11
Lebanon	1	14–29	16	8	8
Rwanda	3	12–25	Not specified	Not specified	
Thailand	1	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	
Turkey	2	17–26	22	11*	11*
Venezuela	1	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>	<b>122</b> (minimum)	<b>61</b> (minimum)*	<b>61</b> (minimum)*

\* Estimated numbers assume there was gender parity in those groups where the gender balance of participants was not specified.

## National consultations

Country/territory	Age	Number of participants	Female	Male
Canada	Not specified	130	65**	65**
Colombia	18–31	30	14	16
Kosovo*	15–29	140	84	56
Libya	<35	329	191	138
Myanmar	18–29	25	11	14
Sri Lanka	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified	Not specified
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>365**</b>	<b>289**</b>

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

\*\* Estimated numbers assume there was gender parity in those groups where the gender balance of participants was not specified.

## Regional consultations

Region	Countries	Age	Number of participants	Female	Male	Prefers not to answer
<b>Arab States</b> (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria/Syrians in Host Countries, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen)	18	17–32	59	35	24	0
<b>Asia and the Pacific</b> (Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Pacific Islands, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam)	20	15–34	39	20	19	0
<b>East and Southern Africa</b> (Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe)	16	21–34	18	10	8	0
<b>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</b> (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,* Kyrgyzstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)	19	19–35	39	20	19	0
<b>Europe</b> (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo,* Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)	26 (+6**)	15–30	44	22	21	1
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b> (Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela)	30	18–31	61	37	24	0
<b>North Africa</b> (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia)	(5**)	20–31	32	16	16	0
<b>West and Central Africa</b> (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome Principe, Senegal, Togo)	19	21–31	39	20	19	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>1</b>

\* References to Kosovo should be understood in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

\*\* Indicates countries included in two regional consultations.

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